on the soul-第2章
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the other two？ Must we not say that there is no type of thinker who concerns himself with those qualities or attributes of the material which are in fact inseparable from the material； and without attempting even in thought to separate them？ The physicist is he who concerns himself with all the properties active and passive of bodies or materials thus or thus defined； attributes not considered as being of this character he leaves to others； in certain cases it may be to a specialist； e。g。 a carpenter or a physician； in others （a） where they are inseparable in fact； but are separable from any particular kind of body by an effort of abstraction； to the mathematician； （b） where they are separate both in fact and in thought from body altogether； to the First Philosopher or metaphysician。 But we must return from this digression； and repeat that the affections of soul are inseparable from the material substratum of animal life； to which we have seen that such affections； e。g。 passion and fear； attach； and have not the same mode of being as a line or a plane。
2
For our study of soul it is necessary； while formulating the problems of which in our further advance we are to find the solutions； to call into council the views of those of our predecessors who have declared any opinion on this subject； in order that we may profit by whatever is sound in their suggestions and avoid their errors。 The starting…point of our inquiry is an exposition of those characteristics which have chiefly been held to belong to soul in its very nature。 Two characteristic marks have above all others been recognized as distinguishing that which has soul in it from that which has not…movement and sensation。 It may be said that these two are what our predecessors have fixed upon as characteristic of soul。 Some say that what originates movement is both pre…eminently and primarily soul； believing that what is not itself moved cannot originate movement in another； they arrived at the view that soul belongs to the class of things in movement。 This is what led Democritus to say that soul is a sort of fire or hot substance； his 'forms' or atoms are infinite in number； those which are spherical he calls fire and soul； and compares them to the motes in the air which we see in shafts of light coming through windows； the mixture of seeds of all sorts he calls the elements of the whole of Nature （Leucippus gives a similar account）； the spherical atoms are identified with soul because atoms of that shape are most adapted to permeate everywhere； and to set all the others moving by being themselves in movement。 This implies the view that soul is identical with what produces movement in animals。 That is why； further； they regard respiration as the characteristic mark of life； as the environment compresses the bodies of animals； and tends to extrude those atoms which impart movement to them； because they themselves are never at rest； there must be a reinforcement of these by similar atoms coming in from without in the act of respiration； for they prevent the extrusion of those which are already within by counteracting the compressing and consolidating force of the environment； and animals continue to live only so long as they are able to maintain this resistance。 The doctrine of the Pythagoreans seems to rest upon the same ideas； some of them declared the motes in air； others what moved them； to be soul。 These motes were referred to because they are seen always in movement； even in a complete calm。 The same tendency is shown by those who define soul as that which moves itself； all seem to hold the view that movement is what is closest to the nature of soul； and that while all else is moved by soul； it alone moves itself。 This belief arises from their never seeing anything originating movement which is not first itself moved。 Similarly also Anaxagoras （and whoever agrees with him in saying that mind set the whole in movement） declares the moving cause of things to be soul。 His position must； however； be distinguished from that of Democritus。 Democritus roundly identifies soul and mind； for he identifies what appears with what is true…that is why he commends Homer for the phrase 'Hector lay with thought distraught'； he does not employ mind as a special faculty dealing with truth； but identifies soul and mind。 What Anaxagoras says about them is more obscure； in many places he tells us that the cause of beauty and order is mind； elsewhere that it is soul； it is found； he says； in all animals； great and small； high and low； but mind （in the sense of intelligence） appears not to belong alike to all animals； and indeed not even to all human beings。 All those； then； who had special regard to the fact that what has soul in it is moved； adopted the view that soul is to be identified with what is eminently originative of movement。 All； on the other hand； who looked to the fact that what has soul in it knows or perceives what is； identify soul with the principle or principles of Nature； according as they admit several such principles or one only。 Thus Empedocles declares that it is formed out of all his elements； each of them also being soul； his words are：
For 'tis by Earth we see Earth； by Water Water； By Ether Ether divine； by Fire destructive Fire； By Love Love； and Hate by cruel Hate。
In the same way Plato in the Timaeus fashions soul out of his elements； for like； he holds； is known by like； and things are formed out of the principles or elements； so that soul must be so too。 Similarly also in his lectures 'On Philosophy' it was set forth that the Animal…itself is compounded of the Idea itself of the One together with the primary length； breadth； and depth； everything else； the objects of its perception； being similarly constituted。 Again he puts his view in yet other terms： Mind is the monad； science or knowledge the dyad （because it goes undeviatingly from one point to another）； opinion the number of the plane； sensation the number of the solid； the numbers are by him expressly identified with the Forms themselves or principles； and are formed out of the elements； now things are apprehended either by mind or science or opinion or sensation； and these same numbers are the Forms of things。 Some thinkers； accepting both premisses； viz。 that the soul is both originative of movement and cognitive； have compounded it of both and declared the soul to be a self…moving number。 As to the nature and number of the first principles opinions differ。 The difference is greatest between those who regard them as corporeal and those who regard them as incorporeal； and from both dissent those who make a blend and draw their principles from both sources。 The number of principles is also in dispute； some admit one only； others assert several。 There is a consequent diversity in their several accounts of soul； they assume； naturally enough； that what is in its own nature originative of movement must be among what is primordial。 That has led some to regard it as fire； for fire is the subtlest of the elements and nearest to incorporeality； further； in the most primary sense； fire both is moved and originates movement in all the others。 Democritus has expressed himself more ingeniously than the rest on the grounds for ascribing each of these two characters to soul； soul and mind are； he says； one and the same thing； and this thing must be one of the primary and indivisible bodies； and its power of originating movement must be due to its fineness of grain and the shape of its atoms； he says that of all the shapes the spherical is the most mobile； and that this is the shape of the particles of fire and mind。 Anaxagoras； as we said above； seems to distinguish between soul and mind； but in practice he treats them as a single substance； except that it is mind that he specially posits as the principle of all things； at any rate what he says is that mind alone of all that is simple； unmixed； and pure。 He assigns both characteristics； knowing and origination of movement； to the same principle； when he says that it was mind that set the whole in movement。 Thales； too； to judge from what is recorded about him； seems to have held soul to be a motive f
