seven discourses on art-第24章
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opinions are found to be no better than prejudices。 And since they deserve； on account of their duration and extent； to be considered as really true； they become capable of no small decree of stability and determination by their permanent and uniform nature。
As these prejudices become more narrow； more local； more transitory； this secondary taste becomes more and more fantastical； recedes from real science； is less to be approved by reason； and less followed in practice； though in no case perhaps to be wholly neglected； where it does not stand； as it sometimes does； in direct defiance of the most respectable opinions received amongst mankind。
Having laid down these positions； I shall proceed with less method； because less will serve； to explain and apply them。
We will take it for granted that reason is something invariable and fixed in the nature of things； and without endeavouring to go back to an account of first principles； which for ever will elude our search； we will conclude that whatever goes under the name of taste； which we can fairly bring under the dominion of reason； must be considered as equally exempt from change。 If therefore； in the course of this inquiry； we can show that there are rules for the conduct of the artist which are fixed and invariable； it implies； of course； that the art of the connoisseur； or； in other words； taste； has likewise invariable principles。
Of the judgment which we make on the works of art； and the preference that we give to one class of art over another； if a reason be demanded； the question is perhaps evaded by answering； 〃I judge from my taste〃； but it does not follow that a better answer cannot be given； though for common gazers this may be sufficient。 Every man is not obliged to investigate the causes of his approbation or dislike。
The arts would lie open for ever to caprice and casualty； if those who are to judge of their excellences had no settled principles by which they are to regulate their decisions； and the merit or defect of performances were to be determined by unguided fancy。 And indeed we may venture to assert that whatever speculative knowledge is necessary to the artist； is equally and indispensably necessary to the connoisseur。
The first idea that occurs in the consideration of what is fixed in art； or in taste； is that presiding principle of which I have so frequently spoken in former discourses； the general idea of nature。 The beginning； the middle； and the end of everything that is valuable in taste； is comprised in the knowledge of what is truly nature； for whatever ideas are not conformable to those of nature； or universal opinion； must be considered as more or less capricious。
The idea of nature comprehending not only the forms which nature produces； but also the nature and internal fabric and organisation； as I may call it； of the human mind and imagination： general ideas； beauty； or nature； are but different ways of expressing the same thing； whether we apply these terms to statues； poetry； or picture。 Deformity is not nature； but an accidental deviation from her accustomed practice。 This general idea therefore ought to be called nature； and nothing else； correctly speaking； has a right to that name。 But we are so far from speaking； in common conversation； with any such accuracy； that； on the contrary； when we criticise Rembrandt and other Dutch painters； who introduced into their historical pictures exact representations of individual objects with all their imperfections； we say； though it is not in a good taste； yet it is nature。
This misapplication of terms must be very often perplexing to the young student。 Is not； he may say； art an imitation of nature？ Must he not； therefore； who imitates her with the greatest fidelity be the best artist？ By this mode of reasoning Rembrandt has a higher place than Raffaelle。 But a very little reflection will serve to show us that these particularities cannot be nature： for how can that be the nature of man； in which no two individuals are the same？
It plainly appears that as a work is conducted under the influence of general ideas or partial it is principally to be considered as the effect of a good or a bad taste。
As beauty therefore does not consist in taking what lies immediately before you； so neither； in our pursuit of taste； are those opinions which we first received and adopted the best choice； or the most natural to the mind and imagination。
In the infancy of our knowledge we seize with greediness the good that is within our reach； it is by after…consideration； and in consequence of discipline； that we refuse the present for a greater good at a distance。 The nobility or elevation of all arts； like the excellence of virtue itself； consists in adopting this enlarged and comprehensive idea； and all criticism built upon the more confined view of what is natural； may properly be called shallow criticism； rather than false； its defect is that the truth is not sufficiently extensive。
It has sometimes happened that some of the greatest men in our art have been betrayed into errors by this confined mode of reasoning。 Poussin； who； upon the whole； may be produced as an instance of attention to the most enlarged and extensive ideas of nature； from not having settled principles on this point； has in one instance at least； I think； deserted truth for prejudice。 He is said to have vindicated the conduct of Julio Romano； for his inattention to the masses of light and shade； or grouping the figures； in the battle of Constantine； as if designedly neglected； the better to correspond with the hurry and confusion of a battle。 Poussin's own conduct in his representations of Bacchanalian triumphs and sacrifices； makes us more easily give credit to this report； since in such subjects； as well indeed as in many others； it was too much his own practice。 The best apology we can make for this conduct is what proceeds from the association of our ideas； the prejudice we have in favour of antiquity。 Poussin's works； as I have formerly observed； have very much the air of the ancient manner of painting； in which there are not the least traces to make us think that what we call the keeping； the composition of light and shade； or distribution of the work into masses； claimed any part of their attention。 But surely whatever apology we may find out for this neglect； it ought to be ranked among the defects of Poussin； as well as of the antique paintings； and the moderns have a right to that praise which is their due； for having given so pleasing an addition to the splendour of the art。
Perhaps no apology ought to be received for offences committed against the vehicle （whether it be the organ of seeing or of hearing） by which our pleasures are conveyed to the mind。 We must take the same care that the eye be not perplexed and distracted by a confusion of equal parts； or equal lights； as of offending it by an unharmonious mixture of colours。 We may venture to be more confident of the truth of this observation； since we find that Shakespeare； on a parallel occasion； has made Hamlet recommend to the players a precept of the same kind； never to offend the ear by harsh sounds：… 〃In the very torrent； tempest； and whirlwind of your passions；〃 says he； 〃you must beget a temperance that may give it smoothness。〃 And yet； at the same time； he very justly observes； 〃The end of playing； both at the first and now； is to hold； as it were； the mirror up to nature。〃 No one can deny but that violent passions will naturally emit harsh and disagreeable tones； yet this great poet and critic thought that this imitation of nature would cost too much； if purchased at the expense of disagreeable sensations； or； as he expresses it； of 〃splitting the ear。〃 The poet and actor； as well as the painter of genius who is well acquainted with all the variety and sources of pleasure in the mind and imagination； has little regard or attention to common nature； or creeping after common sense。 By overleaping those narrow bounds； he more effectually seizes the whole mind； and more powerfully accomplishes his purpose。 This success is ignorantly imagined to proceed from inattention to all rules； and in defiance of reason and judgment； w
