cratylus-第38章

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is　given　by　custom　and　not　by　likeness；　for　custom　may　indicate　by　the

unlike　as　well　as　by　the　like。　　But　as　we　are　agreed　thus　far；　Cratylus

（for　I　shall　assume　that　your　silence　gives　consent）；　then　custom　and

convention　must　be　supposed　to　contribute　to　the　indication　of　our

thoughts；　for　suppose　we　take　the　instance　of　number；　how　can　you　ever

imagine；　my　good　friend；　that　you　will　find　names　resembling　every

individual　number；　unless　you　allow　that　which　you　term　convention　and

agreement　to　have　authority　in　determining　the　correctness　of　names？　　I

quite　agree　with　you　that　words　should　as　far　as　possible　resemble　things；

but　I　fear　that　this　dragging　in　of　resemblance；　as　Hermogenes　says；　is　a

shabby　thing；　which　has　to　be　supplemented　by　the　mechanical　aid　of

convention　with　a　view　to　correctness；　for　I　believe　that　if　we　could

always；　or　almost　always；　use　likenesses；　which　are　perfectly　appropriate；

this　would　be　the　most　perfect　state　of　language；　as　the　opposite　is　the

most　imperfect。　　But　let　me　ask　you；　what　is　the　force　of　names；　and　what

is　the　use　of　them？



CRATYLUS：　　The　use　of　names；　Socrates；　as　I　should　imagine；　is　to　inform：　

the　simple　truth　is；　that　he　who　knows　names　knows　also　the　things　which

are　expressed　by　them。



SOCRATES：　　I　suppose　you　mean　to　say；　Cratylus；　that　as　the　name　is；　so

also　is　the　thing；　and　that　he　who　knows　the　one　will　also　know　the　other；

because　they　are　similars；　and　all　similars　fall　under　the　same　art　or

science；　and　therefore　you　would　say　that　he　who　knows　names　will　also　know

things。



CRATYLUS：　　That　is　precisely　what　I　mean。



SOCRATES：　　But　let　us　consider　what　is　the　nature　of　this　information　about

things　which；　according　to　you；　is　given　us　by　names。　　Is　it　the　best　sort

of　information？　or　is　there　any　other？　　What　do　you　say？



CRATYLUS：　　I　believe　that　to　be　both　the　only　and　the　best　sort　of

information　about　them；　there　can　be　no　other。



SOCRATES：　　But　do　you　believe　that　in　the　discovery　of　them；　he　who

discovers　the　names　discovers　also　the　things；　or　is　this　only　the　method

of　instruction；　and　is　there　some　other　method　of　enquiry　and　discovery。



CRATYLUS：　　I　certainly　believe　that　the　methods　of　enquiry　and　discovery

are　of　the　same　nature　as　instruction。



SOCRATES：　　Well；　but　do　you　not　see；　Cratylus；　that　he　who　follows　names　in

the　search　after　things；　and　analyses　their　meaning；　is　in　great　danger　of

being　deceived？



CRATYLUS：　　How　so？



SOCRATES：　　Why　clearly　he　who　first　gave　names　gave　them　according　to　his

conception　of　the　things　which　they　signifieddid　he　not？



CRATYLUS：　　True。



SOCRATES：　　And　if　his　conception　was　erroneous；　and　he　gave　names　according

to　his　conception；　in　what　position　shall　we　who　are　his　followers　find

ourselves？　　Shall　we　not　be　deceived　by　him？



CRATYLUS：　　But；　Socrates；　am　I　not　right　in　thinking　that　he　must　surely

have　known；　or　else；　as　I　was　saying；　his　names　would　not　be　names　at　all？　

And　you　have　a　clear　proof　that　he　has　not　missed　the　truth；　and　the　proof

isthat　he　is　perfectly　consistent。　　Did　you　ever　observe　in　speaking　that

all　the　words　which　you　utter　have　a　common　character　and　purpose？



SOCRATES：　　But　that；　friend　Cratylus；　is　no　answer。　　For　if　he　did　begin　in

error；　he　may　have　forced　the　remainder　into　agreement　with　the　original

error　and　with　himself；　there　would　be　nothing　strange　in　this；　any　more

than　in　geometrical　diagrams；　which　have　often　a　slight　and　invisible　flaw

in　the　first　part　of　the　process；　and　are　consistently　mistaken　in　the　long

deductions　which　follow。　　And　this　is　the　reason　why　every　man　should

expend　his　chief　thought　and　attention　on　the　consideration　of　his　first

principles：are　they　or　are　they　not　rightly　laid　down？　and　when　he　has

duly　sifted　them；　all　the　rest　will　follow。　　Now　I　should　be　astonished　to

find　that　names　are　really　consistent。　　And　here　let　us　revert　to　our

former　discussion：　　Were　we　not　saying　that　all　things　are　in　motion　and

progress　and　flux；　and　that　this　idea　of　motion　is　expressed　by　names？　　Do

you　not　conceive　that　to　be　the　meaning　of　them？



CRATYLUS：　　Yes；　that　is　assuredly　their　meaning；　and　the　true　meaning。



SOCRATES：　　Let　us　revert　to　episteme　（knowledge）　and　observe　how　ambiguous

this　word　is；　seeming　rather　to　signify　stopping　the　soul　at　things　than

going　round　with　them；　and　therefore　we　should　leave　the　beginning　as　at

present；　and　not　reject　the　epsilon；　but　make　an　insertion　of　an　iota

instead　of　an　epsilon　（not　pioteme；　but　epiisteme）。　　Take　another　example：　

bebaion　（sure）　is　clearly　the　expression　of　station　and　position；　and　not

of　motion。　　Again；　the　word　istoria　（enquiry）　bears　upon　the　face　of　it　the

stopping　（istanai）　of　the　stream；　and　the　word　piston　（faithful）　certainly

indicates　cessation　of　motion；　then；　again；　mneme　（memory）；　as　any　one　may

see；　expresses　rest　in　the　soul；　and　not　motion。　　Moreover；　words　such　as

amartia　and　sumphora；　which　have　a　bad　sense；　viewed　in　the　light　of　their

etymologies　will　be　the　same　as　sunesis　and　episteme　and　other　words　which

have　a　good　sense　（compare　omartein；　sunienai；　epesthai；　sumpheresthai）；

and　much　the　same　may　be　said　of　amathia　and　akolasia；　for　amathia　may　be

explained　as　e　ama　theo　iontos　poreia；　and　akolasia　as　e　akolouthia　tois

pragmasin。　　Thus　the　names　which　in　these　instances　we　find　to　have　the

worst　sense；　will　turn　out　to　be　framed　on　the　same　principle　as　those

which　have　the　best。　　And　any　one　I　believe　who　would　take　the　trouble

might　find　many　other　examples　in　which　the　giver　of　names　indicates；　not

that　things　are　in　motion　or　progress；　but　that　they　are　at　rest；　which　is

the　opposite　of　motion。



CRATYLUS：　　Yes；　Socrates；　but　observe；　the　greater　number　express　motion。



SOCRATES：　　What　of　that；　Cratylus？　　Are　we　to　count　them　like　votes？　and　is

correctness　of　names　the　voice　of　the　majority？　　Are　we　to　say　of　whichever

sort　there　are　most；　those　are　the　true　ones？



CRATYLUS：　　No；　that　is　not　reasonable。



SOCRATES：　　Certainly　not。　　But　let　us　have　done　with　this　question　and

proceed　to　another；　about　which　I　should　like　to　know　whether　you　think

with　me。　　Were　we　not　lately　acknowledging　that　the　first　givers　of　names

in　states；　both　Hellenic　and　barbarous；　were　the　legislators；　and　that　the

art　which　gave　names　was　the　art　of　the　legislator？



CRATYLUS：　　Quite　true。



SOCRATES：　　Tell　me；　then；　did　the　first　legislators；　who　were　the　givers　of

the　first　names；　know　or　not　know　the　things　which　they　named？



CRATYLUS：　　They　must　have　known；　Socrates。



SOCRATES：　　Why；　yes；　friend　Cratylus；　they　could　hardly　have　been　ignorant。



CRATYLUS：　　I　should　say　not。



SOCRATES：　　Let　us　return　to　the　point　from　which　we　digressed。　　You　were

saying；　if　you　remember；　that　he　who　gave　names　must　have　known　the　things

which　he　named；　are　you　still　of　that　opinion？



CRATYLUS：　　I　am。



SOCRATES：　　And　would　you　say　that　the　giver　of　the　first　names　had　also　a

knowledge　of　the　things　which　he　named？



CRATYLUS：　　I　should。



SOCRATES：　　But　how　could　he　have　learned　or　discovered　things　from　names　if

the　primitive　names　were　not　yet　given？　　For；　if　we　are　correct　in　our

view；　the　only　way　of　learning　and　discovering　things；　is　either　to

discover　names　for　ourselves　or　to　learn　them　from　others。



CRATYLUS：　　I　think　that　there　is　a　good　deal　in　what　you　say；　Socrates。



SOCRATES：　　But　if　things　are　only　to　be　known　through　names；　how　can　we

suppose　that　the　givers　of　names　had　knowledge；　or　were　legislators　before

there　were　names　at　all；　and　therefore　before　they　could　have　known　them？



CRATYLUS：　　I　believe；　Socrates；　the　true　account　of　the　matter　to　be；　that

a　power　more　than　human　gave　things　their　first　names；　and　that　the　names

which　are　thus　given　are　necessarily　their　true　names。



SOCRATES：　　Then　how　came　the　giver　of　the　names；　if　he　was　an　inspired