the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第151章

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ourselves　under　their　guidance；　we　can　make　no　teleological　use　of　the
knowledge　of　nature；　as　regards　cognition；　unless　nature　itself　has
established　teleological　unity。　For　without　this　unity　we　should　not
even　possess　reason；　because　we　should　have　no　school　for　reason；
and　no　cultivation　through　objects　which　afford　the　materials　for
its　conceptions。　But　teleological　unity　is　a　necessary　unity；　and
founded　on　the　essence　of　the　individual　will　itself。　Hence　this　will；
which　is　the　condition　of　the　application　of　this　unity　in　concreto；
must　be　so　likewise。　In　this　way　the　transcendental　enlargement　of　our
rational　cognition　would　be；　not　the　cause；　but　merely　the　effect　of
the　practical　teleology　which　pure　reason　imposes　upon　us。
　　Hence；　also；　we　find　in　the　history　of　human　reason　that；　before　the
moral　conceptions　were　sufficiently　purified　and　determined；　and
before　men　had　attained　to　a　perception　of　the　systematic　unity　of
ends　according　to　these　conceptions　and　from　necessary　principles；　the
knowledge　of　nature；　and　even　a　considerable　amount　of　intellectual
culture　in　many　other　sciences；　could　produce　only　rude　and　vague
conceptions　of　the　Deity；　sometimes　even　admitting　of　an　astonishing
indifference　with　regard　to　this　question　altogether。　But　the　more
enlarged　treatment　of　moral　ideas；　which　was　rendered　necessary　by　the
extreme　pure　moral　law　of　our　religion；　awakened　the　interest；　and
thereby　quickened　the　perceptions　of　reason　in　relation　to　this
object。　In　this　way；　and　without　the　help　either　of　an　extended
acquaintance　with　nature；　or　of　a　reliable　transcendental　insight　（for
these　have　been　wanting　in　all　ages）；　a　conception　of　the　Divine　Being
was　arrived　at；　which　we　now　bold　to　be　the　correct　one；　not　because
speculative　reason　convinces　us　of　its　correctness；　but　because　it
accords　with　the　moral　principles　of　reason。　Thus　it　is　to　pure
reason；　but　only　in　its　practical　use；　that　we　must　ascribe　the
merit　of　having　connected　with　our　highest　interest　a　cognition；　of
which　mere　speculation　was　able　only　to　form　a　conjecture；　but　the
validity　of　which　it　was　unable　to　establish…　and　of　having　thereby
rendered　it；　not　indeed　a　demonstrated　dogma；　but　a　hypothesis
absolutely　necessary　to　the　essential　ends　of　reason。
　　But　if　practical　reason　has　reached　this　elevation；　and　has　attained
to　the　conception　of　a　sole　Primal　Being　as　the　supreme　good；　it
must　not；　therefore；　imagine　that　it　has　transcended　the　empirical
conditions　of　its　application；　and　risen　to　the　immediate　cognition　of
new　objects；　it　must　not　presume　to　start　from　the　conception　which　it
has　gained；　and　to　deduce　from　it　the　moral　laws　themselves。　For　it
was　these　very　laws；　the　internal　practical　necessity　of　which　led
us　to　the　hypothesis　of　an　independent　cause；　or　of　a　wise　ruler　of
the　universe；　who　should　give　them　effect。　Hence　we　are　not　entitled
to　regard　them　as　accidental　and　derived　from　the　mere　will　of　the
ruler；　especially　as　we　have　no　conception　of　such　a　will；　except　as
formed　in　accordance　with　these　laws。　So　far；　then；　as　practical
reason　has　the　right　to　conduct　us；　we　shall　not　look　upon　actions
as　binding　on　us；　because　they　are　the　mands　of　God；　but　we　shall
regard　them　as　divine　mands；　because　we　are　internally　bound　by
them。　We　shall　study　freedom　under　the　teleological　unity　which
accords　with　principles　of　reason；　we　shall　look　upon　ourselves　as
acting　in　conformity　with　the　divine　will　only　in　so　far　as　we　hold
sacred　the　moral　law　which　reason　teaches　us　from　the　nature　of
actions　themselves；　and　we　shall　believe　that　we　can　obey　that　will
only　by　promoting　the　weal　of　the　universe　in　ourselves　and　in　others。
Moral　theology　is；　therefore；　only　of　immanent　use。　It　teaches　us　to
fulfil　our　destiny　here　in　the　world；　by　placing　ourselves　in
harmony　with　the　general　system　of　ends；　and　warns　us　against　the
fanaticism；　nay；　the　crime　of　depriving　reason　of　its　legislative
authority　in　the　moral　conduct　of　life；　for　the　purpose　of　directly
connecting　this　authority　with　the　idea　of　the　Supreme　Being。　For　this
would　be；　not　an　immanent；　but　a　transcendent　use　of　moral　theology；
and；　like　the　transcendent　use　of　mere　speculation；　would　inevitably
pervert　and　frustrate　the　ultimate　ends　of　reason。

　　　　　　　SECTION　III。　Of　Opinion；　Knowledge；　and　Belief。

　　The　holding　of　a　thing　to　be　true　is　a　phenomenon　in　our
understanding　which　may　rest　on　objective　grounds；　but　requires；　also；
subjective　causes　in　the　mind　of　the　person　judging。　If　a　judgement　is
valid　for　every　rational　being；　then　its　ground　is　objectively
sufficient；　and　it　is　termed　a　conviction。　If；　on　the　other　hand；　it
has　its　ground　in　the　particular　character　of　the　subject；　it　is
termed　a　persuasion。
　　Persuasion　is　a　mere　illusion；　the　ground　of　the　judgement；　which
lies　solely　in　the　subject；　being　regarded　as　objective。　Hence　a
judgement　of　this　kind　has　only　private　validity…　is　only　valid　for
the　individual　who　judges；　and　the　holding　of　a　thing　to　be　true　in
this　way　cannot　be　municated。　But　truth　depends　upon　agreement　with
the　object；　and　consequently　the　judgements　of　all　understandings；
if　true；　must　be　in　agreement　with　each　other　（consentientia　uni
tertio　consentiunt　inter　se）。　Conviction　may；　therefore；　be
distinguished；　from　an　external　point　of　view；　from　persuasion；　by　the
possibility　of　municating　it　and　by　showing　its　validity　for　the
reason　of　every　man；　for　in　this　case　the　presumption；　at　least；
arises　that　the　agreement　of　all　judgements　with　each　other；　in
spite　of　the　different　characters　of　individuals；　rests　upon　the
mon　ground　of　the　agreement　of　each　with　the　object；　and　thus　the
correctness　of　the　judgement　is　established。
　　Persuasion；　accordingly；　cannot　be　subjectively　distinguished　from
conviction；　that　is；　so　long　as　the　subject　views　its　judgement　simply
as　a　phenomenon　of　its　own　mind。　But　if　we　inquire　whether　the　grounds
of　our　judgement；　which　are　valid　for　us；　produce　the　same　effect　on
the　reason　of　others　as　on　our　own；　we　have　then　the　means；　though
only　subjective　means；　not；　indeed；　of　producing　conviction；　but　of
detecting　the　merely　private　validity　of　the　judgement；　in　other
words；　of　discovering　that　there　is　in　it　the　element　of　mere
persuasion。
　　If　we　can；　in　addition　to　this；　develop　the　subjective　causes　of　the
judgement；　which　we　have　taken　for　its　objective　grounds；　and　thus
explain　the　deceptive　judgement　as　a　phenomenon　in　our　mind；　apart
altogether　from　the　objective　character　of　the　object；　we　can　then
expose　the　illusion　and　need　be　no　longer　deceived　by　it；　although；　if
its　subjective　cause　lies　in　our　nature；　we　cannot　hope　altogether
to　escape　its　influence。
　　I　can　only　maintain；　that　is；　affirm　as　necessarily　valid　for
every　one；　that　which　produces　conviction。　Persuasion　I　may　keep　for
myself；　if　it　is　agreeable　to　me；　but　I　cannot；　and　ought　not；　to
attempt　to　impose　it　as　binding　upon　others。
　　Holding　for　true；　or　the　subjective　validity　of　a　judgement　in
relation　to　conviction　（which　is；　at　the　same　time；　objectively
valid）；　has　the　three　following　degrees：　opinion；　belief；　and
knowledge。　Opinion　is　a　consciously　insufficient　judgement；
subjectively　as　well　as　objectively。　Belief　is　subjectively
sufficient；　but　is　recognized　as　being　objectively　insufficient。
Knowledge　is　both　subjectively　and　objectively　sufficient。
Subjective　sufficiency　is　termed　conviction　（for　myself）；　objective
sufficiency　is　termed　certainty　（for　all）。　I　need　not　dwell　longer
on　the　explanation　of　such　simple　conceptions。
　　I　must　never　venture　to　be　of　opinion；　without　knowing　something；　at
least；　by　which　my　judgement；　in　itself　merely　problematical；　is
brought　into　connection　with　the　truth…　which　connection；　although　not
perfect；　is　still　something　more　than　an　arbitrary　fiction。
Moreover；　the　law　of　such　a　connection　must　be　certain。　For　if；　in
relation　to　this　law；　I　have　nothing　more　than　opinion；　my　judgement
is　but　a　play　of　the　imagination；　without　the　least　relation　to　truth。
In　the　judgements　of　pure　reason；　opinion　has　no　place。　For；　as　they
do　not　rest　on　empirical　grounds　and