on the soul-第17章
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the sensitive subject are both realized in the latter。 But while in some cases each aspect of the total actuality has a distinct name； e。g。 sounding and hearkening； in some one or other is nameless； e。g。 the actuality of sight is called seeing； but the actuality of colour has no name： the actuality of the faculty of taste is called tasting； but the actuality of flavour has no name。 Since the actualities of the sensible object and of the sensitive faculty are one actuality in spite of the difference between their modes of being； actual hearing and actual sounding appear and disappear from existence at one and the same moment； and so actual savour and actual tasting； &c。； while as potentialities one of them may exist without the other。 The earlier students of nature were mistaken in their view that without sight there was no white or black； without taste no savour。 This statement of theirs is partly true； partly false： 'sense' and 'the sensible object' are ambiguous terms； i。e。 may denote either potentialities or actualities： the statement is true of the latter； false of the former。 This ambiguity they wholly failed to notice。 If voice always implies a concord； and if the voice and the hearing of it are in one sense one and the same； and if concord always implies a ratio； hearing as well as what is heard must be a ratio。 That is why the excess of either the sharp or the flat destroys the hearing。 （So also in the case of savours excess destroys the sense of taste； and in the case of colours excessive brightness or darkness destroys the sight； and in the case of smell excess of strength whether in the direction of sweetness or bitterness is destructive。） This shows that the sense is a ratio。 That is also why the objects of sense are （1） pleasant when the sensible extremes such as acid or sweet or salt being pure and unmixed are brought into the proper ratio； then they are pleasant： and in general what is blended is more pleasant than the sharp or the flat alone； or； to touch； that which is capable of being either warmed or chilled： the sense and the ratio are identical： while （2） in excess the sensible extremes are painful or destructive。 Each sense then is relative to its particular group of sensible qualities： it is found in a sense…organ as such and discriminates the differences which exist within that group； e。g。 sight discriminates white and black； taste sweet and bitter； and so in all cases。 Since we also discriminate white from sweet； and indeed each sensible quality from every other； with what do we perceive that they are different？ It must be by sense； for what is before us is sensible objects。 （Hence it is also obvious that the flesh cannot be the ultimate sense…organ： if it were； the discriminating power could not do its work without immediate contact with the object。） Therefore （1） discrimination between white and sweet cannot be effected by two agencies which remain separate； both the qualities discriminated must be present to something that is one and single。 On any other supposition even if I perceived sweet and you perceived white； the difference between them would be apparent。 What says that two things are different must be one； for sweet is different from white。 Therefore what asserts this difference must be self…identical； and as what asserts； so also what thinks or perceives。 That it is not possible by means of two agencies which remain separate to discriminate two objects which are separate； is therefore obvious； and that （it is not possible to do this in separate movements of time may be seen' if we look at it as follows。 For as what asserts the difference between the good and the bad is one and the same； so also the time at which it asserts the one to be different and the other to be different is not accidental to the assertion （as it is for instance when I now assert a difference but do not assert that there is now a difference）； it asserts thus…both now and that the objects are different now； the objects therefore must be present at one and the same moment。 Both the discriminating power and the time of its exercise must be one and undivided。 But； it may be objected； it is impossible that what is self…identical should be moved at me and the same time with contrary movements in so far as it is undivided； and in an undivided moment of time。 For if what is sweet be the quality perceived； it moves the sense or thought in this determinate way； while what is bitter moves it in a contrary way； and what is white in a different way。 Is it the case then that what discriminates； though both numerically one and indivisible； is at the same time divided in its being？ In one sense； it is what is divided that perceives two separate objects at once； but in another sense it does so qua undivided； for it is divisible in its being but spatially and numerically undivided。 is not this impossible？ For while it is true that what is self…identical and undivided may be both contraries at once potentially； it cannot be self…identical in its being…it must lose its unity by being put into activity。 It is not possible to be at once white and black； and therefore it must also be impossible for a thing to be affected at one and the same moment by the forms of both； assuming it to be the case that sensation and thinking are properly so described。 The answer is that just as what is called a 'point' is； as being at once one and two； properly said to be divisible； so here； that which discriminates is qua undivided one； and active in a single moment of time； while so far forth as it is divisible it twice over uses the same dot at one and the same time。 So far forth then as it takes the limit as two' it discriminates two separate objects with what in a sense is divided： while so far as it takes it as one； it does so with what is one and occupies in its activity a single moment of time。 About the principle in virtue of which we say that animals are percipient； let this discussion suffice。
3
There are two distinctive peculiarities by reference to which we characterize the soul （1） local movement and （2） thinking； discriminating； and perceiving。 Thinking both speculative and practical is regarded as akin to a form of perceiving； for in the one as well as the other the soul discriminates and is cognizant of something which is。 Indeed the ancients go so far as to identify thinking and perceiving； e。g。 Empedocles says 'For 'tis in respect of what is present that man's wit is increased'； and again 'Whence it befalls them from time to time to think diverse thoughts'； and Homer's phrase 'For suchlike is man's mind' means the same。 They all look upon thinking as a bodily process like perceiving； and hold that like is known as well as perceived by like； as I explained at the beginning of our discussion。 Yet they ought at the same time to have accounted for error also； for it is more intimately connected with animal existence and the soul continues longer in the state of error than in that of truth。 They cannot escape the dilemma： either （1） whatever seems is true （and there are some who accept this） or （2） error is contact with the unlike； for that is the opposite of the knowing of like by like。 But it is a received principle that error as well as knowledge in respect to contraries is one and the same。 That perceiving and practical thinking are not identical is therefore obvious； for the former is universal in the animal world； the latter is found in only a small division of it。 Further； speculative thinking is also distinct from perceiving…I mean that in which we find rightness and wrongness…rightness in prudence； knowledge； true opinion； wrongness in their opposites； for perception of the special objects of sense is always free from error； and is found in all animals； while it is possible to think falsely as well as truly； and thought is found only where there is discourse of reason as well as sensibility。 For imagination is different from either perceiving or discursive thinking； though it is not found without sensation； or judgement without it。 That this activity is not the same kind of thinking as judgement is obvious。 For imagining lies within our own power whenever we wish （e。g。 we can call up a pi
