the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第142章

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does　not　give　us　any　certain　information　in　regard　to　the　bounds　of
our　knowledge。　All　unsuccessful　dogmatical　attempts　of　reason　are
facia；　which　it　is　always　useful　to　submit　to　the　censure　of　the
sceptic。　But　this　cannot　help　us　to　any　decision　regarding　the
expectations　which　reason　cherishes　of　better　success　in　future
endeavours；　the　investigations　of　scepticism　cannot；　therefore；　settle
the　dispute　regarding　the　rights　and　powers　of　human　reason。
　　Hume　is　perhaps　the　ablest　and　most　ingenious　of　all　sceptical
philosophers；　and　his　writings　have；　undoubtedly；　exerted　the　most
powerful　influence　in　awakening　reason　to　a　thorough　investigation
into　its　own　powers。　It　will；　therefore；　well　repay　our　labours　to
consider　for　a　little　the　course　of　reasoning　which　he　followed　and
the　errors　into　which　he　strayed；　although　setting　out　on　the　path
of　truth　and　certitude。
　　Hume　was　probably　aware；　although　he　never　clearly　developed　the
notion；　that　we　proceed　in　judgements　of　a　certain　class　beyond　our
conception　if　the　object。　I　have　termed　this　kind　of　judgement
synthetical。　As　regard　the　manner　in　which　I　pass　beyond　my　conception
by　the　aid　of　experience；　no　doubts　can　be　entertained。　Experience
is　itself　a　synthesis　of　perceptions；　and　it　employs　perceptions　to
increment　the　conception；　which　I　obtain　by　means　of　another
perception。　But　we　feel　persuaded　that　we　are　able　to　proceed　beyond　a
conception；　and　to　extend　our　cognition　a　priori。　We　attempt　this　in
two　ways…　either；　through　the　pure　understanding；　in　relation　to
that　which　may　bee　an　object　of　experience；　or；　through　pure
reason；　in　relation　to　such　properties　of　things；　or　of　the
existence　of　things；　as　can　never　be　presented　in　any　experience。　This
sceptical　philosopher　did　not　distinguish　these　two　kinds　of
judgements；　as　he　ought　to　have　done；　but　regarded　this　augmentation
of　conceptions；　and；　if　we　may　so　express　ourselves；　the　spontaneous
generation　of　understanding　and　reason；　independently　of　the
impregnation　of　experience；　as　altogether　impossible。　The　so…called
a　priori　principles　of　these　faculties　he　consequently　held　to　be
invalid　and　imaginary；　and　regarded　them　as　nothing　but　subjective
habits　of　thought　originating　in　experience；　and　therefore　purely
empirical　and　contingent　rules；　to　which　we　attribute　a　spurious
necessity　and　universality。　In　support　of　this　strange　assertion；　he
referred　us　to　the　generally　acknowledged　principle　of　the　relation
between　cause　and　effect。　No　faculty　of　the　mind　can　conduct　us　from
the　conception　of　a　thing　to　the　existence　of　something　else；　and
hence　he　believed　he　could　infer　that；　without　experience；　we
possess　no　source　from　which　we　can　augment　a　conception；　and　no
ground　sufficient　to　justify　us　in　framing　a　judgement　that　is　to
extend　our　cognition　a　priori。　That　the　light　of　the　sun；　which　shines
upon　a　piece　of　wax；　at　the　same　time　melts　it；　while　it　hardens　clay；
no　power　of　the　understanding　could　infer　from　the　conceptions　which
we　previously　possessed　of　these　substances；　much　less　is　there　any
a　priori　law　that　could　conduct　us　to　such　a　conclusion；　which
experience　alone　can　certify。　On　the　other　hand；　we　have　seen　in　our
discussion　of　transcendental　logic；　that；　although　we　can　never
proceed　immediately　beyond　the　content　of　the　conception　which　is
given　us；　we　can　always　cognize　pletely　a　priori…　in　relation；
however；　to　a　third　term；　namely；　possible　experience…　the　law　of
its　connection　with　other　things。　For　example；　if　I　observe　that　a
piece　of　wax　melts；　I　can　cognize　a　priori　that　there　must　have　been
something　（the　sun's　heat）　preceding；　which　this　law；　although；
without　the　aid　of　experience；　I　could　not　cognize　a　priori　and　in　a
determinate　manner　either　the　cause　from　the　effect；　or　the　effect
from　the　cause。　Hume　was；　therefore；　wrong　in　inferring；　from　the
contingency　of　the　determination　according　to　law；　the　contingency
of　the　law　itself；　and　the　passing　beyond　the　conception　of　a　thing　to
possible　experience　（which　is　an　a　priori　proceeding；　constituting　the
objective　reality　of　the　conception）；　he　confounded　with　our　synthesis
of　objects　in　actual　experience；　which　is　always；　of　course；
empirical。　Thus；　too；　he　regarded　the　principle　of　affinity；　which　has
its　seat　in　the　understanding　and　indicates　a　necessary　connection；　as
a　mere　rule　of　association；　lying　in　the　imitative　faculty　of
imagination；　which　can　present　only　contingent；　and　not　objective
connections。
　　The　sceptical　errors　of　this　remarkably　acute　thinker　arose
principally　from　a　defect；　which　was　mon　to　him　with　the
dogmatists；　namely；　that　he　had　never　made　a　systematic　review　of
all　the　different　kinds　of　a　priori　synthesis　performed　by　the
understanding。　Had　he　done　so；　he　would　have　found；　to　take　one
example　among　many；　that　the　principle　of　permanence　was　of　this
character；　and　that　it；　as　well　as　the　principle　of　causality；
anticipates　experience。　In　this　way　he　might　have　been　able　to
describe　the　determinate　limits　of　the　a　priori　operations　of
understanding　and　reason。　But　he　merely　declared　the　understanding
to　be　limited；　instead　of　showing　what　its　limits　were；　he　created　a
general　mistrust　in　the　power　of　our　faculties；　without　giving　us
any　determinate　knowledge　of　the　bounds　of　our　necessary　and
unavoidable　ignorance；　he　examined　and　condemned　some　of　the
principles　of　the　understanding；　without　investigating　all　its
powers　with　the　pleteness　necessary　to　criticism。　He　denies；　with
truth；　certain　powers　to　the　understanding；　but　he　goes　further；　and
declares　it　to　be　utterly　inadequate　to　the　a　priori　extension　of
knowledge；　although　he　has　not　fully　examined　all　the　powers　which
reside　in　the　faculty；　and　thus　the　fate　which　always　overtakes
scepticism　meets　him　too。　That　is　to　say；　his　own　declarations　are
doubted；　for　his　objections　were　based　upon　facta；　which　are
contingent；　and　not　upon　principles；　which　can　alone　demonstrate　the
necessary　invalidity　of　all　dogmatical　assertions。
　　As　Hume　makes　no　distinction　between　the　well…grounded　claims　of　the
understanding　and　the　dialectical　pretensions　of　reason；　against
which；　however；　his　attacks　are　mainly　directed；　reason　does　not
feel　itself　shut　out　from　all　attempts　at　the　extension　of　a　priori
cognition；　and　hence　it　refuses；　in　spite　of　a　few　checks　in　this　or
that　quarter；　to　relinquish　such　efforts。　For　one　naturally　arms
oneself　to　resist　an　attack；　and　bees　more　obstinate　in　the　resolve
to　establish　the　claims　he　has　advanced。　But　a　plete　review　of
the　powers　of　reason；　and　the　conviction　thence　arising　that　we　are　in
possession　of　a　limited　field　of　action；　while　we　must　admit　the
vanity　of　higher　claims；　puts　an　end　to　all　doubt　and　dispute；　and
induces　reason　to　rest　satisfied　with　the　undisturbed　possession　of
its　limited　domain。
　　To　the　uncritical　dogmatist；　who　has　not　surveyed　the　sphere　of
his　understanding；　nor　determined；　in　accordance　with　principles；
the　limits　of　possible　cognition；　who；　consequently；　is　ignorant　of
his　own　powers；　and　believes　he　will　discover　them　by　the　attempts
he　makes　in　the　field　of　cognition；　these　attacks　of　scepticism　are
not　only　dangerous；　but　destructive。　For　if　there　is　one　proposition
in　his　chain　of　reasoning　which　be　he　cannot　prove；　or　the　fallacy
in　which　be　cannot　evolve　in　accordance　with　a　principle；　suspicion
falls　on　all　his　statements；　however　plausible　they　may　appear。
　　And　thus　scepticism；　the　bane　of　dogmatical　philosophy；　conducts
us　to　a　sound　investigation　into　the　understanding　and　the　reason。
When　we　are　thus　far　advanced；　we　need　fear　no　further
attacks；　for　the　limits　of　our　domain　are　clearly　marked　out；　and　we
can　make　no　claims　nor　bee　involved　in　any　disputes　regarding　the
region　that　lies　beyond　these　limits。　Thus　the　sceptical　procedure
in　philosophy　does　not　present　any　solution　of　the　problems　of　reason；
but　it　forms　an　excellent　exercise　for　its　powers；　awakening　its
circumspection；　and　indicating　the　means　whereby　it　may　most　fully
establish　its　claims　to　its　legitimate　possessions。

　　　　SECTION　III。　The　Discipline　of　Pure　Reason　in　Hypothesis。