the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第69章

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　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Appearance。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　A。　OF　REASON　IN　GENERAL。

　　All　our　knowledge　begins　with　sense；　proceeds　thence　to
understanding；　and　ends　with　reason；　beyond　which　nothing　higher　can
be　discovered　in　the　human　mind　for　elaborating　the　matter　of
intuition　and　subjecting　it　to　the　highest　unity　of　thought。　At　this
stage　of　our　inquiry　it　is　my　duty　to　give　an　explanation　of　this；　the
highest　faculty　of　cognition；　and　I　confess　I　find　myself　here　in　some
difficulty。　Of　reason；　as　of　the　understanding；　there　is　a　merely
formal；　that　is；　logical　use；　in　which　it　makes　abstraction　of　all
content　of　cognition；　but　there　is　also　a　real　use；　inasmuch　as　it
contains　in　itself　the　source　of　certain　conceptions　and　principles；
which　it　does　not　borrow　either　from　the　senses　or　the
understanding。　The　former　faculty　has　been　long　defined　by　logicians
as　the　faculty　of　mediate　conclusion　in　contradistinction　to　immediate
conclusions　（consequentiae　immediatae）；　but　the　nature　of　the
latter；　which　itself　generates　conceptions；　is　not　to　be　understood
from　this　definition。　Now　as　a　division　of　reason　into　a　logical　and　a
transcendental　faculty　presents　itself　here；　it　bees　necessary　to
seek　for　a　higher　conception　of　this　source　of　cognition　which　shall
prehend　both　conceptions。　In　this　we　may　expect；　according　to　the
analogy　of　the　conceptions　of　the　understanding；　that　the　logical
conception　will　give　us　the　key　to　the　transcendental；　and　that　the
table　of　the　functions　of　the　former　will　present　us　with　the　clue
to　the　conceptions　of　reason。
　　In　the　former　part　of　our　transcendental　logic；　we　defined　the
understanding　to　be　the　faculty　of　rules；　reason　may　be
distinguished　from　understanding　as　the　faculty　of　principles。
　　The　term　principle　is　ambiguous；　and　monly　signifies　merely　a
cognition　that　may　be　employed　as　a　principle；　although　it　is　not　in
itself；　and　as　regards　its　proper　origin；　entitled　to　the　distinction。
Every　general　proposition；　even　if　derived　from　experience　by　the
process　of　induction；　may　serve　as　the　major　in　a　syllogism；　but　it　is
not　for　that　reason　a　principle。　Mathematical　axioms　（for　example；
there　can　be　only　one　straight　line　between　two　points）　are　general
a　priori　cognitions；　and　are　therefore　rightly　denominated　principles；
relatively　to　the　cases　which　can　be　subsumed　under　them。　But　I　cannot
for　this　reason　say　that　I　cognize　this　property　of　a　straight　line
from　principles…　I　cognize　it　only　in　pure　intuition。
　　Cognition　from　principles；　then；　is　that　cognition　in　which　I
cognize　the　particular　in　the　general　by　means　of　conceptions。　Thus
every　syllogism　is　a　form　of　the　deduction　of　a　cognition　from　a
principle。　For　the　major　always　gives　a　conception；　through　which
everything　that　is　subsumed　under　the　condition　thereof　is　cognized
according　to　a　principle。　Now　as　every　general　cognition　may　serve
as　the　major　in　a　syllogism；　and　the　understanding　presents　us　with
such　general　a　priori　propositions；　they　may　be　termed　principles；
in　respect　of　their　possible　use。
　　But　if　we　consider　these　principles　of　the　pure　understanding　in
relation　to　their　origin；　we　shall　find　them　to　be　anything　rather
than　cognitions　from　conceptions。　For　they　would　not　even　be
possible　a　priori；　if　we　could　not　rely　on　the　assistance　of　pure
intuition　（in　mathematics）；　or　on　that　of　the　conditions　of　a　possible
experience。　That　everything　that　happens　has　a　cause；　cannot　be
concluded　from　the　general　conception　of　that　which　happens；　on　the
contrary　the　principle　of　causality　instructs　us　as　to　the　mode　of
obtaining　from　that　which　happens　a　determinate　empirical　conception。
　　Synthetical　cognitions　from　conceptions　the　understanding　cannot
supply；　and　they　alone　are　entitled　to　be　called　principles。　At　the
same　time；　all　general　propositions　may　be　termed　parative
principles。
　　It　has　been　a　long…cherished　wish…　that　（who　knows　how　late）；　may
one　day；　be　happily　acplished…　that　the　principles　of　the　endless
variety　of　civil　laws　should　be　investigated　and　exposed；　for　in
this　way　alone　can　we　find　the　secret　of　simplifying　legislation。
But　in　this　case；　laws　are　nothing　more　than　limitations　of　our
freedom　upon　conditions　under　which　it　subsists　in　perfect　harmony
with　itself；　they　consequently　have　for　their　object　that　which　is
pletely　our　own　work；　and　of　which　we　ourselves　may　be　the　cause　by
means　of　these　conceptions。　But　how　objects　as　things　in　themselves…
how　the　nature　of　things　is　subordinated　to　principles　and　is　to　be
determined。　according　to　conceptions；　is　a　question　which　it　seems
well　nigh　impossible　to　answer。　Be　this；　however；　as　it　may…　for　on
this　point　our　investigation　is　yet　to　be　made…　it　is　at　least
manifest　from　what　we　have　said　that　cognition　from　principles　is
something　very　different　from　cognition　by　means　of　the　understanding；
which　may　indeed　precede　other　cognitions　in　the　form　of　a
principle；　but　in　itself…　in　so　far　as　it　is　synthetical…　is　neither
based　upon　mere　thought；　nor　contains　a　general　proposition　drawn　from
conceptions　alone　shall　prehend
　　The　understanding　may　be　a　faculty　for　the　production　of　unity　of
phenomena　by　virtue　of　rules；　the　reason　is　a　faculty　for　the
production　of　unity　of　rules　（of　the　understanding）　under
principles。　Reason；　therefore；　never　applies　directly　to　experience；
or　to　any　sensuous　object；　its　object　is；　on　the　contrary；　the
understanding；　to　the　manifold　cognition　of　which　it　gives　a　unity　a
priori　by　means　of　conceptions…　a　unity　which　may　be　called　rational
unity；　and　which　is　of　a　nature　very　different　from　that　of　the
unity　produced　by　the　understanding。
　　The　above　is　the　general　conception　of　the　faculty　of　reason；　in
so　far　as　it　has　been　possible　to　make　it　prehensible　in　the
absence　of　examples。　These　will　be　given　in　the　sequel。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　B。　OF　THE　LOGICAL　USE　OF　REASON。

　　A　distinction　is　monly　made　between　that　which　is　immediately
cognized　and　that　which　is　inferred　or　concluded。　That　in　a　figure
which　is　bounded　by　three　straight　lines　there　are　three　angles；　is　an
immediate　cognition；　but　that　these　angles　are　together　equal　to　two
right　angles；　is　an　inference　or　conclusion。　Now；　as　we　are　constantly
employing　this　mode　of　thought　and　have　thus　bee　quite　accustomed
to　it；　we　no　longer　remark　the　above　distinction；　and；　as　in　the
case　of　the　so…called　deceptions　of　sense；　consider　as　immediately
perceived；　what　has　really　been　inferred。　In　every　reasoning　or
syllogism；　there　is　a　fundamental　proposition；　afterwards　a　second
drawn　from　it；　and　finally　the　conclusion；　which　connects　the　truth　in
the　first　with　the　truth　in　the　second…　and　that　infallibly。　If　the
judgement　concluded　is　so　contained　in　the　first　proposition　that　it
can　be　deduced　from　it　without　the　meditation　of　a　third　notion；　the
conclusion　is　called　immediate　（consequentia　immediata）；　I　prefer
the　term　conclusion　of　the　understanding。　But　if；　in　addition　to　the
fundamental　cognition；　a　second　judgement　is　necessary　for　the
production　of　the　conclusion；　it　is　called　a　conclusion　of　the　reason。
In　the　proposition：　All　men　are　mortal；　are　contained　the
propositions：　Some　men　are　mortal；　Nothing　that　is　not　mortal　is　a
man；　and　these　are　therefore　immediate　conclusions　from　the　first。
On　the　other　hand；　the　proposition：　all　the　learned　are　mortal；　is　not
contained　in　the　main　proposition　（for　the　conception　of　a　learned　man
does　not　occur　in　it）；　and　it　can　be　deduced　from　the　main　proposition
only　by　means　of　a　mediating　judgement。
　　In　every　syllogism　I　first　cogitate　a　rule　（the　major）　by　means　of
the　understanding。　In　the　next　place　I　subsume　a　cognition　under　the
condition　of　the　rule　（and　this　is　the　minor）　by　means　of　the
judgement。　And　finally　I　determine　my　cognition　by　means　of　the
predicate　of　the　rule　（this　is　the　conclusio）；　consequently；　I
determine　it　a　priori　by　means　of　the　reason。　The　relations；
therefore；　which　the　major　proposition；　as　the　rule；　represents
between　a　cognition　and　its　condition；　constitute　the　different
kinds　of　syllogisms。　These　are　just　threefold…　analogously　with　all
judgements；　in