the writings-5-第14章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！



legislation　to　drive　the　man　with　his　slave　out　of　the　Territory；　or

to　decide　that　his　slave　is　free　because　of　his　being　taken　in　there；

or　to　tax　him　to　such　an　extent　that　he　cannot　keep　him　there；　the

Supreme　Court　will　unhesitatingly　decide　all　such　legislation

unconstitutional；　as　long　as　that　Supreme　Court　is　constructed　as　the

Dred　Scott　Supreme　Court　is。　　The　first　two　things　they　have　already

decided；　except　that　there　is　a　little　quibble　among　lawyers　between

the　words　〃dicta〃　and　〃decision。〃　　They　have　already　decided　a　negro

cannot　be　made　free　by　Territorial　legislation。



What　is　the　Dred　Scott　decision？　　Judge　Douglas　labors　to　show　that

it　is　one　thing；　while　I　think　it　is　altogether　different。　　It　is　a

long　opinion；　but　it　is　all　embodied　in　this　short　statement：　〃The

Constitution　of　the　United　States　forbids　Congress　to　deprive　a　man

of　his　property；　without　due　process　of　law；　the　right　of　property　in

slaves　is　distinctly　and　expressly　affirmed　in　that　Constitution：

therefore；　if　Congress　shall　undertake　to　say　that　a　man's　slave　is

no　longer　his　slave　when　he　crosses　a　certain　line　into　a　Territory；

that　is　depriving　him　of　his　property　without　due　process　of　law；　and

is　unconstitutional。〃　　There　is　the　whole　Dred　Scott　decision。　　They

add　that　if　Congress　cannot　do　so　itself；　Congress　cannot　confer　any

power　to　do　so；　and　hence　any　effort　by　the　Territorial　Legislature

to　do　either　of　these　things　is　absolutely　decided　against。　　It　is　a

foregone　conclusion　by　that　court。



Now；　as　to　this　indirect　mode　by　〃unfriendly　legislation；〃　all

lawyers　here　will　readily　understand　that　such　a　proposition　cannot

be　tolerated　for　a　moment；　because　a　legislature　cannot　indirectly　do

that　which　it　cannot　accomplish　directly。　　Then　I　say　any　legislation

to　control　this　property；　as　property；　for　its　benefit　as　property；

would　be　hailed　by　this　Dred　Scott　Supreme　Court；　and　fully

sustained；　but　any　legislation　driving　slave　property　out；　or

destroying　it　as　property；　directly　or　indirectly；　will　most

assuredly；　by　that　court；　be　held　unconstitutional。



Judge　Douglas　says　if　the　Constitution　carries　slavery　into　the

Territories；　beyond　the　power　of　the　people　of　the　Territories　to

control　it　as　other　property；　then　it　follows　logically　that　every

one　who　swears　to　support　the　Constitution　of　the　United　States　must

give　that　support　to　that　property　which　it　needs。　　And；　if　the

Constitution　carries　slavery　into　the　Territories；　beyond　the　power

of　the　people；　to　control　it　as　other　property；　then　it　also　carries

it　into　the　States；　because　the　Constitution　is　the　supreme　law　of

the　land。　　Now；　gentlemen；　if　it　were　not　for　my　excessive　modesty；　I

would　say　that　I　told　that　very　thing　to　Judge　Douglas　quite　a　year

ago。　　This　argument　is　here　in　print；　and　if　it　were　not　for　my

modesty；　as　I　said；　I　might　call　your　attention　to　it。　　If　you　read

it；　you　will　find　that　I　not　only　made　that　argument；　but　made　it

better　than　he　has　made　it　since。



There　is；　however；　this　difference：　I　say　now；　and　said　then；　there

is　no　sort　of　question　that　the　Supreme　Court　has　decided　that　it　is

the　right　of　the　slave　holder　to　take　his　slave　and　hold　him　in　the

Territory；　and　saying　this；　judge　Douglas　himself　admits　the

conclusion。　　He　says　if　that　is　so；　this　consequence　will　follow；　and

because　this　consequence　would　follow；　his　argument　is；　the　decision

cannot；　therefore；　be　that　way；〃　that　would　spoil　my　popular

sovereignty；　and　it　cannot　be　possible　that　this　great　principle　has

been　squelched　out　in　this　extraordinary　way。　　It　might　be；　if　it

were　not　for　the　extraordinary　consequences　of　spoiling　my　humbug。〃



Another　feature　of　the　judge's　argument　about　the　Dred　Scott　case　is；

an　effort　to　show　that　that　decision　deals　altogether　in　declarations

of　negatives；　that　the　Constitution　does　not　affirm　anything　as

expounded　by　the　Dred　Scott　decision；　but　it　only　declares　a　want　of

power　a　total　absence　of　power；　in　reference　to　the　Territories。　　It

seems　to　be　his　purpose　to　make　the　whole　of　that　decision　to　result

in　a　mere　negative　declaration　of　a　want　of　power　in　Congress　to　do

anything　in　relation　to　this　matter　in　the　Territories。　　I　know　the

opinion　of　the　Judges　states　that　there　is　a　total　absence　of　power；

but　that　is；　unfortunately；　not　all　it　states：　for　the　judges　add

that　the　right　of　property　in　a　slave　is　distinctly　and　expressly

affirmed　in　the　Constitution。　　It　does　not　stop　at　saying　that　the

right　of　property　in　a　slave　is　recognized　in　the　Constitution；　is

declared　to　exist　somewhere　in　the　Constitution；　but　says　it　is

affirmed　in　the　Constitution。　　Its　language　is　equivalent　to　saying

that　it　is　embodied　and　so　woven　in　that　instrument　that　it　cannot　be

detached　without　breaking　the　Constitution　itself。　　In　a　word；　it　is

part　of　the　Constitution。



Douglas　is　singularly　unfortunate　in　his　effort　to　make　out　that

decision　to　be　altogether　negative；　when　the　express　language　at　the

vital　part　is　that　this　is　distinctly　affirmed　in　the　Constitution。

I　think　myself；　and　I　repeat　it　here；　that　this　decision　does　not

merely　carry　slavery　into　the　Territories；　but　by　its　logical

conclusion　it　carries　it　into　the　States　in　which　we　live。　　One

provision　of　that　Constitution　is；　that　it　shall　be　the　supreme　law

of　the　land；I　do　not　quote　the　language；any　constitution　or　law

of　any　State　to　the　contrary　notwithstanding。　　This　Dred　Scott

decision　says　that　the　right　of　property　in　a　slave　is　affirmed　in

that　Constitution　which　is　the　supreme　law　of　the　land；　any　State

constitution　or　law　notwithstanding。　　Then　I　say　that　to　destroy　a

thing　which　is　distinctly　affirmed　and　supported　by　the　supreme　law

of　the　land；　even　by　a　State　constitution　or　law；　is　a　violation　of

that　supreme　law；　and　there　is　no　escape　from　it。　　In　my　judgment

there　is　no　avoiding　that　result；　save　that　the　American　people　shall

see　that　constitutions　are　better　construed　than　our　Constitution　is

construed　in　that　decision。　　They　must　take　care　that　it　is　more

faithfully　and　truly　carried　out　than　it　is　there　expounded。



I　must　hasten　to　a　conclusion。　Near　the　beginning　of　my　remarks　I

said　that　this　insidious　Douglas　popular　sovereignty　is　the　measure

that　now　threatens　the　purpose　of　the　Republican　party　to　prevent

slavery　from　being　nationalized　in　the　United　States。　　I　propose　to

ask　your　attention　for　a　little　while　to　some　propositions　in

affirmance　of　that　statement。　　Take　it　just　as　it　stands；　and　apply

it　as　a　principle；　extend　and　apply　that　principle　elsewhere；　and

consider　where　it　will　lead　you。　　I　now　put　this　proposition；　that

Judge　Douglas's　popular　sovereignty　applied　will　reopen　the　African

slave　trade；　and　I　will　demonstrate　it　by　any　variety　of　ways　in

which　you　can　turn　the　subject　or　look　at　it。



The　Judge　says　that　the　people　of　the　Territories　have　the　right；　by

his　principle；　to　have　slaves；　if　they　want　them。　　Then　I　say　that

the　people　in　Georgia　have　the　right　to　buy　slaves　in　Africa；　if　they

want　them；　and　I　defy　any　man　on　earth　to　show　any　distinction

between　the　two　things；to　show　that　the　one　is　either　more　wicked

or　more　unlawful；　to　show；　on　original　principles；　that　one　is　better

or　worse　than　the　other；　or　to　show；　by　the　Constitution；　that　one

differs　a　whit　from　the　other。　　He　will　tell　me；　doubtless；　that

there　is　no　constitutional　provision　against　people　taking　slaves

into　the　new　Territories；　and　I　tell　him　that　there　is　equally　no

constitutional　provision　against　buying　slaves　in　Africa。　　He　will

tell　you　that　a　people；　in　the　exercise　of　popular　sovereignty；　ought

to　do　as　they　please　about　that　thing；　and　have　slaves　if　they　want

them；　and　I　tell　you　that　the　people　of　Georgia　are　as　much　entitled

to　popular　sovereignty　and　to　buy　slaves　in　Africa；　if　they　want

them；　as　the　people　of　the　Territory　are　to　have　slaves　if　they　want

them。　　I　ask