on the soul-第15章
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o the organism。 That they are manifold is clear when we consider touching with the tongue； we apprehend at the tongue all tangible qualities as well as flavour。 Suppose all the rest of our flesh was； like the tongue； sensitive to flavour； we should have identified the sense of taste and the sense of touch； what saves us from this identification is the fact that touch and taste are not always found together in the same part of the body。 The following problem might be raised。 Let us assume that every body has depth； i。e。 has three dimensions； and that if two bodies have a third body between them they cannot be in contact with one another； let us remember that what is liquid is a body and must be or contain water； and that if two bodies touch one another under water； their touching surfaces cannot be dry； but must have water between； viz。 the water which wets their bounding surfaces； from all this it follows that in water two bodies cannot be in contact with one another。 The same holds of two bodies in air…air being to bodies in air precisely what water is to bodies in water…but the facts are not so evident to our observation； because we live in air； just as animals that live in water would not notice that the things which touch one another in water have wet surfaces。 The problem； then； is： does the perception of all objects of sense take place in the same way； or does it not； e。g。 taste and touch requiring contact （as they are commonly thought to do）； while all other senses perceive over a distance？ The distinction is unsound； we perceive what is hard or soft； as well as the objects of hearing； sight； and smell； through a 'medium'； only that the latter are perceived over a greater distance than the former； that is why the facts escape our notice。 For we do perceive everything through a medium； but in these cases the fact escapes us。 Yet； to repeat what we said before； if the medium for touch were a membrane separating us from the object without our observing its existence； we should be relatively to it in the same condition as we are now to air or water in which we are immersed； in their case we fancy we can touch objects； nothing coming in between us and them。 But there remains this difference between what can be touched and what can be seen or can sound； in the latter two cases we perceive because the medium produces a certain effect upon us； whereas in the perception of objects of touch we are affected not by but along with the medium； it is as if a man were struck through his shield； where the shock is not first given to the shield and passed on to the man； but the concussion of both is simultaneous。 In general； flesh and the tongue are related to the real organs of touch and taste； as air and water are to those of sight； hearing； and smell。 Hence in neither the one case nor the other can there be any perception of an object if it is placed immediately upon the organ； e。g。 if a white object is placed on the surface of the eye。 This again shows that what has the power of perceiving the tangible is seated inside。 Only so would there be a complete analogy with all the other senses。 In their case if you place the object on the organ it is not perceived； here if you place it on the flesh it is perceived； therefore flesh is not the organ but the medium of touch。 What can be touched are distinctive qualities of body as body； by such differences I mean those which characterize the elements； viz； hot cold； dry moist； of which we have spoken earlier in our treatise on the elements。 The organ for the perception of these is that of touch…that part of the body in which primarily the sense of touch resides。 This is that part which is potentially such as its object is actually： for all sense…perception is a process of being so affected； so that that which makes something such as it itself actually is makes the other such because the other is already potentially such。 That is why when an object of touch is equally hot and cold or hard and soft we cannot perceive； what we perceive must have a degree of the sensible quality lying beyond the neutral point。 This implies that the sense itself is a 'mean' between any two opposite qualities which determine the field of that sense。 It is to this that it owes its power of discerning the objects in that field。 What is 'in the middle' is fitted to discern； relatively to either extreme it can put itself in the place of the other。 As what is to perceive both white and black must； to begin with； be actually neither but potentially either （and so with all the other sense…organs）； so the organ of touch must be neither hot nor cold。 Further； as in a sense sight had for its object both what was visible and what was invisible （and there was a parallel truth about all the other senses discussed）； so touch has for its object both what is tangible and what is intangible。 Here by 'intangible' is meant （a） what like air possesses some quality of tangible things in a very slight degree and （b） what possesses it in an excessive degree； as destructive things do。 We have now given an outline account of each of the several senses。
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The following results applying to any and every sense may now be formulated。 （A） By a 'sense' is meant what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter。 This must be conceived of as taking place in the way in which a piece of wax takes on the impress of a signet…ring without the iron or gold； we say that what produces the impression is a signet of bronze or gold； but its particular metallic constitution makes no difference： in a similar way the sense is affected by what is coloured or flavoured or sounding； but it is indifferent what in each case the substance is； what alone matters is what quality it has； i。e。 in what ratio its constituents are combined。 （B） By 'an organ of sense' is meant that in which ultimately such a power is seated。 The sense and its organ are the same in fact； but their essence is not the same。 What perceives is； of course； a spatial magnitude； but we must not admit that either the having the power to perceive or the sense itself is a magnitude； what they are is a certain ratio or power in a magnitude。 This enables us to explain why objects of sense which possess one of two opposite sensible qualities in a degree largely in excess of the other opposite destroy the organs of sense； if the movement set up by an object is too strong for the organ； the equipoise of contrary qualities in the organ； which just is its sensory power； is disturbed； it is precisely as concord and tone are destroyed by too violently twanging the strings of a lyre。 This explains also why plants cannot perceive。 in spite of their having a portion of soul in them and obviously being affected by tangible objects themselves； for undoubtedly their temperature can be lowered or raised。 The explanation is that they have no mean of contrary qualities； and so no principle in them capable of taking on the forms of sensible objects without their matter； in the case of plants the affection is an affection by form…and…matter together。 The problem might be raised： Can what cannot smell be said to be affected by smells or what cannot see by colours； and so on？ It might be said that a smell is just what can be smelt； and if it produces any effect it can only be so as to make something smell it； and it might be argued that what cannot smell cannot be affected by smells and further that what can smell can be affected by it only in so far as it has in it the power to smell （similarly with the proper objects of all the other senses）。 Indeed that this is so is made quite evident as follows。 Light or darkness； sounds and smells leave bodies quite unaffected； what does affect bodies is not these but the bodies which are their vehicles； e。g。 what splits the trunk of a tree is not the sound of the thunder but the air which accompanies thunder。 Yes； but； it may be objected； bodies are affected by what is tangible and by flavours。 If not； by what are things that are without soul affected； i。e。 altered in quality？ Must we not； then； admit that the objects of the other senses also may affect them？ Is not the true account this； that all
