on the soul-第5章
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ence of this view will therefore be that distributed throughout the whole body there will be many souls； since every one of the bodily parts is a different mixture of the elements； and the ratio of mixture is in each case a harmony； i。e。 a soul。 From Empedocles at any rate we might demand an answer to the following question for he says that each of the parts of the body is what it is in virtue of a ratio between the elements： is the soul identical with this ratio； or is it not rather something over and above this which is formed in the parts？ Is love the cause of any and every mixture； or only of those that are in the right ratio？ Is love this ratio itself； or is love something over and above this？ Such are the problems raised by this account。 But； on the other hand； if the soul is different from the mixture； why does it disappear at one and the same moment with that relation between the elements which constitutes flesh or the other parts of the animal body？ Further； if the soul is not identical with the ratio of mixture； and it is consequently not the case that each of the parts has a soul； what is that which perishes when the soul quits the body？ That the soul cannot either be a harmony； or be moved in a circle； is clear from what we have said。 Yet that it can be moved incidentally is； as we said above； possible； and even that in a sense it can move itself； i。e。 in the sense that the vehicle in which it is can be moved； and moved by it； in no other sense can the soul be moved in space。 More legitimate doubts might remain as to its movement in view of the following facts。 We speak of the soul as being pained or pleased； being bold or fearful； being angry； perceiving； thinking。 All these are regarded as modes of movement； and hence it might be inferred that the soul is moved。 This； however； does not necessarily follow。 We may admit to the full that being pained or pleased； or thinking； are movements （each of them a 'being moved'）； and that the movement is originated by the soul。 For example we may regard anger or fear as such and such movements of the heart； and thinking as such and such another movement of that organ； or of some other； these modifications may arise either from changes of place in certain parts or from qualitative alterations （the special nature of the parts and the special modes of their changes being for our present purpose irrelevant）。 Yet to say that it is the soul which is angry is as inexact as it would be to say that it is the soul that weaves webs or builds houses。 It is doubtless better to avoid saying that the soul pities or learns or thinks and rather to say that it is the man who does this with his soul。 What we mean is not that the movement is in the soul； but that sometimes it terminates in the soul and sometimes starts from it； sensation e。g。 coming from without inwards； and reminiscence starting from the soul and terminating with the movements； actual or residual； in the sense organs。 The case of mind is different； it seems to be an independent substance implanted within the soul and to be incapable of being destroyed。 If it could be destroyed at all； it would be under the blunting influence of old age。 What really happens in respect of mind in old age is； however； exactly parallel to what happens in the case of the sense organs； if the old man could recover the proper kind of eye； he would see just as well as the young man。 The incapacity of old age is due to an affection not of the soul but of its vehicle； as occurs in drunkenness or disease。 Thus it is that in old age the activity of mind or intellectual apprehension declines only through the decay of some other inward part； mind itself is impassible。 Thinking； loving； and hating are affections not of mind； but of that which has mind； so far as it has it。 That is why； when this vehicle decays； memory and love cease； they were activities not of mind； but of the composite which has perished； mind is； no doubt； something more divine and impassible。 That the soul cannot be moved is therefore clear from what we have said； and if it cannot be moved at all； manifestly it cannot be moved by itself。 Of all the opinions we have enumerated； by far the most unreasonable is that which declares the soul to be a self…moving number； it involves in the first place all the impossibilities which follow from regarding the soul as moved； and in the second special absurdities which follow from calling it a number。 How we to imagine a unit being moved？ By what agency？ What sort of movement can be attributed to what is without parts or internal differences？ If the unit is both originative of movement and itself capable of being moved； it must contain difference。 Further； since they say a moving line generates a surface and a moving point a line； the movements of the psychic units must be lines （for a point is a unit having position； and the number of the soul is； of course； somewhere and has position）。 Again； if from a number a number or a unit is subtracted； the remainder is another number； but plants and many animals when divided continue to live； and each segment is thought to retain the same kind of soul。 It must be all the same whether we speak of units or corpuscles； for if the spherical atoms of Democritus became points； nothing being retained but their being a quantum； there must remain in each a moving and a moved part； just as there is in what is continuous； what happens has nothing to do with the size of the atoms； it depends solely upon their being a quantum。 That is why there must be something to originate movement in the units。 If in the animal what originates movement is the soul； so also must it be in the case of the number； so that not the mover and the moved together； but the mover only； will be the soul。 But how is it possible for one of the units to fulfil this function of originating movement？ There must be some difference between such a unit and all the other units； and what difference can there be between one placed unit and another except a difference of position？ If then； on the other hand； these psychic units within the body are different from the points of the body； there will be two sets of units both occupying the same place； for each unit will occupy a point。 And yet； if there can be two； why cannot there be an infinite number？ For if things can occupy an indivisible lace； they must themselves be indivisible。 If； on the other hand； the points of the body are identical with the units whose number is the soul； or if the number of the points in the body is the soul； why have not all bodies souls？ For all bodies contain points or an infinity of points。 Further； how is it possible for these points to be isolated or separated from their bodies； seeing that lines cannot be resolved into points？
5
The result is； as we have said； that this view； while on the one side identical with that of those who maintain that soul is a subtle kind of body； is on the other entangled in the absurdity peculiar to Democritus' way of describing the manner in which movement is originated by soul。 For if the soul is present throughout the whole percipient body； there must； if the soul be a kind of body； be two bodies in the same place； and for those who call it a number； there must be many points at one point； or every body must have a soul； unless the soul be a different sort of number…other； that is； than the sum of the points existing in a body。 Another consequence that follows is that the animal must be moved by its number precisely in the way that Democritus explained its being moved by his spherical psychic atoms。 What difference does it make whether we speak of small spheres or of large units； or； quite simply； of units in movement？ One way or another； the movements of the animal must be due to their movements。 Hence those who combine movement and number in the same subject lay themselves open to these and many other similar absurdities。 It is impossible not only that these characters should give the definition of soul…it is impossible that they should even be attributes of it。 The point is clear if the attempt be made to start from this as the account of soul and explain from it the affections and actions
