the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第66章

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the　very　reason　that　their　content　is　greater　than　that　which　is
cogitated　in　the　general　conception。　And　yet　the　whole　intellectual
system　of　Leibnitz　is　based　upon　this　false　principle；　and　with　it
must　necessarily　fall　to　the　ground；　together　with　all　the　ambiguous
principles　in　reference　to　the　employment　of　the　understanding　which
have　thence　originated。
　　Leibnitz's　principle　of　the　identity　of　indiscernibles　or
indistinguishables　is　really　based　on　the　presupposition　that；　if　in
the　conception　of　a　thing　a　certain　distinction　is　not　to　be　found；　it
is　also　not　to　be　met　with　in　things　themselves；　that；　consequently；
all　things　are　pletely　identical　（numero　eadem）　which　are　not
distinguishable　from　each　other　（as　to　quality　or　quantity）　in　our
conceptions　of　them。　But；　as　in　the　mere　conception　of　anything
abstraction　has　been　made　of　many　necessary　conditions　of　intuition；
that　of　which　abstraction　has　been　made　is　rashly　held　to　be
non…existent；　and　nothing　is　attributed　to　the　thing　but　what　is
contained　in　its　conception。
　　The　conception　of　a　cubic　foot　of　space；　however　I　may　think　it；
is　in　itself　pletely　identical。　But　two　cubic　feet　in　space　are
nevertheless　distinct　from　each　other　from　the　sole　fact　of　their
being　in　different　places　（they　are　numero　diversa）；　and　these
places　are　conditions　of　intuition；　wherein　the　object　of　this
conception　is　given；　and　which　do　not　belong　to　the　conception；　but　to
the　faculty　of　sensibility。　In　like　manner；　there　is　in　the　conception
of　a　thing　no　contradiction　when　a　negative　is　not　connected　with　an
affirmative；　and　merely　affirmative　conceptions　cannot；　in
conjunction；　produce　any　negation。　But　in　sensuous　intuition；
wherein　reality　（take　for　example；　motion）　is　given；　we　find
conditions　（opposite　directions）…　of　which　abstraction　has　been　made
in　the　conception　of　motion　in　general…　which　render　possible　a
contradiction　or　opposition　（not　indeed　of　a　logical　kind）…　and
which　from　pure　positives　produce　zero　=　0。　We　are　therefore　not
justified　in　saying　that　all　reality　is　in　perfect　agreement　and
harmony；　because　no　contradiction　is　discoverable　among　its
conceptions。*　According　to　mere　conceptions；　that　which　is　internal　is
the　substratum　of　all　relations　or　external　determinations。　When；
therefore；　I　abstract　all　conditions　of　intuition；　and　confine
myself　solely　to　the　conception　of　a　thing　in　general；　I　can　make
abstraction　of　all　external　relations；　and　there　must　nevertheless
remain　a　conception　of　that　which　indicates　no　relation；　but　merely
internal　determinations。　Now　it　seems　to　follow　that　in　everything
（substance）　there　is　something　which　is　absolutely　internal　and
which　antecedes　all　external　determinations；　inasmuch　as　it　renders
them　possible；　and　that　therefore　this　substratum　is　something　which
does　not　contain　any　external　relations　and　is　consequently　simple
（for　corporeal　things　are　never　anything　but　relations；　at　least　of
their　parts　external　to　each　other）；　and；　inasmuch　as　we　know　of　no
other　absolutely　internal　determinations　than　those　of　the　internal
sense；　this　substratum　is　not　only　simple；　but　also；　analogously
with　our　internal　sense；　determined　through　representations；　that　is
to　say；　all　things　are　properly　monads；　or　simple　beings　endowed
with　the　power　of　representation。　Now　all　this　would　be　perfectly
correct；　if　the　conception　of　a　thing　were　the　only　necessary
condition　of　the　presentation　of　objects　of　external　intuition。　It　is；
on　the　contrary；　manifest　that　a　permanent　phenomenon　in　space
（impenetrable　extension）　can　contain　mere　relations；　and　nothing
that　is　absolutely　internal；　and　yet　be　the　primary　substratum　of
all　external　perception。　By　mere　conceptions　I　cannot　think　anything
external；　without；　at　the　same　time；　thinking　something　internal；
for　the　reason　that　conceptions　of　relations　presuppose　given
things；　and　without　these　are　impossible。　But；　as　an　intuition　there
is　something　（that　is；　space；　which；　with　all　it　contains；　consists　of
purely　formal；　or；　indeed；　real　relations）　which　is　not　found　in　the
mere　conception　of　a　thing　in　general；　and　this　presents　to　us　the
substratum　which　could　not　be　cognized　through　conceptions　alone；　I
cannot　say：　because　a　thing　cannot　be　represented　by　mere
conceptions　without　something　absolutely　internal；　there　is　also；　in
the　things　themselves　which　are　contained　under　these　conceptions；　and
in　their　intuition　nothing　external　to　which　something　absolutely
internal　does　not　serve　as　the　foundation。　For；　when　we　have　made
abstraction　of　all　the　conditions　of　intuition；　there　certainly
remains　in　the　mere　conception　nothing　but　the　internal　in　general；
through　which　alone　the　external　is　possible。　But　this　necessity；
which　is　grounded　upon　abstraction　alone；　does　not　obtain　in　the
case　of　things　themselves；　in　so　far　as　they　are　given　in　intuition
with　such　determinations　as　express　mere　relations；　without　having
anything　internal　as　their　foundation；　for　they　are　not　things　of　a
thing　of　which　we　can　neither　for　they　are　not　things　in　themselves；
but　only　phenomena。　What　we　cognize　in　matter　is　nothing　but　relations
（what　we　call　its　internal　determinations　are　but　paratively
internal）。　But　there　are　some　self…subsistent　and　permanent；　through
which　a　determined　object　is　given。　That　I；　when　abstraction　is　made
of　these　relations；　have　nothing　more　to　think；　does　not　destroy　the
conception　of　a　thing　as　phenomenon；　nor　the　conception　of　an　object
in　abstracto；　but　it　does　away　with　the　possibility　of　an　object
that　is　determinable　according　to　mere　conceptions；　that　is；　of　a
noumenon。　It　is　certainly　startling　to　hear　that　a　thing　consists
solely　of　relations；　but　this　thing　is　simply　a　phenomenon；　and　cannot
be　cogitated　by　means　of　the　mere　categories：　it　does　itself　consist
in　the　mere　relation　of　something　in　general　to　the　senses。　In　the
same　way；　we　cannot　cogitate　relations　of　things　in　abstracto；　if　we
mence　with　conceptions　alone；　in　any　other　manner　than　that　one
is　the　cause　of　determinations　in　the　other；　for　that　is　itself　the
conception　of　the　understanding　or　category　of　relation。　But；　as　in
this　case　we　make　abstraction　of　all　intuition；　we　lose　altogether　the
mode　in　which　the　manifold　determines　to　each　of　its　parts　its
place；　that　is；　the　form　of　sensibility　（space）；　and　yet　this　mode
antecedes　all　empirical　causality。

　　*If　any　one　wishes　here　to　have　recourse　to　the　usual　subterfuge；
and　to　say；　that　at　least　realitates　noumena　cannot　be　in　opposition
to　each　other；　it　will　be　requisite　for　him　to　adduce　an　example　of
this　pure　and　non…sensuous　reality；　that　it　may　be　understood
whether　the　notion　represents　something　or　nothing。　But　an　example
cannot　be　found　except　in　experience；　which　never　presents　to　us
anything　more　than　phenomena；　and　thus　the　proposition　means　nothing
more　than　that　the　conception　which　contains　only　affirmatives　does
not　contain　anything　negative…　a　proposition　nobody　ever　doubted。

　　If　by　intelligible　objects　we　understand　things　which　can　be　thought
by　means　of　the　pure　categories；　without　the　need　of　the　schemata　of
sensibility；　such　objects　are　impossible。　For　the　condition　of　the
objective　use　of　all　our　conceptions　of　understanding　is　the　mode　of
our　sensuous　intuition；　whereby　objects　are　given；　and；　if　we　make
abstraction　of　the　latter；　the　former　can　have　no　relation　to　an
object。　And　even　if　we　should　suppose　a　different　kind　of　intuition
from　our　own；　still　our　functions　of　thought　would　have　no　use　or
signification　in　respect　thereof。　But　if　we　understand　by　the　term；
objects　of　a　non…sensuous　intuition；　in　respect　of　which　our
categories　are　not　valid；　and　of　which　we　can　accordingly　have　no
knowledge　（neither　intuition　nor　conception）；　in　this　merely
negative　sense　noumena　must　be　admitted。　For　this　is　no　more　than
saying　that　our　mode　of　intuition　is　not　applicable　to　all　things；　but
only　to　objects　of　our　senses；　that　consequently　its　objective
validity　is　limited；　and　that　room　is　therefore　left　for　another
kind　of　intuition；　and　thus　also　for　things　that　may　be　objects　of　it。
But　in　this　sense　the