贝壳电子书 > 英文原著电子书 > on sense and the sensible >

第10章

on sense and the sensible-第10章

小说: on sense and the sensible 字数: 每页4000字

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页,按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页,按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部!
————未阅读完?加入书签已便下次继续阅读!





the current opinion that one sees and hears coinstantaneously is due



merely to the fact that the intervals of time 'between the really



successive perceptions of sight and hearing' escape observation。 But



this can scarcely be true; nor is it conceivable that any portion of



time should be 'absolutely' imperceptible; or that any should be



absolutely unnoticeable; the truth being that it is possible to



perceive every instant of time。 'This is so'; because; if it is



inconceivable that a person should; while perceiving himself or



aught else in a continuous time; be at any instant unaware of his



own existence; while; obviously; the assumption; that there is in



the time…continuum a time so small as to be absolutely



imperceptible; carries the implication that a person would; during



such time; be unaware of his own existence; as well as of his seeing



and perceiving; 'this assumption must be false'。



  Again; if there is any magnitude; whether time or thing;



absolutely imperceptible owing to its smallness; it follows that there



would not be either a thing which one perceives; or a time in which



one perceives it; unless in the sense that in some part of the given



time he sees some part of the given thing。 For 'let there be a line



ab; divided into two parts at g; and let this line represent a whole



object and a corresponding whole time。 Now;' if one sees the whole



line; and perceives it during a time which forms one and the same



continuum; only in the sense that he does so in some portion of this



time; let us suppose the part gb; representing a time in which by



supposition he was perceiving nothing; cut off from the whole。 Well;



then; he perceives in a certain part 'viz。 in the remainder' of the



time; or perceives a part 'viz。 the remainder' of the line; after



the fashion in which one sees the whole earth by seeing some given



part of it; or walks in a year by walking in some given part of the



year。 But 'by hypothesis' in the part bg he perceives nothing:



therefore; in fact; he is said to perceive the whole object and during



the whole time simply because he perceives 'some part of the object'



in some part of the time ab。 But the same argument holds also in the



case of ag 'the remainder; regarded in its turn as a whole'; for it



will be found 'on this theory of vacant times and imperceptible



magnitudes' that one always perceives only in some part of a given



whole time; and perceives only some part of a whole magnitude; and



that it is impossible to perceive any 'really' whole 'object in a



really whole time; a conclusion which is absurd; as it would logically



annihilate the perception of both Objects and Time'。



  Therefore we must conclude that all magnitudes are perceptible;



but their actual dimensions do not present themselves immediately in



their presentation as objects。 One sees the sun; or a four…cubit rod



at a distance; as a magnitude; but their exact dimensions are not



given in their visual presentation: nay; at times an object of sight



appears indivisible; but 'vision like other special senses; is



fallible respecting 'common sensibles'; e。g。 magnitude; and' nothing



that one sees is really indivisible。 The reason of this has been



previously explained。 It is clear then; from the above arguments; that



no portion of time is imperceptible。



  But we must here return to the question proposed above for



discussion; whether it is possible or impossible to perceive several



objects coinstantaneously; by 'coinstantaneously' I mean perceiving



the several objects in a time one and indivisible relatively to one



another; i。e。 indivisible in a sense consistent with its being all a



continuum。



  First; then; is it conceivable that one should perceive the



different things coinstantaneously; but each with a different part



of the Soul? Or 'must we object' that; in the first place; to begin



with the objects of one and the same sense; e。g。 Sight; if we assume



it 'the Soul qua exercising Sight' to perceive one colour with one



part; and another colour with a different part; it will have a



plurality of parts the same in species; 'as they must be;' since the



objects which it thus perceives fall within the same genus?



  Should any one 'to illustrate how the Soul might have in it two



different parts specifically identical; each directed to a set of



aistheta the same in genus with that to which the other is directed'



urge that; as there are two eyes; so there may be in the Soul



something analogous; 'the reply is' that of the eyes; doubtless;



some one organ is formed; and hence their actualization in



perception is one; but if this is so in the Soul; then; in so far as



what is formed of both 'i。e。 of any two specifically identical parts



as assumed' is one; the true perceiving subject also will be one; 'and



the contradictory of the above hypothesis (of different parts of



Soul remaining engaged in simultaneous perception with one sense) is



what emerges from the analogy'; while if the two parts of Soul



remain separate; the analogy of the eyes will fail; 'for of these some



one is really formed'。



  Furthermore; 'on the supposition of the need of different parts of



Soul; co…operating in each sense; to discern different objects



coinstantaneously'; the senses will be each at the same time one and



many; as if we should say that they were each a set of diverse



sciences; for neither will an 'activity' exist without its proper



faculty; nor without activity will there be sensation。



  But if the Soul does not; in the way suggested 'i。e。 with



different parts of itself acting simultaneously'; perceive in one



and the same individual time sensibles of the same sense; a fortiori



it is not thus that it perceives sensibles of different senses。 For it



is; as already stated; more conceivable that it should perceive a



plurality of the former together in this way than a plurality of



heterogeneous objects。



  If then; as is the fact; the Soul with one part perceives Sweet;



with another; White; either that which results from these is some



one part; or else there is no such one resultant。 But there must be



such an one; inasmuch as the general faculty of sense…perception is



one。 What one object; then; does that one faculty 'when perceiving



an object; e。g。 as both White and Sweet' perceive? 'None'; for



assuredly no one object arises by composition of these



'heterogeneous objects; such as White and Sweet'。 We must conclude;



therefore; that there is; as has been stated before; some one



faculty in the soul with which the latter perceives all its



percepts; though it perceives each different genus of sensibles



through a different organ。



  May we not; then; conceive this faculty which perceives White and



Sweet to be one qua indivisible 'sc。 qua combining its different



simultaneous objects' in its actualization; but different; when it has



become divisible 'sc。 qua distinguishing its different simultaneous



objects' in its actualization?



  Or is what occurs in the case of the perceiving Soul conceivably



analogous to what holds true in that of the things themselves? For the



same numerically one thing is white and sweet; and has many other



qualities; 'while its numerical oneness is not thereby prejudiced'



if the fact is not that the qualities are really separable in the



object from one another; but that the being of each quality is



different 'from that of every other'。 In the same way therefore we



must assume also; in the case of the Soul; that the faculty of



perception in general is in itself numerically one and the same; but



different 'differentiated' in its being; different; that is to say; in



genus as regards some of its objects; in species as regards others。



Hence too; we may conclude that one can perceive 'numerically



diff

返回目录 上一页 下一页 回到顶部 0 0

你可能喜欢的