the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第47章

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that　is；　the　substance　（phenomenon）；　but　all　that　changes　or　can
change　belongs　only　to　the　mode　of　the　existence　of　this　substance
or　substances；　consequently　to　its　determinations。
　　I　find　that　in　all　ages　not　only　the　philosopher；　but　even　the
mon　understanding；　has　preposited　this　permanence　as　a　substratum
of　all　change　in　phenomena；　indeed；　I　am　pelled　to　believe　that
they　will　always　accept　this　as　an　indubitable　fact。　Only　the
philosopher　expresses　himself　in　a　more　precise　and　definite　manner；
when　he　says：　〃In　all　changes　in　the　world；　the　substance　remains；　and
the　accidents　alone　are　changeable。〃　But　of　this　decidedly　synthetical
proposition；　I　nowhere　meet　with　even　an　attempt　at　proof；　nay；　it
very　rarely　has　the　good　fortune　to　stand；　as　it　deserves　to　do；　at
the　head　of　the　pure　and　entirely　a　priori　laws　of　nature。　In　truth；
the　statement　that　substance　is　permanent；　is　tautological。　For　this
very　permanence　is　the　ground　on　which　we　apply　the　category　of
substance　to　the　phenomenon；　and　we　should　have　been　obliged　to
prove　that　in　all　phenomena　there　is　something　permanent；　of　the
existence　of　which　the　changeable　is　nothing　but　a　determination。
But　because　a　proof　of　this　nature　cannot　be　dogmatical；　that　is；
cannot　be　drawn　from　conceptions；　inasmuch　as　it　concerns　a
synthetical　proposition　a　priori；　and　as　philosophers　never
reflected　that　such　propositions　are　valid　only　in　relation　to
possible　experience；　and　therefore　cannot　be　proved　except　by　means　of
a　deduction　of　the　possibility　of　experience；　it　is　no　wonder　that
while　it　has　served　as　the　foundation　of　all　experience　（for　we　feel
the　need　of　it　in　empirical　cognition）；　it　has　never　been　supported　by
proof。
　　A　philosopher　was　asked：　〃What　is　the　weight　of　smoke？〃　He　answered：
〃Subtract　from　the　weight　of　the　burnt　wood　the　weight　of　the
remaining　ashes；　and　you　will　have　the　weight　of　the　smoke。〃　Thus　he
presumed　it　to　be　incontrovertible　that　even　in　fire　the　matter
（substance）　does　not　perish；　but　that　only　the　form　of　it　undergoes
a　change。　In　like　manner　was　the　saying：　〃From　nothing　es　nothing；〃
only　another　inference　from　the　principle　or　permanence；　or　rather
of　the　ever…abiding　existence　of　the　true　subject　in　phenomena。　For　if
that　in　the　phenomenon　which　we　call　substance　is　to　be　the　proper
substratum　of　all　determination　of　time；　it　follows　that　all　existence
in　past　as　well　as　in　future　time；　must　be　determinable　by　means　of　it
alone。　Hence　we　are　entitled　to　apply　the　term　substance　to　a
phenomenon；　only　because　we　suppose　its　existence　in　all　time；　a
notion　which　the　word　permanence　does　not　fully　express；　as　it　seems
rather　to　be　referable　to　future　time。　However；　the　internal　necessity
perpetually　to　be；　is　inseparably　connected　with　the　necessity
always　to　have　been；　and　so　the　expression　may　stand　as　it　is。
〃Gigni　de　nihilo　nihil；　in　nihilum　nil　posse　reverti；〃*　are　two
propositions　which　the　ancients　never　parted；　and　which　people
nowadays　sometimes　mistakenly　disjoin；　because　they　imagine　that　the
propositions　apply　to　objects　as　things　in　themselves；　and　that　the
former　might　be　inimical　to　the　dependence　（even　in　respect　of　its
substance　also）　of　the　world　upon　a　supreme　cause。　But　this
apprehension　is　entirely　needless；　for　the　question　in　this　case　is
only　of　phenomena　in　the　sphere　of　experience；　the　unity　of　which
never　could　be　possible；　if　we　admitted　the　possibility　that　new
things　（in　respect　of　their　substance）　should　arise。　For　in　that　case；
we　should　lose　altogether　that　which　alone　can　represent　the　unity
of　time；　to　wit；　the　identity　of　the　substratum；　as　that　through　which
alone　all　change　possesses　plete　and　thorough　unity。　This
permanence　is；　however；　nothing　but　the　manner　in　which　we　represent
to　ourselves　the　existence　of　things　in　the　phenomenal　world。

　　*＇Persius；　Satirae；　iii。83…84。　〃Nothing　can　be　produced　from
nothing；　nothing　can　be　returned　into　nothing。〃＇

　　The　determinations　of　a　substance；　which　are　only　particular　modes
of　its　existence；　are　called　accidents。　They　are　always　real；
because　they　concern　the　existence　of　substance　（negations　are　only
determinations；　which　express　the　non…existence　of　something　in　the
substance）。　Now；　if　to　this　real　in　the　substance　we　ascribe　a
particular　existence　（for　example；　to　motion　as　an　accident　of
matter）；　this　existence　is　called　inherence；　in　contradistinction　to
the　existence　of　substance；　which　we　call　subsistence。　But　hence　arise
many　misconceptions；　and　it　would　be　a　more　accurate　and　just　mode
of　expression　to　designate　the　accident　only　as　the　mode　in　which
the　existence　of　a　substance　is　positively　determined。　Meanwhile；　by
reason　of　the　conditions　of　the　logical　exercise　of　our　understanding；
it　is　impossible　to　avoid　separating；　as　it　were；　that　which　in　the
existence　of　a　substance　is　subject　to　change；　whilst　the　substance
remains；　and　regarding　it　in　relation　to　that　which　is　properly
permanent　and　radical。　On　this　account；　this　category　of　substance
stands　under　the　title　of　relation；　rather　because　it　is　the　condition
thereof　than　because　it　contains　in　itself　any　relation。
　　Now；　upon　this　notion　of　permanence　rests　the　proper　notion　of　the
conception　change。　Origin　and　extinction　are　not　changes　of　that　which
originates　or　bees　extinct。　Change　is　but　a　mode　of　existence；
which　follows　on　another　mode　of　existence　of　the　same　object；　hence
all　that　changes　is　permanent；　and　only　the　condition　thereof　changes。
Now　since　this　mutation　affects　only　determinations；　which　can　have
a　beginning　or　an　end；　we　may　say；　employing　an　expression　which　seems
somewhat　paradoxical：　〃Only　the　permanent　（substance）　is　subject　to
change；　the　mutable　suffers　no　change；　but　rather　alternation；　that
is；　when　certain　determinations　cease；　others　begin。〃
　　Change；　when；　cannot　be　perceived　by　us　except　in　substances；　and
origin　or　extinction　in　an　absolute　sense；　that　does　not　concern
merely　a　determination　of　the　permanent；　cannot　be　a　possible
perception；　for　it　is　this　very　notion　of　the　permanent　which
renders　possible　the　representation　of　a　transition　from　one　state
into　another；　and　from　non…being　to　being；　which；　consequently；　can　be
empirically　cognized　only　as　alternating　determinations　of　that
which　is　permanent。　Grant　that　a　thing　absolutely　begins　to　be；　we
must　then　have　a　point　of　time　in　which　it　was　not。　But　how　and　by
what　can　we　fix　and　determine　this　point　of　time；　unless　by　that　which
already　exists？　For　a　void　time…　preceding…　is　not　an　object　of
perception；　but　if　we　connect　this　beginning　with　objects　which
existed　previously；　and　which　continue　to　exist　till　the　object　in
question　in　question　begins　to　be；　then　the　latter　can　only　be　a
determination　of　the　former　as　the　permanent。　The　same　holds　good　of
the　notion　of　extinction；　for　this　presupposes　the　empirical
representation　of　a　time；　in　which　a　phenomenon　no　longer　exists。
　　Substances　（in　the　world　of　phenomena）　are　the　substratum　of　all
determinations　of　time。　The　beginning　of　some；　and　the　ceasing　to　be
of　other　substances；　would　utterly　do　away　with　the　only　condition
of　the　empirical　unity　of　time；　and　in　that　case　phenomena　would
relate　to　two　different　times；　in　which；　side　by　side；　existence　would
pass；　which　is　absurd。　For　there　is　only　one　time　in　which　all
different　times　must　be　placed；　not　as　coexistent；　but　as　successive。
　　Accordingly；　permanence　is　a　necessary　condition　under　which　alone
phenomena；　as　things　or　objects；　are　determinable　in　a　possible
experience。　But　as　regards　the　empirical　criterion　of　this　necessary
permanence；　and　with　it　of　the　substantiality　of　phenomena；　we　shall
find　sufficient　opportunity　to　speak　in　the　sequel。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　B。　SECOND　ANALOGY。

　　　　　　Principle　of　the　Succession　of　Time　According
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　to　the　Law　of　Causality。

　　　　　All　changes　take　place　according　to　the　law　of　the
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　connection　of　Cause　and　Effect。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PROOF。

　　（That　all　phenomena　in　the　succession　of　time　are　only　changes；　that
is；　a　successive　being　and　non…being　of　the　determinations　of
substan