the american republic-第42章
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permissible only where there is no regular government。
The British constitution is consistent with itself； but imposes no restriction on the power of the government。 The French imperial constitution is illogical； inconsistent with itself as well as with the free action of the nation。 The American constitution has all the advantages of both； and the disadvantages of neither。 The convention is not the government like the British Parliament； nor a creature of the state like the French senate； but the sovereign state itself； in a practical form。 By means of the convention the government is restricted to its delegated powers； and these； if found in practice either 250 too great or too small； can be enlarged or contracted in a regular； orderly way； without resorting to a revolution or to a plebiscitum。 Whatever political grievances there may be； there is always present the sovereign convention competent to redress them。 The efficiency of power is thus secured without danger to liberty； and freedom without danger to power。 The recognition of the convention； the real political sovereign of the country and its separation from and independence of the ordinary government； is one of the most striking features of the American constitution。
The next thing to be noted； after the convention； is the constitution by the convention of the government。 This constitution； as Mr。 Madison well observes； divides the powers conceded by the convention to government between the General Government and the particular State governments。 Strictly speaking； the government is one； and its powers only are divided and exercised by two sets of agents or ministries。 This division of the powers of government could never have been established by the convention if the American people had not been providentially constituted one people； existing and acting through particular State organizations。 Here the unwritten constitution； or the constitution 251 written in the people themselves； rendered practicable and dictated the written constitution； or constitution ordained by the convention and engrossed on parchment。 It only expresses in the government the fact which pre…existed in the national organization and life。
This division of the powers of government is peculiar to the United States； and is an effective safeguard against both feudal disintegration and Roman centralism。 Misled by their prejudices and peculiar interests； a portion of the people of the United States； pleading in their justification the theory of State sovereignty； attempted disintegration； secession； and national independence separate from that of the United States； but the central force of the constitution was too strong for them to succeed。 The unity of the nation was too strong to be effectually broken。 No doubt the reaction against secession and disintegration will strengthen the tendency to centralism； but centralism can succeed no better than disintegration has succeeded because the General government has no subsistentia； no suppositum； to borrow a theological term； outside or independent of the States。 The particular governments are stronger； if there be any difference； to protect the States against centralism than the General government is to protect the 252 Union against disintegration； and after swinging for a time too far toward one extreme and then too far toward the other； the public mind will recover its equilibrium； and the government move on in its constitutional path。
Republican Rome attempted to guard against excessive centralism by the tribunitial veto； or by the organization of a negative or obstructive power。 Mr。 Calhoun thought this admirable； and wished to effect the same end here； where it is secured by other； more effective； and less objectionable means； by a State veto on the acts of Congress； by a dual executive； and by substituting concurrent for numerical majorities。 Imperial Rome gradually swept away the tribunitial veto； concentrated all power in the hands of the emperor； became completely centralized； and fell。 The British constitution seeks the same end by substituting estates for the state； and establishing a mixed government； in which monarchy； aristocracy； and democracy temper； check； or balance each other； but practically the commons estate has become supreme； and the nobility govern not in the house of lords； and can really influence public affairs only through the house of commons。 The principle of the British constitution is not the division of the powers of government； but the an… 253 tagonism of estates； or rather of interests； trusting to the obstructive influence of that antagonism to preserve the government from pure centralism。 Hence the study of the British statesman is to manage diverse and antagonistic parties and interests so as to gain the ability to act； which he can do only by intrigue； cajolery； bribery in one form or another； and corruption of every sort。 The British government cannot be carried on by fair； honest； and honorable means； any more than could the Roman under the antagonism created by the tribunitial veto。 The French tried the English system of organized antagonism in 1789； as a cure for the centralism introduced by Richelieu and Louis XIV。； and again under the Restoration and Louis Philippe； and called it the system of constitutional guarantees； but they could never manage it； and they have taken refuge in unmitigated centralism under Napoleon III。； who； however well disposed； finds no means in the constitution of the French nation of tempering it。 The English system； called the constitutional； and sometimes the parliamentary system； will not work in France； and indeed works really well nowhere。
The American system； sometimes called the Federal system； is not founded on antagonism 254 of classes； estates； or interests； and is in no sense a system of checks and balances。 It needs and tolerates no obstructive forces。 It does not pit section against section； the States severally against the General government； nor the General government against the State governments； and nothing is more hurtful than the attempt to explain it and work it on the principles of British constitutionalism。 The convention created no antagonistic powers； it simply divided the powers of government； and gave neither to the General government nor to the State governments all the powers of government； nor in any instance did it give to the two governments jurisdiction in the same matters。 Hence each has its own sphere； in which it can move on without colliding with that of the other。 Each is independent and complete in relation to its own work； incomplete and dependent on the other for the complete work of government。
The division of power is not between a NATIONAL government and State governments； but between a GENERAL government and particular governments。 The General government； inasmuch as it extends to matters common to all the States； is usually called the Government of the United States； and sometimes the Federal 255 government； to distinguish it from the particular or State governments； but without strict propriety； for the government of the United States； or the Federal government； means； in strictness； both the General government and the particular Governments； since neither is in itself the complete government of the country。 The General government has authority within each of the States； and each of the State governments has authority in the Union。 The line between the Union and the States severally； is not precisely the line between the General government and the particular governments。 As； for instance； the General government lays direct taxes on the people of the States； and collects internal revenue within them； and the citizens of a particular State； and none others； are electors of President and Vice…President of the United States； and representatives in the lower house of Congress； while senators in Congress are elected by the State legislatures
