the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第48章

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　　（That　all　phenomena　in　the　succession　of　time　are　only　changes；　that
is；　a　successive　being　and　non…being　of　the　determinations　of
substance；　which　is　permanent；　consequently　that　a　being　of
substance　itself　which　follows　on　the　non…being　thereof；　or　a
non…being　of　substance　which　follows　on　the　being　thereof；　in　other
words；　that　the　origin　or　extinction　of　substance　itself；　is
impossible…　all　this　has　been　fully　established　in　treating　of　the
foregoing　principle。　This　principle　might　have　been　expressed　as
follows：　〃All　alteration　（succession）　of　phenomena　is　merely
change〃；　for　the　changes　of　substance　are　not　origin　or　extinction；
because　the　conception　of　change　presupposes　the　same　subject　as
existing　with　two　opposite　determinations；　and　consequently　as
permanent。　After　this　premonition；　we　shall　proceed　to　the　proof。）
　　I　perceive　that　phenomena　succeed　one　another；　that　is　to　say；　a
state　of　things　exists　at　one　time；　the　opposite　of　which　existed　in　a
former　state。　In　this　case；　then；　I　really　connect　together　two
perceptions　in　time。　Now　connection　is　not　an　operation　of　mere
sense　and　intuition；　but　is　the　product　of　a　synthetical　faculty　of
imagination；　which　determines　the　internal　sense　in　respect　of　a
relation　of　time。　But　imagination　can　connect　these　two　states　in
two　ways；　so　that　either　the　one　or　the　other　may　antecede　in　time；
for　time　in　itself　cannot　be　an　object　of　perception；　and　what　in　an
object　precedes　and　what　follows　cannot　be　empirically　determined　in
relation　to　it。　I　am　only　conscious；　then；　that　my　imagination
places　one　state　before　and　the　other　after；　not　that　the　one　state
antecedes　the　other　in　the　object。　In　other　words；　the　objective
relation　of　the　successive　phenomena　remains　quite　undetermined　by
means　of　mere　perception。　Now　in　order　that　this　relation　may　be
cognized　as　determined；　the　relation　between　the　two　states　must　be　so
cogitated　that　it　is　thereby　determined　as　necessary；　which　of　them
must　be　placed　before　and　which　after；　and　not　conversely。　But　the
conception　which　carries　with　it　a　necessity　of　synthetical　unity；　can
be　none　other　than　a　pure　conception　of　the　understanding　which　does
not　lie　in　mere　perception；　and　in　this　case　it　is　the　conception　of
〃the　relation　of　cause　and　effect；〃　the　former　of　which　determines　the
latter　in　time；　as　its　necessary　consequence；　and　not　as　something
which　might　possibly　antecede　（or　which　might　in　some　cases　not　be
perceived　to　follow）。　It　follows　that　it　is　only　because　we　subject
the　sequence　of　phenomena；　and　consequently　all　change；　to　the　law
of　causality；　that　experience　itself；　that　is；　empirical　cognition
of　phenomena；　bees　possible；　and　consequently；　that　phenomena
themselves；　as　objects　of　experience；　are　possible　only　by　virtue　of
this　law。
　　Our　apprehension　of　the　manifold　of　phenomena　is　always
successive。　The　representations　of　parts　succeed　one　another。
Whether　they　succeed　one　another　in　the　object　also；　is　a　second　point
for　reflection；　which　was　not　contained　in　the　former。　Now　we　may
certainly　give　the　name　of　object　to　everything；　even　to　every
representation；　so　far　as　we　are　conscious　thereof；　but　what　this　word
may　mean　in　the　case　of　phenomena；　not　merely　in　so　far　as　they　（as
representations）　are　objects；　but　only　in　so　far　as　they　indicate　an
object；　is　a　question　requiring　deeper　consideration。　In　so　far　as
they；　regarded　merely　as　representations；　are　at　the　same　time　objects
of　consciousness；　they　are　not　to　be　distinguished　from
apprehension；　that　is；　reception　into　the　synthesis　of　imagination；
and　we　must　therefore　say：　〃The　manifold　of　phenomena　is　always
produced　successively　in　the　mind。〃　If　phenomena　were　things　in
themselves；　no　man　would　be　able　to　conjecture　from　the　succession
of　our　representations　how　this　manifold　is　connected　in　the　object；
for　we　have　to　do　only　with　our　representations。　How　things　may　be
in　themselves；　without　regard　to　the　representations　through　which
they　affect　us；　is　utterly　beyond　the　sphere　of　our　cognition。　Now
although　phenomena　are　not　things　in　themselves；　and　are
nevertheless　the　only　thing　given　to　us　to　be　cognized；　it　is　my
duty　to　show　what　sort　of　connection　in　time　belongs　to　the　manifold
in　phenomena　themselves；　while　the　representation　of　this　manifold
in　apprehension　is　always　successive。　For　example；　the　apprehension　of
the　manifold　in　the　phenomenon　of　a　house　which　stands　before　me；　is
successive。　Now　es　the　question　whether　the　manifold　of　this
house　is　in　itself　successive…　which　no　one　will　be　at　all　willing
to　grant。　But；　so　soon　as　I　raise　my　conception　of　an　object　to　the
transcendental　signification　thereof；　I　find　that　the　house　is　not　a
thing　in　itself；　but　only　a　phenomenon；　that　is；　a　representation；　the
transcendental　object　of　which　remains　utterly　unknown。　What　then　am　I
to　understand　by　the　question：　〃How　can　the　manifold　be　connected　in
the　phenomenon　itself…　not　considered　as　a　thing　in　itself；　but　merely
as　a　phenomenon？〃　Here　that　which　lies　in　my　successive　apprehension
is　regarded　as　representation；　whilst　the　phenomenon　which　is　given
me；　notwithstanding　that　it　is　nothing　more　than　a　plex　of　these
representations；　is　regarded　as　the　object　thereof；　with　which　my
conception；　drawn　from　the　representations　of　apprehension；　must
harmonize。　It　is　very　soon　seen　that；　as　accordance　of　the　cognition
with　its　object　constitutes　truth；　the　question　now　before　us　can　only
relate　to　the　formal　conditions　of　empirical　truth；　and　that　the
phenomenon；　in　opposition　to　the　representations　of　apprehension；
can　only　be　distinguished　therefrom　as　the　object　of　them；　if　it　is
subject　to　a　rule　which　distinguishes　it　from　every　other
apprehension；　and　which　renders　necessary　a　mode　of　connection　of
the　manifold。　That　in　the　phenomenon　which　contains　the　condition　of
this　necessary　rule　of　apprehension；　is　the　object。
　　Let　us　now　proceed　to　our　task。　That　something　happens；　that　is　to
say；　that　something　or　some　state　exists　which　before　was　not；
cannot　be　empirically　perceived；　unless　a　phenomenon　precedes；　which
does　not　contain　in　itself　this　state。　For　a　reality　which　should
follow　upon　a　void　time；　in　other　words；　a　beginning；　which　no　state
of　things　precedes；　can　just　as　little　be　apprehended　as　the　void　time
itself。　Every　apprehension　of　an　event　is　therefore　a　perception　which
follows　upon　another　perception。　But　as　this　is　the　case　with　all
synthesis　of　apprehension；　as　I　have　shown　above　in　the　example　of　a
house；　my　apprehension　of　an　event　is　not　yet　sufficiently
distinguished　from　other　apprehensions。　But　I　remark　also　that　if　in　a
phenomenon　which　contains　an　occurrence；　I　call　the　antecedent　state
of　my　perception；　A；　and　the　following　state；　B；　the　perception　B
can　only　follow　A　in　apprehension；　and　the　perception　A　cannot
follow　B；　but　only　precede　it。　For　example；　I　see　a　ship　float　down
the　stream　of　a　river。　My　perception　of　its　place　lower　down　follows
upon　my　perception　of　its　place　higher　up　the　course　of　the　river；　and
it　is　impossible　that；　in　the　apprehension　of　this　phenomenon；　the
vessel　should　be　perceived　first　below　and　afterwards　higher　up　the
stream。　Here；　therefore；　the　order　in　the　sequence　of　perceptions　in
apprehension　is　determined；　and　by　this　order　apprehension　is
regulated。　In　the　former　example；　my　perceptions　in　the　apprehension
of　a　house　might　begin　at　the　roof　and　end　at　the　foundation；　or
vice　versa；　or　I　might　apprehend　the　manifold　in　this　empirical
intuition；　by　going　from　left　to　right；　and　from　right　to　left。
Accordingly；　in　the　series　of　these　perceptions；　there　was　no
determined　order；　which　necessitated　my　beginning　at　a　certain
point；　in　order　empirically　to　connect　the　manifold。　But　this　rule
is　always　to　be　met　with　in　the　perception　of　that　which　happens；
and　it　makes　the　order　of　the　successive　perceptions　in　the
apprehension　of　such　a　phenomenon　necessary。
　　I　must；　therefore；　in　the　present　case；　deduce　the　subjective
sequence　of　apprehension　from　the　objective　sequence　of　phenomena；　for
otherwise　the　former　is　quite　undetermined；　and　one　phenomenon　is
not　di