the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第50章

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inevitably　and　always；　that　is；　in　conformity　with　a　rule。　From　all
this　it　is　evident　that；　in　the　first　place；　I　cannot　reverse　the
order　of　succession；　and　make　that　which　happens　precede　that　upon
which　it　follows；　and　that；　in　the　second　place；　if　the　antecedent
state　be　posited；　a　certain　determinate　event　inevitably　and
necessarily　follows。　Hence　it　follows　that　there　exists　a　certain
order　in　our　representations；　whereby　the　present　gives　a　sure
indication　of　some　previously　existing　state；　as　a　correlate；　though
still　undetermined；　of　the　existing　event　which　is　given…　a
correlate　which　itself　relates　to　the　event　as　its　consequence；
conditions　it；　and　connects　it　necessarily　with　itself　in　the　series
of　time。
　　If　then　it　be　admitted　as　a　necessary　law　of　sensibility；　and
consequently　a　formal　condition　of　all　perception；　that　the
preceding　necessarily　determines　the　succeeding　time　（inasmuch　as　I
cannot　arrive　at　the　succeeding　except　through　the　preceding）；　it　must
likewise　be　an　indispensable　law　of　empirical　representation　of　the
series　of　time　that　the　phenomena　of　the　past　determine　all
phenomena　in　the　succeeding　time；　and　that　the　latter；　as　events；
cannot　take　place；　except　in　so　far　as　the　former　determine　their
existence　in　time；　that　is　to　say；　establish　it　according　to　a　rule。
For　it　is　of　course　only　in　phenomena　that　we　can　empirically
cognize　this　continuity　in　the　connection　of　times。
　　For　all　experience　and　for　the　possibility　of　experience；
understanding　is　indispensable；　and　the　first　step　which　it　takes　in
this　sphere　is　not　to　render　the　representation　of　objects　clear；
but　to　render　the　representation　of　an　object　in　general；　possible。　It
does　this　by　applying　the　order　of　time　to　phenomena；　and　their
existence。　In　other　words；　it　assigns　to　each　phenomenon；　as　a
consequence；　a　place　in　relation　to　preceding　phenomena；　determined
a　priori　in　time；　without　which　it　could　not　harmonize　with　time
itself；　which　determines　a　place　a　priori　to　all　its　parts。　This
determination　of　place　cannot　be　derived　from　the　relation　of
phenomena　to　absolute　time　（for　it　is　not　an　object　of　perception）；
but；　on　the　contrary；　phenomena　must　reciprocally　determine　the　places
in　time　of　one　another；　and　render　these　necessary　in　the　order　of
time。　In　other　words；　whatever　follows　or　happens；　must　follow　in
conformity　with　a　universal　rule　upon　that　which　was　contained　in
the　foregoing　state。　Hence　arises　a　series　of　phenomena；　which；　by
means　of　the　understanding；　produces　and　renders　necessary　exactly　the
same　order　and　continuous　connection　in　the　series　of　our　possible
perceptions；　as　is　found　a　priori　in　the　form　of　internal　intuition
（time）；　in　which　all　our　perceptions　must　have　place。
　　That　something　happens；　then；　is　a　perception　which　belongs　to　a
possible　experience；　which　bees　real　only　because　I　look　upon　the
phenomenon　as　determined　in　regard　to　its　place　in　time；
consequently　as　an　object；　which　can　always　be　found　by　means　of　a
rule　in　the　connected　series　of　my　perceptions。　But　this　rule　of　the
determination　of　a　thing　according　to　succession　in　time　is　as
follows：　〃In　what　precedes　may　be　found　the　condition；　under　which
an　event　always　（that　is；　necessarily）　follows。〃　From　all　this　it　is
obvious　that　the　principle　of　cause　and　effect　is　the　principle　of
possible　experience；　that　is；　of　objective　cognition　of　phenomena；
in　regard　to　their　relations　in　the　succession　of　time。
　　The　proof　of　this　fundamental　proposition　rests　entirely　on　the
following　momenta　of　argument。　To　all　empirical　cognition　belongs
the　synthesis　of　the　manifold　by　the　imagination；　a　synthesis　which　is
always　successive；　that　is；　in　which　the　representations　therein
always　follow　one　another。　But　the　order　of　succession　in
imagination　is　not　determined；　and　the　series　of　successive
representations　may　be　taken　retrogressively　as　well　as　progressively。
But　if　this　synthesis　is　a　synthesis　of　apprehension　（of　the
manifold　of　a　given　phenomenon）；then　the　order　is　determined　in　the
object；　or　to　speak　more　accurately；　there　is　therein　an　order　of
successive　synthesis　which　determines　an　object；　and　according　to
which　something　necessarily　precedes；　and　when　this　is　posited；
something　else　necessarily　follows。　If；　then；　my　perception　is　to
contain　the　cognition　of　an　event；　that　is；　of　something　which
really　happens；　it　must　be　an　empirical　judgement；　wherein　we　think
that　the　succession　is　determined；　that　is；　it　presupposes　another
phenomenon；　upon　which　this　event　follows　necessarily；　or　in
conformity　with　a　rule。　If；　on　the　contrary；　when　I　posited　the
antecedent；　the　event　did　not　necessarily　follow；　I　should　be
obliged　to　consider　it　merely　as　a　subjective　play　of　my
imagination；　and　if　in　this　I　represented　to　myself　anything　as
objective；　I　must　look　upon　it　as　a　mere　dream。　Thus；　the　relation
of　phenomena　（as　possible　perceptions）；　according　to　which　that
which　happens　is；　as　to　its　existence；　necessarily　determined　in
time　by　something　which　antecedes；　in　conformity　with　a　rule…　in　other
words；　the　relation　of　cause　and　effect…　is　the　condition　of　the
objective　validity　of　our　empirical　judgements　in　regard　to　the
sequence　of　perceptions；　consequently　of　their　empirical　truth；　and
therefore　of　experience。　The　principle　of　the　relation　of　causality　in
the　succession　of　phenomena　is　therefore　valid　for　all　objects　of
experience；　because　it　is　itself　the　ground　of　the　possibility　of
experience。
　　Here；　however；　a　difficulty　arises；　which　must　be　resolved。　The
principle　of　the　connection　of　causality　among　phenomena　is　limited　in
our　formula　to　the　succession　thereof；　although　in　practice　we　find
that　the　principle　applies　also　when　the　phenomena　exist　together　in
the　same　time；　and　that　cause　and　effect　may　be　simultaneous。　For
example；　there　is　heat　in　a　room；　which　does　not　exist　in　the　open
air。　I　look　about　for　the　cause；　and　find　it　to　be　the　fire；　Now　the
fire　as　the　cause　is　simultaneous　with　its　effect；　the　heat　of　the
room。　In　this　case；　then；　there　is　no　succession　as　regards　time；
between　cause　and　effect；　but　they　are　simultaneous；　and　still　the　law
holds　good。　The　greater　part　of　operating　causes　in　nature　are
simultaneous　with　their　effects；　and　the　succession　in　time　of　the
latter　is　produced　only　because　the　cause　cannot　achieve　the　total
of　its　effect　in　one　moment。　But　at　the　moment　when　the　effect　first
arises；　it　is　always　simultaneous　with　the　causality　of　its　cause；
because；　if　the　cause　had　but　a　moment　before　ceased　to　be；　the　effect
could　not　have　arisen。　Here　it　must　be　specially　remembered　that　we
must　consider　the　order　of　time　and　not　the　lapse　thereof。　The
relation　remains；　even　though　no　time　has　elapsed。　The　time　between
the　causality　of　the　cause　and　its　immediate　effect　may　entirely
vanish；　and　the　cause　and　effect　be　thus　simultaneous；　but　the
relation　of　the　one　to　the　other　remains　always　determinable　according
to　time。　If；　for　example；　I　consider　a　leaden　ball；　which　lies　upon
a　cushion　and　makes　a　hollow　in　it；　as　a　cause；　then　it　is
simultaneous　with　the　effect。　But　I　distinguish　the　two　through　the
relation　of　time　of　the　dynamical　connection　of　both。　For　if　I　lay　the
ball　upon　the　cushion；　then　the　hollow　follows　upon　the　before
smooth　surface；　but　supposing　the　cushion　has；　from　some　cause　or
another；　a　hollow；　there　does　not　thereupon　follow　a　leaden　ball。
　　Thus；　the　law　of　succession　of　time　is　in　all　instances　the　only
empirical　criterion　of　effect　in　relation　to　the　causality　of　the
antecedent　cause。　The　glass　is　the　cause　of　the　rising　of　the　water
above　its　horizontal　surface；　although　the　two　phenomena　are
contemporaneous。　For；　as　soon　as　I　draw　some　water　with　the　glass　from
a　larger　vessel；　an　effect　follows　thereupon；　namely；　the　change　of
the　horizontal　state　which　the　water　had　in　the　large　vessel　into　a
concave；　which　it　assumes　in　the　glass。
　　This　conception　of　causality　leads　us　to　the　conception　of　action；
that　of　action；　to　the　conception　of　force；　and　through　it；　to　the
conception　of　substance。　As　I　do　not　wish　this　critical　essay；　the
sole　purpo