the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第4章

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subtraction　of　certain　elements；*　a　light　broke　upon　all　natural
philosophers。　They　learned　that　reason　only　perceives　that　which　it
produces　after　its　own　design；　that　it　must　not　be　content　to
follow；　as　it　were；　in　the　leading…strings　of　nature；　but　must　proceed
in　advance　with　principles　of　judgement　according　to　unvarying　laws；
and　pel　nature　to　reply　its　questions。　For　accidental　observations；
made　according　to　no　preconceived　plan；　cannot　be　united　under　a
necessary　law。　But　it　is　this　that　reason　seeks　for　and　requires。　It
is　only　the　principles　of　reason　which　can　give　to　concordant
phenomena　the　validity　of　laws；　and　it　is　only　when　experiment　is
directed　by　these　rational　principles　that　it　can　have　any　real
utility。　Reason　must　approach　nature　with　the　view；　indeed；　of
receiving　information　from　it；　not；　however；　in　the　character　of　a
pupil；　who　listens　to　all　that　his　master　chooses　to　tell　him；　but
in　that　of　a　judge；　who　pels　the　witnesses　to　reply　to　those
questions　which　he　himself　thinks　fit　to　propose。　To　this　single
idea　must　the　revolution　be　ascribed；　by　which；　after　groping　in　the
dark　for　so　many　centuries；　natural　science　was　at　length　conducted
into　the　path　of　certain　progress。

　　*I　do　not　here　follow　with　exactness　the　history　of　the　experimental
method；　of　which；　indeed；　the　first　steps　are　involved　in　some
obscurity。

　　We　e　now　to　metaphysics；　a　purely　speculative　science；　which
occupies　a　pletely　isolated　position　and　is　entirely　independent　of
the　teachings　of　experience。　It　deals　with　mere　conceptions…　not；　like
mathematics；　with　conceptions　applied　to　intuition…　and　in　it；
reason　is　the　pupil　of　itself　alone。　It　is　the　oldest　of　the　sciences；
and　would　still　survive；　even　if　all　the　rest　were　swallowed　up　in　the
abyss　of　an　all…destroying　barbarism。　But　it　has　not　yet　had　the
good　fortune　to　attain　to　the　sure　scientific　method。　This　will　be
apparent；　if　we　apply　the　tests　which　we　proposed　at　the　outset。　We
find　that　reason　perpetually　es　to　a　stand；　when　it　attempts　to
gain　a　priori　the　perception　even　of　those　laws　which　the　most
mon　experience　confirms。　We　find　it　pelled　to　retrace　its
steps　in　innumerable　instances；　and　to　abandon　the　path　on　which　it
had　entered；　because　this　does　not　lead　to　the　desired　result。　We
find；　too；　that　those　who　are　engaged　in　metaphysical　pursuits　are　far
from　being　able　to　agree　among　themselves；　but　that；　on　the
contrary；　this　science　appears　to　furnish　an　arena　specially　adapted
for　the　display　of　skill　or　the　exercise　of　strength　in　mock…contests…
a　field　in　which　no　batant　ever　yet　succeeded　in　gaining　an　inch　of
ground；　in　which；　at　least；　no　victory　was　ever　yet　crowned　with
permanent　possession。
　　This　leads　us　to　inquire　why　it　is　that；　in　metaphysics；　the　sure
path　of　science　has　not　hitherto　been　found。　Shall　we　suppose　that
it　is　impossible　to　discover　it？　Why　then　should　nature　have　visited
our　reason　with　restless　aspirations　after　it；　as　if　it　were　one　of
our　weightiest　concerns？　Nay；　more；　how　little　cause　should　we　have　to
place　confidence　in　our　reason；　if　it　abandons　us　in　a　matter　about
which；　most　of　all；　we　desire　to　know　the　truth…　and　not　only　so；
but　even　allures　us　to　the　pursuit　of　vain　phantoms；　only　to　betray　us
in　the　end？　Or；　if　the　path　has　only　hitherto　been　missed；　what
indications　do　we　possess　to　guide　us　in　a　renewed　investigation；
and　to　enable　us　to　hope　for　greater　success　than　has　fallen　to　the
lot　of　our　predecessors？
　　It　appears　to　me　that　the　examples　of　mathematics　and　natural
philosophy；　which；　as　we　have　seen；　were　brought　into　their　present
condition　by　a　sudden　revolution；　are　sufficiently　remarkable　to　fix
our　attention　on　the　essential　circumstances　of　the　change　which　has
proved　so　advantageous　to　them；　and　to　induce　us　to　make　the
experiment　of　imitating　them；　so　far　as　the　analogy　which；　as　rational
sciences；　they　bear　to　metaphysics　may　permit。　It　has　hitherto　been
assumed　that　our　cognition　must　conform　to　the　objects；　but　all
attempts　to　ascertain　anything　about　these　objects　a　priori；　by
means　of　conceptions；　and　thus　to　extend　the　range　of　our　knowledge；
have　been　rendered　abortive　by　this　assumption。　Let　us　then　make　the
experiment　whether　we　may　not　be　more　successful　in　metaphysics；　if　we
assume　that　the　objects　must　conform　to　our　cognition。　This　appears；
at　all　events；　to　accord　better　with　the　possibility　of　our　gaining
the　end　we　have　in　view；　that　is　to　say；　of　arriving　at　the
cognition　of　objects　a　priori；　of　determining　something　with　respect
to　these　objects；　before　they　are　given　to　us。　We　here　propose　to　do
just　what　Copernicus　did　in　attempting　to　explain　the　celestial
movements。　When　he　found　that　he　could　make　no　progress　by　assuming
that　all　the　heavenly　bodies　revolved　round　the　spectator；　he　reversed
the　process；　and　tried　the　experiment　of　assuming　that　the　spectator
revolved；　while　the　stars　remained　at　rest。　We　may　make　the　same
experiment　with　regard　to　the　intuition　of　objects。　If　the　intuition
must　conform　to　the　nature　of　the　objects；　I　do　not　see　how　we　can
know　anything　of　them　a　priori。　If；　on　the　other　hand；　the　object
conforms　to　the　nature　of　our　faculty　of　intuition；　I　can　then
easily　conceive　the　possibility　of　such　an　a　priori　knowledge。　Now
as　I　cannot　rest　in　the　mere　intuitions；　but…　if　they　are　to　bee
cognitions…　must　refer　them；　as　representations；　to　something；　as
object；　and　must　determine　the　latter　by　means　of　the　former；　here
again　there　are　two　courses　open　to　me。　Either；　first；　I　may　assume
that　the　conceptions；　by　which　I　effect　this　determination；　conform　to
the　object…　and　in　this　case　I　am　reduced　to　the　same　perplexity　as
before；　or　secondly；　I　may　assume　that　the　objects；　or；　which　is　the
same　thing；　that　experience；　in　which　alone　as　given　objects　they
are　cognized；　conform　to　my　conceptions…　and　then　I　am　at　no　loss
how　to　proceed。　For　experience　itself　is　a　mode　of　cognition　which
requires　understanding。　Before　objects；　are　given　to　me；　that　is；　a
priori；　I　must　presuppose　in　myself　laws　of　the　understanding　which
are　expressed　in　conceptions　a　priori。　To　these　conceptions；　then；　all
the　objects　of　experience　must　necessarily　conform。　Now　there　are
objects　which　reason　thinks；　and　that　necessarily；　but　which　cannot　be
given　in　experience；　or；　at　least；　cannot　be　given　so　as　reason　thinks
them。　The　attempt　to　think　these　objects　will　hereafter　furnish　an
excellent　test　of　the　new　method　of　thought　which　we　have　adopted；　and
which　is　based　on　the　principle　that　we　only　cognize　in　things　a
priori　that　which　we　ourselves　place　in　them。*

　　*This　method；　accordingly；　which　we　have　borrowed　from　the　natural
philosopher；　consists　in　seeking　for　the　elements　of　pure　reason　in
that　which　admits　of　confirmation　or　refutation　by　experiment。　Now　the
propositions　of　pure　reason；　especially　when　they　transcend　the　limits
of　possible　experience；　do　not　admit　of　our　making　any　experiment　with
their　objects；　as　in　natural　science。　Hence；　with　regard　to　those
conceptions　and　principles　which　we　assume　a　priori；　our　only　course
ill　be　to　view　them　from　two　different　sides。　We　must　regard　one　and
the　same　conception；　on　the　one　hand；　in　relation　to　experience　as
an　object　of　the　senses　and　of　the　understanding；　on　the　other　hand；
in　relation　to　reason；　isolated　and　transcending　the　limits　of
experience；　as　an　object　of　mere　thought。　Now　if　we　find　that；　when　we
regard　things　from　this　double　point　of　view；　the　result　is　in　harmony
with　the　principle　of　pure　reason；　but　that；　when　we　regard　them
from　a　single　point　of　view；　reason　is　involved　in　self…contradiction；
then　the　experiment　will　establish　the　correctness　of　this
distinction。

　　This　attempt　succeeds　as　well　as　we　could　desire；　and　promises　to
metaphysics；　in　its　first　part…　that　is；　where　it　is　occupied　with
conceptions　a　priori；　of　which　the　corresponding　objects　may　be
given　in　experience…　the　certain　course　of　science。　For　by　this　new
method　we　are　enabled　perfectly　to　explain　the　possibility　of　a　priori
cognition；　and；　what　is　more；　to　demonstrate　satisfactorily　the　laws
which　li