part12-第5章

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divided　into　two　parts　of　9。　letters　each；　and　each　of　the　9。　letters

is　then　numbered　according　to　the　place　it　would　hold　if　the　9。　were

arranged　alphabetically；　thus　＇_so　blotted　as　to　be　illegible＇。　　The

numbers　over　the　letters　being　then　arranged　as　the　letters　to　which

they　belong　stand　in　our　names；　we　can　always　construct　our　key。　　But

why　a　cipher　between　us；　when　official　things　go　naturally　to　the

Secretary　of　State；　and　things　not　political　need　no　cipher。　　1。

matters　of　a　public　nature；　and　proper　to　go　on　our　records；　should

go　to　the　secretary　of　state。　　2。　matters　of　a　public　nature　not

proper　to　be　placed　on　our　records　may　still　go　to　the　secretary　of

state；　headed　by　the　word　‘private。'　But　3。　there　may　be　matters

merely　personal　to　ourselves；　and　which　require　the　cover　of　a　cipher

more　than　those　of　any　other　character。　　This　last　purpose　and　others

which　we　cannot　foresee　may　render　it　convenient　and　advantageous　to

have　at　hand　a　mask　for　whatever　may　need　it。　　But　writing　by　Mr。

Dupont　I　need　no　cipher。　　I　require　from　him　to　put　this　into　your

own　and　no　other　hand；　let　the　delay　occasioned　by　that　be　what　it

will。




　　　　　　　　The　cession　of　Louisiana　and　the　Floridas　by　Spain　to　France

works　most　sorely　on　the　U。S。　　On　this　subject　the　Secretary　of　State

has　written　to　you　fully。　　Yet　I　cannot　forbear　recurring　to　it

personally；　so　deep　is　the　impression　it　makes　in　my　mind。　　It

compleatly　reverses　all　the　political　relations　of　the　U。S。　　and　will

form　a　new　epoch　in　our　political　course。　　Of　all　nations　of　any

consideration　France　is　the　one　which　hitherto　has　offered　the　fewest

points　on　which　we　could　have　any　conflict　of　right；　and　the　most

points　of　a　communion　of　interests。　　From　these　causes　we　have　ever

looked　to　her　as　our　_natural　friend_；　as　one　with　which　we　never

could　have　an　occasion　of　difference。　　Her　growth　therefore　we　viewed

as　our　own；　her　misfortunes　ours。　　There　is　on　the　globe　one　single

spot；　the　possessor　of　which　is　our　natural　and　habitual　enemy。　　It

is　New　Orleans；　through　which　the　produce　of　three…eighths　of　our

territory　must　pass　to　market；　and　from　its　fertility　it　will　ere

long　yield　more　than　half　of　our　whole　produce　and　contain　more　than

half　our　inhabitants。　　France　placing　herself　in　that　door　assumes　to

us　the　attitude　of　defiance。　　Spain　might　have　retained　it　quietly

for　years。　　Her　pacific　dispositions；　her　feeble　state；　would　induce

her　to　increase　our　facilities　there；　so　that　her　possession　of　the

place　would　be　hardly　felt　by　us；　and　it　would　not　perhaps　be　very

long　before　some　circumstance　might　arise　which　might　make　the

cession　of　it　to　us　the　price　of　something　of　more　worth　to　her。　　Not

so　can　it　ever　be　in　the　hands　of　France。　　The　impetuosity　of　her

temper；　the　energy　and　restlessness　of　her　character；　placed　in　a

point　of　eternal　friction　with　us；　and　our　character；　which　though

quiet；　and　loving　peace　and　the　pursuit　of　wealth；　is　high…minded；

despising　wealth　in　competition　with　insult　or　injury；　enterprising

and　energetic　as　any　nation　on　earth；　these　circumstances　render　it

impossible　that　France　and　the　U。S。　can　continue　long　friends　when

they　meet　in　so　irritable　a　position。　　They　as　well　as　we　must　be

blind　if　they　do　not　see　this；　and　we　must　be　very　improvident　if　we

do　not　begin　to　make　arrangements　on　that　hypothesis。　　The　day　that

France　takes　possession　of　N。　Orleans　fixes　the　sentence　which　is　to

restrain　her　forever　within　her　low　water　mark。　　It　seals　the　union

of　two　nations　who　in　conjunction　can　maintain　exclusive　possession

of　the　ocean。　　From　that　moment　we　must　marry　ourselves　to　the

British　fleet　and　nation。　　We　must　turn　all　our　attentions　to　a

maritime　force；　for　which　our　resources　place　us　on　very　high

grounds：　and　having　formed　and　cemented　together　a　power　which　may

render　reinforcement　of　her　settlements　here　impossible　to　France；

make　the　first　cannon；　which　shall　be　fired　in　Europe　the　signal　for

tearing　up　any　settlement　she　may　have　made；　and　for　holding　the　two

continents　of　America　in　sequestration　for　the　common　purposes　of　the

united　British　and　American　nations。　　This　is　not　a　state　of　things

we　seek　or　desire。　　It　is　one　which　this　measure；　if　adopted　by

France；　forces　on　us；　as　necessarily　as　any　other　cause；　by　the　laws

of　nature；　brings　on　its　necessary　effect。　　It　is　not　from　a　fear　of

France　that　we　deprecate　this　measure　proposed　by　her。　　For　however

greater　her　force　is　than　ours　compared　in　the　abstract；　it　is

nothing　in　comparison　of　ours　when　to　be　exerted　on　our　soil。　　But　it

is　from　a　sincere　love　of　peace；　and　a　firm　persuasion　that　bound　to

France　by　the　interests　and　the　strong　sympathies　still　existing　in

the　minds　of　our　citizens；　and　holding　relative　positions　which

ensure　their　continuance　we　are　secure　of　a　long　course　of　peace。

Whereas　the　change　of　friends；　which　will　be　rendered　necessary　if

France　changes　that　position；　embarks　us　necessarily　as　a　belligerent

power　in　the　first　war　of　Europe。　　In　that　case　France　will　have　held

possession　of　New　Orleans　during　the　interval　of　a　peace；　long　or

short；　at　the　end　of　which　it　will　be　wrested　from　her。　　Will　this

short…lived　possession　have　been　an　equivalent　to　her　for　the

transfer　of　such　a　weight　into　the　scale　of　her　enemy？　　Will　not　the

amalgamation　of　a　young；　thriving；　nation　continue　to　that　enemy　the

health　and　force　which　are　at　present　so　evidently　on　the　decline？

And　will　a　few　years　possession　of　N。　Orleans　add　equally　to　the

strength　of　France？　　She　may　say　she　needs　Louisiana　for　the　supply

of　her　West　Indies。　　She　does　not　need　it　in　time　of　peace。　　And　in

war　she　could　not　depend　on　them　because　they　would　be　so　easily

intercepted。　　I　should　suppose　that　all　these　considerations　might　in

some　proper　form　be　brought　into　view　of　the　government　of　France。

Tho'　stated　by　us；　it　ought　not　to　give　offence；　because　we　do　not

bring　them　forward　as　a　menace；　but　as　consequences　not　controulable

by　us；　but　inevitable　from　the　course　of　things。　　We　mention　them　not

as　things　which　we　desire　by　any　means；　but　as　things　we　deprecate；

and　we　beseech　a　friend　to　look　forward　and　to　prevent　them　for　our

common　interests。




　　　　　　　　If　France　considers　Louisiana　however　as　indispensable　for　her

views　she　might　perhaps　be　willing　to　look　about　for　arrangements

which　might　reconcile　it　to　our　interests。　　If　anything　could　do　this

it　would　be　the　ceding　to　us　the　island　of　New　Orleans　and　the

Floridas。　　This　would　certainly　in　a　great　degree　remove　the　causes

of　jarring　and　irritation　between　us；　and　perhaps　for　such　a　length

of　time　as　might　produce　other　means　of　making　the　measure

permanently　conciliatory　to　our　interests　and　friendships。　　It　would

at　any　rate　relieve　us　from　the　necessity　of　taking　immediate

measures　for　countervailing　such　an　operation　by　arrangements　in

another　quarter。　　Still　we　should　consider　N。　Orleans　and　the

Floridas　as　equivalent　for　the　risk　of　a　quarrel　with　France　produced

by　her　vicinage。　　I　have　no　doubt　you　have　urged　these　considerations

on　every　proper　occasion　with　the　government　where　you　are。　　They　are

such　as　must　have　effect　if　you　can　find　the　means　of　producing

thorough　reflection　on　them　by　that　government。　　The　idea　here　is

that　the　troops　sent　to　St。　Domingo；　were　to　proceed　to　Louisiana

after　finishing　their　work　in　that　island。　　If　this　were　the

arrangement；　it　will　give　you　time　to　return　again　and　again　to　the

charge；　for　the　conquest　of　St。　Domingo　will　not　be　a　short　work。　　It

will　take　considerable　time　to　wear　down　a　great　number　of　souldiers。

Every　eye　in　the　U。S。　is　now　fixed　on　this　affair　of　Louisiana。

Perhaps　nothing　since　the　revolutionary　war　has　produced　more　uneasy

sensations　through　the　body　of　the　nation。　　Notwithstanding　temporary

bickerings　have　taken　place　with　France；　she　has　still　a　strong　hold

on　the　affections　of　our