personal memoirs-2-第23章

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where　the　infantry　was　to　form　for　attack。



Gillespie　delivered　the　order　about　1　o'clock；　and　when　the　corps　was

put　in　motion；　General　Warren　joined　me　at　the　front。　　Before　he

came；　I　had　received；　through　Colonel　Babcock；　authority　from　General

Grant　to　relieve　him；　but　I　did　not　wish　to　do　it；　particularly　on

the　eve　of　battle；　so；　saying　nothing　at　all　about　the　message

brought　me；　I　entered　at　once　on　the　plan　for　defeating　Pickett；

telling　Warren　how　the　enemy　was　posted；　explaining　with　considerable

detail；　and　concluding　by　stating　that　I　wished　his　troops　to　be

formed　on　the　Gravelly　Church　road；　near　its　junction　with　the　White

Oak　road；　with　two　divisions　to　the　front；　aligned　obliquely　to　the

White　Oak　road；　and　one　in　reserve；　opposite　the　centre　of　these　two。



General　Warren　seemed　to　understand　me　clearly；　and　then　left　to　join

his　command；　while　I　turned　my　attention　to　the　cavalry；　instructing

Merritt　to　begin　by　making　demonstrations　as　though　to　turn　the

enemy's　right；　and　to　assault　the　front　of　the　works　with　his

dismounted　cavalry　as　soon　as　Warren　became　engaged。　　Afterward　I

rode　around　to　Gravelly　Run　Church；　and　found　the　head　of　Warren's

column　just　appearing；　while　he　was　sitting　under　a　tree　making　a

rough　sketch　of　the　ground。　　I　was　disappointed　that　more　of　the

corps　was　not　already　up；　and　as　the　precious　minutes　went　by　without

any　apparent　effort　to　hurry　the　troops　on　to　the　field；　this

disappointment　grew　into　disgust。　　At　last　I　expressed　to　Warren　my

fears　that　the　cavalry　might　expend　all　their　ammunition　before　the

attack　could　be　made；　that　the　sun　would　go　down　before　the　battle

could　be　begun；　or　that　troops　from　Lee's　right；　which；　be　it

remembered；　was　less　than　three　miles　away　from　my　right；　might；　by

striking　my　rear；　or　even　by　threatening　it；　prevent　the　attack　on

Pickett。



Warren　did　not　seem　to　me　to　be　at　all　solicitous；　his　manner

exhibited　decided　apathy；　and　he　remarked　with　indifference　that

〃Bobby　Lee　was　always　getting　people　into　trouble。〃　　With　unconcern

such　as　this；　it　is　no　wonder　that　fully　three　hours'　time　was

consumed　in　marching　his　corps　from　J。＇G＇　　Boisseau's　to　Gravelly　Run

Church；　though　the　distance　was　but　two　miles。　　However；　when　my

patience　was　almost　worn　out；　Warren　reported　his　troops　ready；

Ayres's　division　being　formed　on　the　west　side　of　the　Gravelly　Church

road；　Crawford's　on　the　east　side；　and　Griffin　in　reserve　behind　the

right　of　Crawford；　a　little　different　from　my　instructions。　　The

corps　had　no　artillery　present；　its　batteries；　on　account　of　the　mud；

being　still　north　of　Gravelly　Run。　　Meanwhile　Merritt　had　been　busy

working　his　men　close　up　to　the　intrenchments　from　the　angle　of　the

return　west；　along　the　White　Oak　road。



About　4　o'clock　Warren　began　the　attack。　　He　was　to　assault　the　left

flank　of　the　Confederate　infantry　at　a　point　where　I　knew　Pickett's

intrenchments　were　refused；　almost　at　right　angles　with　the　White　Oak

road。　　I　did　not　know　exactly　how　far　toward　Hatcher's　Run　this　part

of　the　works　extended；　for　here　the　videttes　of　Mumford's　cavalry

were　covering；　but　I　did　know　where　the　refusal　began。　　This　return；

then；　was　the　point　I　wished　to　assail；　believing　that　if　the　assault

was　made　with　spirit；　the　line　could　be　turned。　　I　therefore　intended

that　Ayres　and　Crawford　should　attack　the　refused　trenches　squarely；

and　when　these　two　divisions　and　Merritt's　cavalry　became　hotly

engaged；　Griffin's　division　was　to　pass　around　the　left　of　the

Confederate　line；　and　I　personally　instructed　Griffin　how　I　wished

him　to　go　in；　telling　him　also　that　as　he　advanced；　his　right　flank

would　be　taken　care　of　by　Mackenzie；who　was　to　be　pushed　over　toward

the　Ford　road　and　Hatcher's　Run。



The　front　of　the　corps　was　oblique　to　the　White　Oak　road；　and　on

getting　there；　it　was　to　swing　round　to　the　left　till　perpendicular

to　the　road；　keeping　closed　to　the　left。　　Ayres　did　his　part　well；

and　to　the　letter；　bringing　his　division　square　up　to　the　front　of

the　return　near　the　angle；　but　Crawford　did　not　wheel　to　the　left；　as

was　intended。　　On　the　contrary；　on　receiving　fire　from　Mumford's

cavalry；　Crawford　swerved　to　the　right　and　moved　north　from　the

return；　thus　isolating　his　division　from　Ayres；　and　Griffin；

uncertain　of　the　enemy's　position；　naturally　followed　Crawford。



The　deflection　of　this　division　on　a　line　of　march　which　finally

brought　it　out　on　the　Ford　road　near　C。　Young's　house；　frustrated　the

purpose　I　had　in　mind　when　ordering　the　attack；　and　caused　a　gap

between　Ayres　and　Crawford；　of　which　the　enemy　quickly　took

advantage；　and　succeeded　in　throwing　a　part　of　Ayres's　division　into

confusion。　　At　this　juncture　I　sent　word　to　General　Warren　to　have

Crawford　recalled；　for　the　direction　he　was　following　was　not　only　a

mistaken　one；　but；　in　case　the　assault　at　the　return　failed；　he　ran

great　risk　of　capture。　　Warren　could　not　be　found；　so　I　then　sent　for

Griffinfirst　by　Colonel　Newhall；　and　then　by　Colonel　Shermanto

come　to　the　aid　of　Ayres；　who　was　now　contending　alone　with　that　part

of　the　enemy's　infantry　at　the　return。　　By　this　time　Griffin　had

observed　and　appreciated　Crawford's　mistake；　however；　and　when　the

staff…officers　reached　him；　was　already　faced　to　the　left；　so；

marching　across　Crawford's　rear；　he　quickly　joined　Ayres；　who

meanwhile　had　rallied　his　troops　and　carried　the　return。



When　Ayres's　division　went　over　the　flank　of　the　enemy's　works；

Devin's　division　of　cavalry；　which　had　been　assaulting　the　front；

went　over　in　company　with　it；　and　hardly　halting　to　reform；　the

intermingling　infantry　and　dismounted　cavalry　swept　down　inside　the

intrenchments；　pushing　to　and　beyond　Five　Forks；　capturing　thousands

of　prisoners。　　The　only　stand　the　enemy　tried　to　make　was　when　he

attempted　to　form　near　the　Ford　road。　　Griffin　pressed　him　so　hard

there；　however；　that　he　had　to　give　way　in　short　order；　and　many　of

his　men；　with　three　pieces　of　artillery；　fell　into　the　hands　of

Crawford　while　on　his　circuitous　march。



The　right　of　Custer's　division　gained　a　foothold　on　the　enemy's　works

simultaneously　with　Devin's；　but　on　the　extreme　left　Custer　had　a

very　severe　combat　with　W。　H。　F。　Lee's　cavalry；　as　well　as　with

Corse's　and　Terry's　infantry。　　Attacking　Terry　and　Corse　with

Pennington's　brigade　dismounted；　he　assailed　Lee's　cavalry　with　his

other　two　brigades　mounted；　but　Lee　held　on　so　obstinately　that

Custer　gained　but　little　ground　till　our　troops；　advancing　behind　the

works；　drove　Corse　and　Terry　out。　　Then　Lee　made　no　further　stand

except　at　the　west　side　of　the　Gillian　field；　where；　assisted　by

Corse's　brigade；　he　endeavored　to　cover　the　retreat；　but　just　before

dark　Custer；　in　concert　with　some　Fifth　Corps　regiments　under　Colonel

Richardson；　drove　ihe　last　of　the　enemy　westward　on　the　White　Oak

road。



Our　success　was　unqualified；　we　had　overthrown　Pickett；　taken　six

guns；　thirteen　battle…flags；　and　nearly　six　thousand　prisoners。　　When

the　battle　was　practically　over；　I　turned　to　consider　my　position

with　reference　to　the　main　Confederate　army。　　My　troops；　though

victorious；　were　isolated　from　the　Army　of　the　Potomac；　for　on　the

31st　of　March　the　extreme　left　of　that　army　had　been　thrown　back

nearly　to　the　Boydton　plank…road；　and　hence　there　was　nothing　to

prevent　the　enemy's　issuing　from　his　trenches　at　the　intersection　of

the　White　Oak　and　Claiborne　roads　and　marching　directly　on　my　rear。

I　surmised　that　he　might　do　this　that　night　or　early　next　morning。

It　was　therefore　necessary　to　protect　myself　in　this　critical

situation；　and　General　Warren　having　sorely　disappointed　me；　both　in

the　moving　of　his　corps　and　in　its　management　during　the　battle；　I

felt　that　he　was　not　the　man　to　rely　upon　under　such　circumstances；

and　deeming　that　it　was　to　the　best　interest　of　the　service　as　well

as　but　just　to　myself；　I　relieved　him；　ordering　him　to　report