statesman-第9章
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页,按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页,按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部!
————未阅读完?加入书签已便下次继续阅读!
Y。 Soc。 Plainly。
Str。 Then we must suppose that the great and small exist and are
discerned in both these ways; and not; as we were saying before;
only relatively to one another; but there must also be another
comparison of them with the mean or ideal standard; would you like
to hear the reason why?
Y。 Soc。 Certainly。
Str。 If we assume the greater to exist only in relation to
the less;
there will never be any comparison of either with the mean。
Y。 Soc。 True。
Str。 And would not this doctrine be the ruin of all the arts and
their creations; would not the art of the Statesman and the
aforesaid art of weaving disappear? For all these arts are on the
watch against excess and defect; not as unrealities; but as real
evils; which occasion a difficulty in action; and the excellence of
beauty of every work of art is due to this observance of measure。
Y。 Soc。 Certainly。
Str。 But if the science of the Statesman disappears; the search
for the royal science will be impossible。
Y。 Soc。 Very true。
Str。 Well; then; as in the case of the Sophist we extorted the
inference that not…being had an existence; because here was the
point at which the argument eluded our grasp; so in this we must
endeavour to show that the greater and; less are not only to be
measured with one another; but also have to do with the production
of the mean; for if this is not admitted; neither a statesman nor
any other man of action can be an undisputed master of his science。
Y。 Soc。 Yes; we must certainly do again what we did then。
Str。 But this; Socrates; is a greater work than the other; of
which we only too well remember the length。 I think; however; that
we may fairly assume something of this sort…
Y。 Soc。 What?
Str。 That we shall some day require this notion of a mean with a
view to the demonstration of absolute truth; meanwhile; the argument
that the very existence of the arts must be held to depend on the
possibility of measuring more or less; not only with one another;
but also with a view to the attainment of the mean; seems to afford
a grand support and satisfactory proof of the doctrine which we are
maintaining; for if there are arts; there is a standard of measure;
and if there is a standard of measure; there are arts; but if either
is wanting; there is neither。
Y。 Soc。 True; and what is the next step?
Str。 The next step clearly is to divide the art of measurement
into two parts; all we have said already; and to place in
the one part
all the arts which measure number; length; depth; breadth; swiftness
with their opposites; and to have another part in which they are
measured with the mean; and the fit; and the opportune; and the due;
and with all those words; in short; which denote a mean or standard
removed from the extremes。
Y。 Soc。 Here are two vast divisions; embracing two very different
spheres。
Str。 There are many accomplished men; Socrates; who say; believing
themselves to speak wisely; that the art of measurement is
universal; and has to do with all things。 And this means what we are
now saying; for all things which come within the province of art do
certainly in some sense partake of measure。 But these
persons; because
they are not accustomed to distinguish classes according to real
forms; jumble together two widely different things; relation to one
another; and to a standard; under the idea that they are the
same; and
also fall into the converse error of dividing other things not
according to their real parts。 Whereas the right way is; if a man
has first seen the unity of things; to go on with the enquiry and
not desist until he has found all the differences contained in it
which form distinct classes; nor again should he be able to rest
contented with the manifold diversities which are seen in a
multitude of things until he has comprehended all of them that have
any affinity within the bounds of one similarity and embraced them
within the reality of a single kind。 But we have said enough on this
head; and also of excess and defect; we have only to bear in
mind that
two divisions of the art of measurement have been discovered
which are
concerned with them; and not forget what they are。
Y。 Soc。 We will not forget。
Str。 And now that this discussion is completed; let us go on to
consider another question; which concerns not this argument only but
the conduct of such arguments in general。
Y。 Soc。 What is this new question?
Str。 Take the case of a child who is engaged in learning his
letters: when he is asked what letters make up a word; should we say
that the question is intended to improve his grammatical knowledge
of that particular word; or of all words?
Y。 Soc。 Clearly; in order that he may have a better
knowledge of all
words。
Str。 And is our enquiry about the Statesman intended only
to improve
our knowledge of politics; or our power of reasoning generally?
Y。 Soc。 Clearly; as in the former example; the purpose is general。
Str。 Still less would any rational man seek to analyse the
notion of
weaving for its own sake。 But people seem to forget that some things
have sensible images; which are readily known; and can be easily
pointed out when any one desires to answer an enquirer without any
trouble or argument; whereas the greatest and highest truths have no
outward image of themselves visible to man; which he who wishes to
satisfy the soul of the enquirer can adapt to the eye of sense; and
therefore we ought to train ourselves to give and accept a rational
account of them; for immaterial things; which are the noblest and
greatest; are shown only in thought and idea; and in no
other way; and
all that we are now saying is said for the sake of them。 Moreover;
there is always less difficulty in fixing the mind on small matters
than on great。
Y。 Soc。 Very good。
Str。 Let us call to mind the bearing of all this。
Y。 Soc。 What is it?
Str。 I wanted to get rid of any impression of tediousness which we
may have experienced in the discussion about weaving; and
the reversal
of the universe; and in the discussion concerning the Sophist and
the being of not…being。 I know that they were felt to be too
long; and
I reproached myself with this; fearing that they might be not only
tedious but irrelevant; and all that I have now said is only
designed to prevent the recurrence of any such disagreeables for the
future。
Y。 Soc。 Very good。 Will you proceed?
Str。 Then I would like to observe that you and I; remembering what
has been said; should praise or blame the length or shortness of
discussions; not by comparing them with one another; but with what
is fitting; having regard to the part of measurement; which; as we
said; was to be borne in mind。
Y。 Soc。 Very true。
Str。 And yet; not everything is to be judged even with a view to
what is fitting; for we should only want such a length as is
suited to
give pleasure; if at all; as a secondary matter; and reason tells
us; that we should be contented to make the ease or rapidity of an
enquiry; not our first; but our second object; the first and highest
of all being to assert the great method of division according to
species…whether the discourse be shorter or longer is not to the
point。 No offence should be taken at length; but the longer and
shorter are to be employed indifferently; according as either of
them is better calculated to sharpen the wits of the auditors。
Reason would also say to him who censures the length of discourses
on such occasions and cannot away with their circumlocution; that he
should not be in such a hurry to have done with them; when
he can only
complain that they are tedious; but he should prove that if they had
been shorter they would have made those who took part in them better
dialecticians; and more capable of expressing the truth of things;
about any other praise and blame; he need not trouble himself…he
should pretend not to hear them。 But we have had enough of this; as
you will probably agree with me in thinking。 Let us return to our