the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第51章

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conception　of　substance。　As　I　do　not　wish　this　critical　essay；　the
sole　purpose　of　which　is　to　treat　of　the　sources　of　our　synthetical
cognition　a　priori；　to　be　crowded　with　analyses　which　merely
explain；　but　do　not　enlarge　the　sphere　of　our　conceptions；　I　reserve
the　detailed　explanation　of　the　above　conceptions　for　a　future
system　of　pure　reason。　Such　an　analysis；　indeed；　executed　with　great
particularity；　may　already　be　found　in　well…known　works　on　this
subject。　But　I　cannot　at　present　refrain　from　making　a　few　remarks
on　the　empirical　criterion　of　a　substance；　in　so　far　as　it　seems　to　be
more　evident　and　more　easily　recognized　through　the　conception　of
action　than　through　that　of　the　permanence　of　a　phenomenon。
　　Where　action　（consequently　activity　and　force）　exists；　substance
also　must　exist；　and　in　it　alone　must　be　sought　the　seat　of　that
fruitful　source　of　phenomena。　Very　well。　But　if　we　are　called　upon
to　explain　what　we　mean　by　substance；　and　wish　to　avoid　the　vice　of
reasoning　in　a　circle；　the　answer　is　by　no　means　so　easy。　How　shall　we
conclude　immediately　from　the　action　to　the　permanence　of　that　which
acts；　this　being　nevertheless　an　essential　and　peculiar　criterion　of
substance　（phenomenon）？　But　after　what　has　been　said　above；　the
solution　of　this　question　bees　easy　enough；　although　by　the
mon　mode　of　procedure…　merely　analysing　our　conceptions…　it　would
be　quite　impossible。　The　conception　of　action　indicates　the　relation
of　the　subject　of　causality　to　the　effect。　Now　because　all　effect
consists　in　that　which　happens；　therefore　in　the　changeable；　the
last　subject　thereof　is　the　permanent；　as　the　substratum　of　all　that
changes；　that　is；　substance。　For　according　to　the　principle　of
causality；　actions　are　always　the　first　ground　of　all　change　in
phenomena　and；　consequently；　cannot　be　a　property　of　a　subject　which
itself　changes；　because　if　this　were　the　case；　other　actions　and
another　subject　would　be　necessary　to　determine　this　change。　From
all　this　it　results　that　action　alone；　as　an　empirical　criterion；　is　a
sufficient　proof　of　the　presence　of　substantiality；　without　any
necessity　on　my　part　of　endeavouring　to　discover　the　permanence　of
substance　by　a　parison。　Besides；　by　this　mode　of　induction　we　could
not　attain　to　the　pleteness　which　the　magnitude　and　strict
universality　of　the　conception　requires。　For　that　the　primary
subject　of　the　causality　of　all　arising　and　passing　away；　all　origin
and　extinction；　cannot　itself　（in　the　sphere　of　phenomena）　arise　and
pass　away；　is　a　sound　and　safe　conclusion；　a　conclusion　which　leads　us
to　the　conception　of　empirical　necessity　and　permanence　in
existence；　and　consequently　to　the　conception　of　a　substance　as
phenomenon。
　　When　something　happens；　the　mere　fact　of　the　occurrence；　without
regard　to　that　which　occurs；　is　an　object　requiring　investigation。　The
transition　from　the　non…being　of　a　state　into　the　existence　of　it；
supposing　that　this　state　contains　no　quality　which　previously　existed
in　the　phenomenon；　is　a　fact　of　itself　demanding　inquiry。　Such　an
event；　as　has　been　shown　in　No。　A；　does　not　concern　substance　（for
substance　does　not　thus　originate）；　but　its　condition　or　state。　It
is　therefore　only　change；　and　not　origin　from　nothing。　If　this
origin　be　regarded　as　the　effect　of　a　foreign　cause；　it　is　termed
creation；　which　cannot　be　admitted　as　an　event　among　phenomena；
because　the　very　possibility　of　it　would　annihilate　the　unity　of
experience。　If；　however；　I　regard　all　things　not　as　phenomena；　but
as　things　in　themselves　and　objects　of　understanding　alone；　they；
although　substances；　may　be　considered　as　dependent；　in　respect　of
their　existence；　on　a　foreign　cause。　But　this　would　require　a　very
different　meaning　in　the　words；　a　meaning　which　could　not　apply　to
phenomena　as　objects　of　possible　experience。
　　How　a　thing　can　be　changed；　how　it　is　possible　that　upon　one　state
existing　in　one　point　of　time；　an　opposite　state　should　follow　in
another　point　of　time…　of　this　we　have　not　the　smallest　conception　a
priori。　There　is　requisite　for　this　the　knowledge　of　real　powers；
which　can　only　be　given　empirically；　for　example；　knowledge　of
moving　forces；　or；　in　other　words；　of　certain　successive　phenomena　（as
movements）　which　indicate　the　presence　of　such　forces。　But　the　form　of
every　change；　the　condition　under　which　alone　it　can　take　place　as　the
ing　into　existence　of　another　state　（be　the　content　of　the
change；　that　is；　the　state　which　is　changed；　what　it　may）；　and
consequently　the　succession　of　the　states　themselves　can　very　well
be　considered　a　priori；　in　relation　to　the　law　of　causality　and　the
conditions　of　time。*

　　*It　must　be　remarked　that　I　do　not　speak　of　the　change　of　certain
relations；　but　of　the　change　of　the　state。　Thus；　when　a　body　moves
in　a　uniform　manner；　it　does　not　change　its　state　（of　motion）；　but
only　when　all　motion　increases　or　decreases。

　　When　a　substance　passes　from　one　state；　a；　into　another　state；　b；
the　point　of　time　in　which　the　latter　exists　is　different　from；　and
subsequent　to　that　in　which　the　former　existed。　In　like　manner；　the
second　state；　as　reality　（in　the　phenomenon）；　differs　from　the
first；　in　which　the　reality　of　the　second　did　not　exist；　as　b　from
zero。　That　is　to　say；　if　the　state；　b；　differs　from　the　state；　a；　only
in　respect　to　quantity；　the　change　is　a　ing　into　existence　of　b　…
a；　which　in　the　former　state　did　not　exist；　and　in　relation　to　which
that　state　is　=　O。
　　Now　the　question　arises　how　a　thing　passes　from　one　state　=　a；
into　another　state　=　b。　Between　two　moments　there　is　always　a
certain　time；　and　between　two　states　existing　in　these　moments　there
is　always　a　difference　having　a　certain　quantity　（for　all　parts　of
phenomena　are　in　their　turn　quantities）。　Consequently；　every
transition　from　one　state　into　another　is　always　effected　in　a　time
contained　between　two　moments；　of　which　the　first　determines　the　state
which　leaves；　and　the　second　determines　the　state　into　the　thing
passes。　the　thing　leaves；　and　the　second　determines　the　state　into
which　the　thing　Both　moments；　then；　are　limitations　of　the　time　of　a
change；　consequently　of　the　intermediate　state　between　both；　and　as
such　they　belong　to　the　total　of　the　change。　Now　every　change　has　a
cause；　which　evidences　its　causality　in　the　whole　time　during　which
the　charge　takes　place。　The　cause；　therefore；　does　not　produce　the
change　all　at　once　or　in　one　moment；　but　in　a　time；　so　that；　as　the
time　gradually　increases　from　the　mencing　instant；　a；　to　its
pletion　at　b；　in　like　manner　also；　the　quantity　of　the　reality
（b　…　a）　is　generated　through　the　lesser　degrees　which　are　contained
between　the　first　and　last。　All　change　is　therefore　possible　only
through　a　continuous　action　of　the　causality；　which；　in　so　far　as　it
is　uniform；　we　call　a　momentum。　The　change　does　not　consist　of　these
momenta；　but　is　generated　or　produced　by　them　as　their　effect。
　　Such　is　the　law　of　the　continuity　of　all　change；　the　ground　of　which
is　that　neither　time　itself　nor　any　phenomenon　in　time　consists　of
parts　which　are　the　smallest　possible；　but　that；　notwithstanding；
the　state　of　a　thing　passes　in　the　process　of　a　change　through　all
these　parts；　as　elements；　to　its　second　state。　There　is　no　smallest
degree　of　reality　in　a　phenomenon；　just　as　there　is　no　smallest　degree
in　the　quantity　of　time；　and　so　the　new　state　of　reality　grows　up
out　of　the　former　state；　through　all　the　infinite　degrees　thereof；　the
differences　of　which　one　from　another；　taken　all　together；　are　less
than　the　difference　between　o　and　a。
　　It　is　not　our　business　to　inquire　here　into　the　utility　of　this
principle　in　the　investigation　of　nature。　But　how　such　a
proposition；　which　appears　so　greatly　to　extend　our　knowledge　of
nature；　is　possible　pletely　a　priori；　is　indeed　a　question　which
deserves　investigation；　although　the　first　view　seems　to　demonstrate
the　truth　and　reality　of　the　principle；　and　the　question；　how　it　is
possible；　may　be　considered　superfluous。　For　there　are　so　many
groundless　pretensions　to　the　enlargement　of　our　knowledge　by　pure
reason　that　we　must　take　it　as　a　general　rule　to　be　mistrustful