the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第139章

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the　object　of　them　lies　entirely　beyond　the　bounds　of　natural　science；
and　within　the　sphere　of　pure　ideas。
　　What　is　to　be　done　to　provide　against　the　danger　which　seems　in
the　present　case　to　menace　the　best　interests　of　humanity？　The
course　to　be　pursued　in　reference　to　this　subject　is　a　perfectly　plain
and　natural　one。　Let　each　thinker　pursue　his　own　path；　if　he　shows
talent；　if　be　gives　evidence　of　profound　thought；　in　one　word；　if　he
shows　that　he　possesses　the　power　of　reasoning…　reason　is　always　the
gainer。　If　you　have　recourse　to　other　means；　if　you　attempt　to
coerce　reason；　if　you　raise　the　cry　of　treason　to　humanity；　if　you
excite　the　feelings　of　the　crowd；　which　can　neither　understand　nor
sympathize　with　such　subtle　speculations…　you　will　only　make
yourselves　ridiculous。　For　the　question　does　not　concern　the　advantage
or　disadvantage　which　we　are　expected　to　reap　from　such　inquiries；　the
question　is　merely　how　far　reason　can　advance　in　the　field　of
speculation；　apart　from　all　kinds　of　interest；　and　whether　we　may
depend　upon　the　exertions　of　speculative　reason；　or　must　renounce
all　reliance　on　it。　Instead　of　joining　the　batants；　it　is　your　part
to　be　a　tranquil　spectator　of　the　struggle…　a　laborious　struggle　for
the　parties　engaged；　but　attended；　in　its　progress　as　well　as　in　its
result；　with　the　most　advantageous　consequences　for　the　interests　of
thought　and　knowledge。　It　is　absurd　to　expect　to　be　enlightened　by
Reason；　and　at　the　same　time　to　prescribe　to　her　what　side　of　the
question　she　must　adopt。　Moreover；　reason　is　sufficiently　held　in
check　by　its　own　power；　the　limits　imposed　on　it　by　its　own　nature　are
sufficient；　it　is　unnecessary　for　you　to　place　over　it　additional
guards；　as　if　its　power　were　dangerous　to　the　constitution　of　the
intellectual　state。　In　the　dialectic　of　reason　there　is　no　victory
gained　which　need　in　the　least　disturb　your　tranquility。
　　The　strife　of　dialectic　is　a　necessity　of　reason；　and　we　cannot
but　wish　that　it　had　been　conducted　long　ere　this　with　that　perfect
freedom　which　ought　to　be　its　essential　condition。　In　this　case；　we
should　have　had　at　an　earlier　period　a　matured　and　profound　criticism；
which　must　have　put　an　end　to　all　dialectical　disputes；　by　exposing
the　illusions　and　prejudices　in　which　they　originated。
　　There　is　in　human　nature　an　unworthy　propensity…　a　propensity　which；
like　everything　that　springs　from　nature；　must　in　its　final　purpose　be
conducive　to　the　good　of　humanity…　to　conceal　our　real　sentiments；　and
to　give　expression　only　to　certain　received　opinions；　which　are
regarded　as　at　once　safe　and　promotive　of　the　mon　good。　It　is　true；
this　tendency；　not　only　to　conceal　our　real　sentiments；　but　to　profess
those　which　may　gain　us　favour　in　the　eyes　of　society；　has　not　only
civilized；　but；　in　a　certain　measure；　moralized　us；　as　no　one　can
break　through　the　outward　covering　of　respectability；　honour；　and
morality；　and　thus　the　seemingly…good　examples　which　we　which　we　see
around　us　form　an　excellent　school　for　moral　improvement；　so　long　as
our　belief　in　their　genuineness　remains　unshaken。　But　this　disposition
to　represent　ourselves　as　better　than　we　are；　and　to　utter　opinions
which　are　not　our　own；　can　be　nothing　more　than　a　kind　of　provisionary
arrangement　of　nature　to　lead　us　from　the　rudeness　of　an　uncivilized
state；　and　to　teach　us　how　to　assume　at　least　the　appearance　and
manner　of　the　good　we　see。　But　when　true　principles　have　been
developed；　and　have　obtained　a　sure　foundation　in　our　habit　of
thought；　this　conventionalism　must　be　attacked　with　earnest　vigour；
otherwise　it　corrupts　the　heart；　and　checks　the　growth　of　good
dispositions　with　the　mischievous　weed　of　air　appearances。
　　I　am　sorry　to　remark　the　same　tendency　to　misrepresentation　and
hypocrisy　in　the　sphere　of　speculative　discussion；　where　there　is　less
temptation　to　restrain　the　free　expression　of　thought。　For　what　can　be
more　prejudicial　to　the　interests　of　intelligence　than　to　falsify
our　real　sentiments；　to　conceal　the　doubts　which　we　feel　in　regard
to　our　statements；　or　to　maintain　the　validity　of　grounds　of　proof
which　we　well　know　to　be　insufficient？　So　long　as　mere　personal　vanity
is　the　source　of　these　unworthy　artifices…　and　this　is　generally　the
case　in　speculative　discussions；　which　are　mostly　destitute　of
practical　interest；　and　are　incapable　of　plete　demonstration…　the
vanity　of　the　opposite　party　exaggerates　as　much　on　the　other　side；
and　thus　the　result　is　the　same；　although　it　is　not　brought　about　so
soon　as　if　the　dispute　had　been　conducted　in　a　sincere　and　upright
spirit。　But　where　the　mass　entertains　the　notion　that　the　aim　of
certain　subtle　speculators　is　nothing　less　than　to　shake　the　very
foundations　of　public　welfare　and　morality…　it　seems　not　only　prudent；
but　even　praise　worthy；　to　maintain　the　good　cause　by　illusory
arguments；　rather　than　to　give　to　our　supposed　opponents　the　advantage
of　lowering　our　declarations　to　the　moderate　tone　of　a　merely
practical　conviction；　and　of　pelling　us　to　confess　our　inability　to
attain　to　apodeictic　certainty　in　speculative　subjects。　But　we　ought
to　reflect　that　there　is　nothing；　in　the　world　more　fatal　to　the
maintenance　of　a　good　cause　than　deceit；　misrepresentation；　and
falsehood。　That　the　strictest　laws　of　honesty　should　be　observed　in
the　discussion　of　a　purely　speculative　subject　is　the　least
requirement　that　can　be　made。　If　we　could　reckon　with　security　even
upon　so　little；　the　conflict　of　speculative　reason　regarding　the
important　questions　of　God；　immortality；　and　freedom；　would　have
been　either　decided　long　ago；　or　would　very　soon　be　brought　to　a
conclusion。　But；　in　general；　the　uprightness　of　the　defence　stands
in　an　inverse　ratio　to　the　goodness　of　the　cause；　and　perhaps　more
honesty　and　fairness　are　shown　by　those　who　deny　than　by　those　who
uphold　these　doctrines。
　　I　shall　persuade　myself；　then；　that　I　have　readers　who　do　not　wish
to　see　a　righteous　cause　defended　by　unfair　arguments。　Such　will　now
recognize　the　fact　that；　according　to　the　principles　of　this　Critique；
if　we　consider　not　what　is；　but　what　ought　to　be　the　case；　there　can
be　really　no　polemic　of　pure　reason。　For　how　can　two　persons　dispute
about　a　thing；　the　reality　of　which　neither　can　present　in　actual　or
even　in　possible　experience？　Each　adopts　the　plan　of　meditating　on　his
idea　for　the　purpose　of　drawing　from　the　idea；　if　he　can；　what　is　more
than　the　idea；　that　is；　the　reality　of　the　object　which　it
indicates。　How　shall　they　settle　the　dispute；　since　neither　is　able　to
make　his　assertions　directly　prehensible　and　certain；　but　must
restrict　himself　to　attacking　and　confuting　those　of　his　opponent？　All
statements　enounced　by　pure　reason　transcend　the　conditions　of
possible　experience；　beyond　the　sphere　of　which　we　can　discover　no
criterion　of　truth；　while　they　are　at　the　same　time　framed　in
accordance　with　the　laws　of　the　understanding；　which　are　applicable
only　to　experience；　and　thus　it　is　the　fate　of　all　such　speculative
discussions　that　while　the　one　party　attacks　the　weaker　side　of　his
opponent；　he　infallibly　lays　open　his　own　weaknesses。
　　The　critique　of　pure　reason　may　be　regarded　as　the　highest
tribunal　for　all　speculative　disputes；　for　it　is　not　involved　in　these
disputes；　which　have　an　immediate　relation　to　certain　objects　and
not　to　the　laws　of　the　mind；　but　is　instituted　for　the　purpose　of
determining　the　rights　and　limits　of　reason。
　　Without　the　control　of　criticism；　reason　is；　as　it　were；　in　a
state　of　nature；　and　can　only　establish　its　claims　and　assertions　by
war。　Criticism；　on　the　contrary；　deciding　all　questions　according　to
the　fundamental　laws　of　its　own　institution；　secures　to　us　the　peace
of　law　and　order；　and　enables　us　to　discuss　all　differences　in　the
more　tranquil　manner　of　a　legal　process。　In　the　former　case；
disputes　are　ended　by　victory；　which　both　sides　may　claim　and　which　is
followed　by　a　hollow　armistice；　in　the　latter；　by　a　sentence；　which；
as　it　strikes　at　the　root　of　all　speculative　differences；　ensures　to
all　concerned　a　lasting　peace。　The　endless　disputes　of　a　dogmatizing
reason　pel　us　to　look　for　some　mo