the memorabilia-第29章
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that the thing named was sometimes bad。 But he； knowing that if a
thing troubles us； we immediately want that which will put an end to
our trouble； answered precisely as it was best to do。＇5＇
＇4＇ See Grote； 〃Plato；〃 ii。 585； on Philebus。
＇5＇ Or； 〃made the happiest answer。〃
Soc。 Do I understand you to ask me whether I know anything good for
fever？
No （he replied）； that is not my question。
Soc。 Then for inflammation of the eyes？
Aristip。 No； nor yet that。
Soc。 Well then； for hunger？
Aristip。 No； nor yet for hunger。
Well； but （answered Socrates） if you ask me whether I know of any good
thing which is good for nothing； I neither know of it nor want to
know。
And when Aristippus； returning to the charge； asked him 〃if he knew of
any thing beautiful；〃
He answered： Yes； many things。
Aristip。 Are they all like each other？
Soc。 On the contrary； they are often as unlike as possible。
How then （he asked） can that be beautiful which is unlike the
beautiful？
Soc。 Bless me！ for the simple reason that it is possible for a man who
is a beautiful runner to be quite unlike another man who is a
beautiful boxer；＇6＇ or for a shield； which is a beautiful weapon for
the purpose of defence； to be absolutely unlike a javelin； which is a
beautiful weapon of swift and sure discharge。
＇6＇ See Grote； 〃H。 G。〃 x。 164； in reference to Epaminondas and his
gymnastic training； below； III。 x。 6。
Aristip。 Your answers are no better now than＇7＇ when I asked you
whether you knew any good thing。 They are both of a pattern。
＇7＇ Or； 〃You answer precisely as you did when 。 。 。〃
Soc。 And so they should be。 Do you imagine that one thing is good and
another beautiful？ Do not you know that relatively to the same
standard all things are at once beautiful and good？＇8＇ In the first
place； virtue is not a good thing relatively to one standard and a
beautiful thing relatively to another standard； and in the next place；
human beings； on the same principle＇9＇ and relatively to the same
standard； are called 〃beautiful and good〃； and so the bodily frames of
men relatively to the same standards are seen to be 〃beautiful and
good；〃 and in general all things capable of being used by man are
regarded as at once beautiful and good relatively to the same standard
the standing being in each case what the thing happens to be useful
for。＇10＇
＇8＇ Or； 〃good and beautiful are convertible terms： whatever is good is
beautiful； or whatever is beautiful is good。〃
＇9＇ Or； 〃in the same breath。〃 Cf。 Plat。 〃Hipp。 maj。〃 295 D； 〃Gorg。〃
474 D。
＇10＇ Or； 〃and this standard is the serviceableness of the thing in
question。〃
Aristip。 Then I presume even a basket for carrying dung＇11＇ is a
beautiful thing？
＇11＇ Cf。 Plat。 〃Hipp。 maj。〃 288 D； 290 D； and Grote's note； loc。 cit。
p。 381： 〃in regard to the question wherein consists ｛to kalon｝？〃
Soc。 To be sure； and a spear of gold an ugly thing； if for their
respective usesthe former is well and the latter ill adapted。
Aristip。 Do you mean to assert that the same things may be beautiful
and ugly？
Soc。 Yes； to be sure； and by the same showing things may be good and
bad： as； for instance； what is good for hunger may be bad for fever；
and what is good for fever bad for hunger； or again； what is beautiful
for wrestling is often ugly for running； and in general everything is
good and beautiful when well adapted for the end in view； bad and ugly
when ill adapted for the same。
Similarly when he spoke about houses；＇12＇ and argued that 〃the same
house must be at once beautiful and useful〃I could not help feeling
that he was giving a good lesson on the problem： 〃how a house ought to
be built。〃 He investigated the matter thus：
＇12＇ See K。 Joel； op。 cit。 p。 488； 〃Classical Review；〃 vii。 262。
Soc。 〃Do you admit that any one purposing to build a perfect house＇13＇
will plan to make it at once as pleasant and as useful to live in as
possible？〃 and that point being admitted；＇14＇ the next question would
be：
＇13＇ Or； 〃the ideal house〃； lit。 〃a house as it should be。〃
＇14＇ See below； IV。 vi。 15。
〃It is pleasant to have one's house cool in summer and warm in winter；
is it not？〃 and this proposition also having obtained assent； 〃Now；
supposing a house to have a southern aspect； sunshine during winter
will steal in under the verandah；＇15＇ but in summer； when the sun
traverses a path right over our heads； the roof will afford an
agreeable shade； will it not？ If； then； such an arrangement is
desirable； the southern side of a house should be built higher to
catch the rays of the winter sun； and the northern side lower to
prevent the cold winds finding ingress； in a word； it is reasonable to
suppose that the pleasantest and most beautiful dwelling place will be
one in which the owner can at all seasons of the year find the
pleasantest retreat； and stow away his goods with the greatest
security。〃
＇15＇ Or； 〃porticoes〃 or 〃collonades。〃
Paintings＇16＇ and ornamental mouldings are apt （he said） to deprive
one of more joy＇17＇ than they confer。
＇16＇ See 〃Econ。〃 ix。 2； Plat。 〃Hipp。 maj。〃 298 A； 〃Rep。〃 529； Becker；
〃Charicles；〃 268 （Engl。 trans。）
＇17＇ ｛euphrosunas｝； archaic or 〃poetical〃 = 〃joyance。〃 See 〃Hiero；〃
vi。 1。
The fittest place for a temple or an altar （he maintained） was some
site visible from afar； and untrodden by foot of man：＇18＇ since it was
a glad thing for the worshipper to lift up his eyes afar off and offer
up his orison； glad also to wend his way peaceful to prayer
unsullied。＇19＇
＇18＇ e。g。 the summit of Lycabettos； or the height on which stands the
temple of Phygaleia。 Cf。 Eur。 〃Phoen。〃 1372； ｛Pallados
khrusaspidos blepsas pros oikon euxato｝ of Eteocles。
＇19＇ See Vitruvius； i。 7； iv。 5； ap。 Schneid。 ad loc。； W。 L。 Newman；
op。 cit。 i。 338。
IX
Being again asked by some one： could courage be taught；＇1＇ or did it
come by nature？ he answered： I imagine that just as one body is by
nature stronger than another body to encounter toils； so one soul by
nature grows more robust than another soul in face of dangers。
Certainly I do note that people brought up under the same condition of
laws and customs differ greatly in respect of daring。 Still my belief
is that by learning and practice the natural aptitude may always be
strengthened towards courage。 It is clear； for instance； that
Scythians or Thracians would not venture to take shield and spear and
contend with Lacedaemonians； and it is equally evident that
Lacedaemonians would demur to entering the lists of battle against
Thracians if limited to their light shields and javelins； or against
Scythians without some weapon more familiar than their bows and
arrows。＇2＇ And as far as I can see； this principle holds generally：
the natural differences of one man from another may be compensated by
artificial progress； the result of care and attention。 All which
proves clearly that whether nature has endowed us with keener or
blunter sensibilities； the duty of all alike is to learn and practise
those things in which we would fain achieve distinction。
＇1＇ Or； 〃When some one retorted upon him with the question： 'Can
courage be taught？'〃 and for this problem see IV。 vi。 10； 11；
〃Symp。〃 ii。 12； Plat。 〃Lach。〃； 〃Protag。〃 349； 〃Phaedr。〃 269 D； K。
Joel； op。 cit。 p。 325 foll。； Grote； 〃Plato；〃 i。 468 foll。； ii。 60；
Jowett； 〃Plato；〃 i。 77； 119； Newman； op。 cit。 i。 343。
＇2＇ Or； 〃against Thracians with light shields and javelins； or against
Scythians with bows and arrows〃； and for the national arms of
these peoples respectively see Arist。 〃Lysistr。〃 563； 〃Anab。〃 III。
iv。 15； VI。 VII。 passim。
Between wisdom and sobriety of soul （which is temperance） he drew no
distinction。＇3＇ Was a man able on the one hand to recognise things
beautiful and good sufficiently to live in them？ Had he； on the other
hand； knowledge of the 〃base and foul〃 so as to beware of them？ If so；
Socrates judged him to be wise at once and sound of soul （or
temperate）。＇4＇
＇3＇ But cf。 IV。 vi。 7； K。 Joel； op。 cit。 p。 363。
＇4＇ Reading ｛alla to 。 。 。 kai to｝； or more lit。 〃he discovered the
wise man and sound
