the american republic-第52章
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personal insurgents but 〃a territorial civil war。〃 This negatived the assumption that the States that took up arms against 312 the United States remained all the while peaceable and loyal States； with all their political rights and powers in the Union。 The States in the Union are integral elements of the political sovereignty； for the sovereignty of the American nation vests in the States finite； and it is absurd to pretend that the eleven States that made the rebellion and were carrying on a formidable war against the United States； were in the Union； an integral element of that sovereign authority which was carrying on a yet more formidable war against them。 Nevertheless； the government still held to its first assumption； that the States in rebellion continued to be States in the Unionloyal States； with all their rights and franchises unimpaired！
That the government should at first have favored or acquiesced in the doctrine that no State had ceased to be a State in the Union； is not to be wondered at。 The extent and determination of the secession movement were imperfectly understood； and the belief among the supporters of the government； and； perhaps； of the government itself； was； that it was a spasmodic movement for a temporary purpose； rather than a fixed determination to found an independent separate nationality； that it was and would be sustained by the real majority 313 of the people of none of the States； with perhaps the exception of South Carolina； that the true policy of the government would be to treat the seceders with great forbearance； to avoid all measures likely to exasperate them or to embarrass their loyal fellow…citizens； to act simply on the defensive； and to leave the Union men in the several seceding States to gain a political victory at the polls over the secessionists； and to return their States to their normal position in the Union。
The government may not have had much faith in this policy； and Mr。 Lincoln's personal authority might be cited to the effect that it had not； but it was urged strongly by the Union men of the Border States。 The administration was hardly seated in office； and its members were new men； without administrative experience； the President； who had been legally elected indeed； but without a majority of the popular votes； was far from having the full confidence even of the party that elected him； opinions were divided； party spirit ran high； the excitement was great； the crisis was imminent； the government found itself left by its predecessor without an army or a navy； and almost without arms or ordnance； it knew not how far it could count on popular support； and 314 was hardly aware whom it could trust or should distrust； all was hurry and confusion； and what could the government do but to gain time； keep off active war as long as possible； conciliate all it could； and take ground which at the time seemed likely to rally the largest number of the people to its support？ There were men then； warm friends of the administration； and still warmer friends of their country； who believed that a bolder； a less timid； a less cautious policy would have been wiser； that in revolutionary times boldness； what in other times would be rashness； is the highest prudence； on the side of the government as well as on the side of the revolution； that when once it has shown itself； the rebellion that hesitates； deliberates； consults； is defeated and so is the government。 The seceders owed from the first their successes not to their superior organization； to their better preparation； or to the better discipline and appointment of their armies； but to their very rashness； to their audacity even； and the hesitancy； cautious and deliberation of the government。 Napoleon owed his successes as general and civilian far more to the air of power he assumed； and the conviction he produced of his invincibility in the minds of his opponents； than to his civil or 315 military strategy and tactics； admirable as they both were。 But the government believed it wisest to adopt a conciliatory and； in many respects； a temporizing policy； and to rely more on weakening the secessionists in their respective States than on strengthening the hands and hearts of its own staunch and uncompromising supporters。 It must strengthen the Union party in the insurrectionary States； and as this party hoped to succeed by political manipulation rather than by military force； the government must rely rather on a show of military power than on gaining any decisive battle。 As it hoped； or affected to hope； to suppress the rebellion in the States that seceded through their loyal citizens； it was obliged to assume that secession was the work of a faction； of a few ambitious and disappointed politicians； and that the States were all in the Union； and continued in the loyal portion of their inhabitants。 Hence its aid to the loyal Virginians to organize as the State of Virginia； and its subsequent efforts to organize the Union men in Louisiana； Arkansas； and Tennessee； and its disposition to recognize their organization in each of those States as the State itself； though including only a small minority of the territorial people。 Had the facts been 316 as assumed； the government might have treated the loyal people of each State as the State itself； without any gross usurpation of power； but； unhappily； the facts assumed were not facts； and it was soon found that the Union party in all the States that seceded； except the western part of Virginia and the eastern section of Tennessee； after secession had been carried by the popular vote； went almost unanimously with the secessionists； for they as well as the secessionists held the doctrine of State sovereignty； and to treat the handful of citizens that remained loyal in each State as the State itself； became ridiculous； and the government should have seen and acknowledged it。
The rebellion being really territorial； and not personal； the State that seceded was no more continued in the loyal than in the disloyal population。 While the war lasted； both were public enemies of the United States； and neither had or could have any rights as a State in the Union。 The law recognizes a solidarity of all the citizens of a State； and assumes that； when a State is at war； all its citizens are at war； whether approving the war or not。 The loyal people in the States that seceded incurred none of the pains and penalties of treason； but they retained none of the political rights of the 317 State in the Union； and； in reorganizing the State after the suppression of the rebellion； they have no more right to take part than the secessionists themselves。 They； as well as the secessionists； have followed the territory。 It was on this point that the government committed its gravest mistake。 As to the reorganization or reconstruction of the State； the whole territorial people stood on the same footing。
Taking the decision of the Supreme Court as conclusive on the subject； the rebellion was territorial； and； therefore； placed all the States as States out of the Union； and retained them only as population and territory； under or subject to the Union。 The States ceased to exist； that is； as integral elements of the national sovereignty。 The question then occurred； are they to be erected into new States； or are they to be reconstructed and restored to the Union as the identical old States that seceded？ Shall their identity be revived and preserved； or shall they be new States； regardless of that identity ？ There can be no question that the work to be done was that of restoration； not of creation； no tribe should perish from Israel； no star be struck from the firmament of the Union。 Every inhabitant of the fallen States； and every citi… 318 zen of the United States must desire them to be revived and continued with their old names and boundaries； and all true Americans wish to continue the constitution as it is； and the Union as it
