the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第57章

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occupation　being　with　the　synthesis　of　that　which　is　given。
Moreover；　the　poverty　of　the　usual　arguments　which　go　to　prove　the
existence　of　a　vast　sphere　of　possibility；　of　which　all　that　is　real
（every　object　of　experience）　is　but　a　small　part；　is　very
remarkable。　〃All　real　is　possible〃；　from　this　follows　naturally；
according　to　the　logical　laws　of　conversion；　the　particular
proposition：　〃Some　possible　is　real。〃　Now　this　seems　to　be
equivalent　to：　〃Much　is　possible　that　is　not　real。〃　No　doubt　it　does
seem　as　if　we　ought　to　consider　the　sum　of　the　possible　to　be
greater　than　that　of　the　real；　from　the　fact　that　something　must　be
added　to　the　former　to　constitute　the　latter。　But　this　notion　of
adding　to　the　possible　is　absurd。　For　that　which　is　not　in　the　sum
of　the　possible；　and　consequently　requires　to　be　added　to　it；　is
manifestly　impossible。　In　addition　to　accordance　with　the　formal
conditions　of　experience；　the　understanding　requires　a　connection　with
some　perception；　but　that　which　is　connected　with　this　perception　is
real；　even　although　it　is　not　immediately　perceived。　But　that
another　series　of　phenomena；　in　plete　coherence　with　that　which
is　given　in　perception；　consequently　more　than　one　all…embracing
experience　is　possible；　is　an　inference　which　cannot　be　concluded　from
the　data　given　us　by　experience；　and　still　less　without　any　data　at
all。　That　which　is　possible　only　under　conditions　which　are　themselves
merely　possible；　is　not　possible　in　any　respect。　And　yet　we　can　find
no　more　certain　ground　on　which　to　base　the　discussion　of　the　question
whether　the　sphere　of　possibility　is　wider　than　that　of　experience。
　　I　have　merely　mentioned　these　questions；　that　in　treating　of　the
conception　of　the　understanding；　there　might　be　no　omission　of
anything　that；　in　the　mon　opinion；　belongs　to　them。　In　reality；
however；　the　notion　of　absolute　possibility　（possibility　which　is
valid　in　every　respect）　is　not　a　mere　conception　of　the　understanding；
which　can　be　employed　empirically；　but　belongs　to　reason　alone；
which　passes　the　bounds　of　all　empirical　use　of　the　understanding。
We　have；　therefore；　contented　ourselves　with　a　merely　critical　remark；
leaving　the　subject　to　be　explained　in　the　sequel。
　　Before　concluding　this　fourth　section；　and　at　the　same　time　the
system　of　all　principles　of　the　pure　understanding；　it　seems　proper　to
mention　the　reasons　which　induced　me　to　term　the　principles　of
modality　postulates。　This　expression　I　do　not　here　use　in　the　sense
which　some　more　recent　philosophers；　contrary　to　its　meaning　with
mathematicians；　to　whom　the　word　properly　belongs；　attach　to　it…
that　of　a　proposition；　namely；　immediately　certain；　requiring
neither　deduction　nor　proof。　For　if；　in　the　case　of　synthetical
propositions；　however　evident　they　may　be；　we　accord　to　them　without
deduction；　and　merely　on　the　strength　of　their　own　pretensions；
unqualified　belief；　all　critique　of　the　understanding　is　entirely
lost；　and；　as　there　is　no　want　of　bold　pretensions；　which　the　mon
belief　（though　for　the　philosopher　this　is　no　credential）　does　not
reject；　the　understanding　lies　exposed　to　every　delusion　and
conceit；　without　the　power　of　refusing　its　assent　to　those　assertions；
which；　though　illegitimate；　demand　acceptance　as　veritable　axioms。
When；　therefore；　to　the　conception　of　a　thing　an　a　priori
determination　is　synthetically　added；　such　a　proposition　must
obtain；　if　not　a　proof；　at　least　a　deduction　of　the　legitimacy　of
its　assertion。
　　The　principles　of　modality　are；　however；　not　objectively
synthetical；　for　the　predicates　of　possibility；　reality；　and　necessity
do　not　in　the　least　augment　the　conception　of　that　of　which　they　are
affirmed；　inasmuch　as　they　contribute　nothing　to　the　representation　of
the　object。　But　as　they　are；　nevertheless；　always　synthetical；　they
are　so　merely　subjectively。　That　is　to　say；　they　have　a　reflective
power；　and　apply　to　the　conception　of　a　thing；　of　which；　in　other
respects；　they　affirm　nothing；　the　faculty　of　cognition　in　which　the
conception　originates　and　has　its　seat。　So　that　if　the　conception
merely　agree　with　the　formal　conditions　of　experience；　its　object　is
called　possible；　if　it　is　in　connection　with　perception；　and
determined　thereby；　the　object　is　real；　if　it　is　determined
according　to　conceptions　by　means　of　the　connection　of　perceptions；
the　object　is　called　necessary。　The　principles　of　modality　therefore
predicate　of　a　conception　nothing　more　than　the　procedure　of　the
faculty　of　cognition　which　generated　it。　Now　a　postulate　in
mathematics　is　a　practical　proposition　which　contains　nothing　but
the　synthesis　by　which　we　present　an　object　to　ourselves；　and
produce　the　conception　of　it；　for　example…　〃With　a　given　line；　to
describe　a　circle　upon　a　plane；　from　a　given　point〃；　and　such　a
proposition　does　not　admit　of　proof；　because　the　procedure；　which　it
requires；　is　exactly　that　by　which　alone　it　is　possible　to　generate
the　conception　of　such　a　figure。　With　the　same　right；　accordingly；　can
we　postulate　the　principles　of　modality；　because　they　do　not
augment*　the　conception　of　a　thing　but　merely　indicate　the　manner　in
which　it　is　connected　with　the　faculty　of　cognition。

　　*When　I　think　the　reality　of　a　thing；　I　do　really　think　more　than
the　possibility；　but　not　in　the　thing；　for　that　can　never　contain　more
in　reality　than　was　contained　in　its　plete　possibility。　But　while
the　notion　of　possibility　is　merely　the　notion　of　a　position　of
thing　in　relation　to　the　understanding　（its　empirical　use）；　reality　is
the　conjunction　of　the　thing　with　perception。

　　　　　　　　　　　GENERAL　REMARK　ON　THE　SYSTEM　OF　PRINCIPLES。

　　It　is　very　remarkable　that　we　cannot　perceive　the　possibility　of　a
thing　from　the　category　alone；　but　must　always　have　an　intuition；　by
which　to　make　evident　the　objective　reality　of　the　pure　conception
of　the　understanding。　Take；　for　example；　the　categories　of　relation。
How　（1）　a　thing　can　exist　only　as　a　subject；　and　not　as　a　mere
determination　of　other　things；　that　is；　can　be　substance；　or　how
（2）；　because　something　exists；　some　other　thing　must　exist；
consequently　how　a　thing　can　be　a　cause；　or　how　（3）；　when　several
things　exist；　from　the　fact　that　one　of　these　things　exists；　some
consequence　to　the　others　follows；　and　reciprocally；　and　in　this　way　a
munity　of　substances　can　be　possible…　are　questions　whose
solution　cannot　be　obtained　from　mere　conceptions。　The　very　same　is
the　case　with　the　other　categories；　for　example；　how　a　thing　can　be　of
the　same　sort　with　many　others；　that　is；　can　be　a　quantity；　and　so　on。
So　long　as　we　have　not　intuition　we　cannot　know　whether　we　do　really
think　an　object　by　the　categories；　and　where　an　object　can　anywhere　be
found　to　cohere　with　them；　and　thus　the　truth　is　established；　that　the
categories　are　not　in　themselves　cognitions；　but　mere　forms　of　thought
for　the　construction　of　cognitions　from　given　intuitions。　For　the　same
reason　is　it　true　that　from　categories　alone　no　synthetical
proposition　can　be　made。　For　example：　〃In　every　existence　there　is
substance；〃　that　is；　something　that　can　exist　only　as　a　subject　and
not　as　mere　predicate；　or；　〃Everything　is　a　quantity〃…　to　construct
propositions　such　as　these；　we　require　something　to　enable　us　to　go
out　beyond　the　given　conception　and　connect　another　with　it。　For　the
same　reason　the　attempt　to　prove　a　synthetical　proposition　by　means　of
mere　conceptions；　for　example：　〃Everything　that　exists　contingently
has　a　cause；〃　has　never　succeeded。　We　could　never　get　further　than
proving　that；　without　this　relation　to　conceptions；　we　could　not
conceive　the　existence　of　the　contingent；　that　is；　could　not　a
priori　through　the　understanding　cognize　the　existence　of　such　a
thing；　but　it　does　not　hence　follow　that　this　is　also　the　condition　of
the　possibility　of　the　thing　itself　that　is　said　to　be　contingent。　If；
accordingly；　we　look　back　to　our　proof　of　the　principle　of
causality；　we　shall　find　that　we　were　able　to　prove　it　as　valid　only
of　objects　of　possible　experience；　and；　indeed；　only　as　itself　the
principle　of　the　possibility　of　experience；　Consequently　of　the
cognition　of　an　object　given　in　empiric