personal memoirs-2-第2章

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whose　judgment；　warped　by　their　interests　in　the　Baltimore　and　Ohio

railroad；　was　often　confused　and　misled　by　stories　of　scouts　（sent

out　from　Washington）；　averring　that　Kershaw　and　Fitzhugh　Lee　had

returned　to　Petersburg；　Breckenridge　to　southwestern　Virginia；　and　at

one　time　even　maintaining　that　Early's　whole　army　was　east　of　the

Blue　Ridge；　and　its　commander　himself　at　Gordonsville。



During　the　inactivity　prevailing　in　my　army　for　the　ten　days

preceding　Miss　Wright's　communication　the　infantry　was　quiet；　with

the　exception　of　Getty's　division；　which　made　a　reconnoissance　to　the

Opequon；　and　developed　a　heavy　force　of　the　enemy　at　Edwards's

Corners。　　The　cavalry；　however；　was　employed　a　good　deal　in　this

interval　skirmishing　heavily　at　times　to　maintain　a　space　about　six

miles　in　width　between　the　hostile　lines；　for　I　wished　to　control

this　ground　so　that　when　I　was　released　from　the　instructions　of

August　12；　I　could　move　my　men　into　position　for　attack　without　the

knowledge　of　Early。　　The　most　noteworthy　of　these　mounted　encounters

was　that　of　McIntosh's　brigade；　which　captured　the　Eighth　South

Carolina　at　Abraham's　Creek　September　13。



It　was　the　evening　of　the　16th　of　September　that　I　received　from　Miss

Wright　the　positive　information　that　Kershaw　was　in　march　toward

Front　Royal　on　his　way　by　Chester　Gap　to　Richmond。　　Concluding　that

this　was　my　opportunity；　I　at　once　resolved　to　throw　my　whole　force

into　Newtown　the　next　day；　but　a　despatch　from　General　Grant

directing　me　to　meet　him　at　Charlestown；　whither　he　was　coming　to

consult　with　me；　caused　me　to　defer　action　until　after　I　should　see

him。　　In　our　resulting　interview　at　Charlestown；　I　went　over　the

situation　very　thoroughly；　and　pointed　out　with　so　much　confidence

the　chances　of　a　complete　victory　should　I　throw　my　army　across　the

Valley　pike　near　Newtown　that　he　fell　in　with　the　plan　at　once；

authorized　me　to　resume　the　offensive；　and　to　attack　Early　as　soon　as

I　deemed　it　most　propitious　to　do　so；　and　although　before　leaving

City　Point　he　had　outlined　certain　operations　for　my　army；　yet　he

neither　discussed　nor　disclosed　his　plans；　my　knowledge　of　the

situation　striking　him　as　being　so　much　more　accurate　than　his　own。





＇Extract　from　Grant's　Memoirs；〃　page　328。＇



〃。。。。Before　starting　I　had　drawn　up　a　plan　of　campaign　for　Sheridan；

which　I　had　brought　with　me；　but　seeing　that　he　was　so　clear　and　so

positive　in　his　views；　and　so　confident　of　success；　I　said　nothing

about　this；　and　did　not　take　it　out　of　my　pocket。。。。〃







The　interview　over；　I　returned　to　my　army　to　arrange　for　its　movement

toward　Newtown；　but　while　busy　with　these　preparations；　a　report　came

to　me　from　General　Averell　which　showed　that　Early　was　moving　with

two　divisions　of　infantry　toward　Martinsburg。　　This　considerably

altered　the　state　of　affairs；　and　I　now　decided　to　change　my　plan　and

attack　at　once　the　two　divisions　remaining　about　Winchester　and

Stephenson's　depot；　and　later；　the　two　sent　to　Martinsburg；　the

disjointed　state　of　the　enemy　giving　me　an　opportunity　to　take　him　in

detail；　unless　the　Martinsburg　column　should　be　returned　by　forced

marches。



While　General　Early　was　in　the　telegraph　office　at　Martinsburg　on　the

morning　of　the　18th；　he　learned　of　Grant's　visit　to　me；　and

anticipating　activity　by　reason　of　this　circumstance；　he　promptly

proceeded　to　withdraw　so　as　to　get　the　two　divisions　within

supporting　distance　of　Ramseur's；　which　lay　across　the　Berryville

pike　about　two　miles　east　of　Winchester；　between　Abraham's　Creek　and

Red　Bud　Run；　so　by　the　night　of　the　18th　Wharton's　division；　under

Breckenridge；　was　at　Stephenson's　depot；　Rodes　near　there；　and

Gordon's　at　Bunker　Hill。　　At　daylight　of　the　19th　these　positions　of

the　Confederate　infantry　still　obtained；　with　the　cavalry　of　Lomax；

Jackson；　and　Johnson　on　the　right　of　Ramseur；　while　to　the　left　and

rear　of　the　enemy；s　general　line　was　Fitzhugh　Lee；　covering　from

Stephenson's　depot　west　across　the　Valley　pike　to　Applepie　Ridge。



My　army　moved　at　3　o'clock　that　morning。　　The　plan　was　for　Torbert　to

advance　with　Merritt's　division　of　cavalry　from　Summit　Point；　carry

the　crossings　of　the　Opequon　at　Stevens's　and　Lock's　fords；　and　form

a　junction　near　Stephenson's　depot；　with　Averell；　who　was　to　move

south　from　Darksville　by　the　Valley　pike。　　Meanwhile；　Wilson　was　to

strike　up　the　Berryville　pike；　carry　the　Berryville　crossing　of　the

Opequon；　charge　through　the　gorge　or　canyon　on　the　road　west　of　the

stream；　and　occupy　the　open　ground　at　the　head　of　this　defile。

Wilson's　attack　was　to　be　supported　by　the　Sixth　and　Nineteenth

corps；　which　were　ordered　to　the　Berryville　crossing；　and　as　the

cavalry　gained　the　open　ground　beyond　the　gorge；　the　two　infantry

corps；　under　command　of　General　Wright；　were　expected　to　press　on

after　and　occupy　Wilson's　ground；　who　was　then　to　shift　to　the　south

bank　of　Abraham's　Creek　and　cover　my　left；　Crook's　two　divisions；

having　to　march　from　Summit　Point；　were　to　follow　the　Sixth　and

Nineteenth　corps　to　the　Opcquon；　and　should　they　arrive　before　the

action　began；　they　were　to　be　held　in　reserve　till　the　proper　moment

came；　and　then；　as　a　turning…column；　be　thrown　over　toward　the　Valley

pike；　south　of　Winchester。



McIntosh's　brigade　of　Wilson's　division　drove　the　enemy's　pickets

away　from　the　Berryville　crossing　at　dawn；　and　Wilson　following

rapidly　through　the　gorge　with　the　rest　of　the　division；　debouched

from　its　western　extremity　with　such　suddenness　as　to　capture　a　small

earthwork　in　front　of　General　Ramseur's　main　line；　and　not…

withstanding　the　Confederate　infantry；　on　recovering　from　its

astonishment；　tried　hard　to　dislodge　them；　Wilson's　troopers

obstinately　held　the　work　till　the　Sixth　Corps　came　up。　　I　followed

Wilson　to　select　the　ground　on　which　to　form　the　infantry。　　The　Sixth

Corps　began　to　arrive　about　8　o'clock；　and　taking　up　the　line　Wilson

had　been　holding；　just　beyond　the　head　of　the　narrow　ravine；　the

cavalry　was　transferred　to　the　south　side　of　Abraham's　Creek。



The　Confederate　line　lay　along　some　elevated　ground　about　two　miles

east　of　Winchester；　and　extended　from　Abraham's　Creek　north　across

the　Berryville　pike；　the　left　being　hidden　in　the　heavy　timber　on　Red

Bud　Run。　　Between　this　line　and　mine；　especially　on　my　right；　clumps

of　woods　and　patches　of　underbrush　occurred　here　and　there；　but　the

undulating　ground　consisted　mainly　of　open　fields；　many　of　which　were

covered　with　standing　corn　that　had　already　ripened。



Much　time　was　lost　in　getting　all　of　the　Sixth　and　Nineteenth　corps

through　the　narrow　defile；　Grover's　division　being　greatly　delayed

there　by　a　train　of　ammunition　wagons；　and　it　was　not　until　late　in

the　forenoon　that　the　troops　intended　for　the　attack　could　be　got

into　line　ready　to　advance。　　General　Early　was　not　slow　to　avail

himself　of　the　advantages　thus　offered　him；　and　my　chances　of

striking　him　in　detail　were　growing　less　every　moment；　for　Gordon　and

Rodes　were　hurrying　their　divisions　from　Stephenson's　depotacross…

country　on　a　line　that　would　place　Gordon　in　the　woods　south　of　Red

Bud　Run；　and　bring　Rodes　into　the　interval　between　Gordon　and

Ramseur。



When　the　two　corps　had　all　got　through　the　canyon　they　were　formed

with　Getty's　division　of　the　Sixth　to　the　left　of　the　Berryville

pike；　Rickett's　division　to　the　right　of　the　pike；　and　Russell's

division　in　reserve　in　rear　of　the　other　two。　　Grover's　division　of

the　Nineteenth　Corps　came　next　on　the　right　of　Rickett's；　with　Dwight

to　its　rear　in　reserve；　while　Crook　was　to　begin　massing　near　the

Opequon　crossing　about　the　time　Wright　and　Emory　were　ready　to

attack。



Just　before　noon　the　line　of　Getty；　Ricketts；　and　Grover　moved

forward；　and　as　we　advanced；　the　Confederates；　covered　by　some　heavy

woods　on　their　right；　slight　underbrush　and　corn…fields　along　their

Centre；　and　a　large　body　of　timber　on　thei