the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第13章

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〃How　is　metaphysics　possible　as　a　science？〃
　　Thus；　the　critique　of　reason　leads　at　last；　naturally　and
necessarily；　to　science；　and；　on　the　other　hand；　the　dogmatical　use　of
reason　without　criticism　leads　to　groundless　assertions；　against　which
others　equally　specious　can　always　be　set；　thus　ending　unavoidably
in　scepticism。
　　Besides；　this　science　cannot　be　of　great　and　formidable　prolixity；
because　it　has　not　to　do　with　objects　of　reason；　the　variety　of
which　is　inexhaustible；　but　merely　with　Reason　herself　and　her
problems；　problems　which　arise　out　of　her　own　bosom；　and　are　not
proposed　to　her　by　the　nature　of　outward　things；　but　by　her　own
nature。　And　when　once　Reason　has　previously　bee　able　pletely
to　understand　her　own　power　in　regard　to　objects　which　she　meets
with　in　experience；　it　will　be　easy　to　determine　securely　the　extent
and　limits　of　her　attempted　application　to　objects　beyond　the　confines
of　experience。
　　We　may　and　must；　therefore；　regard　the　attempts　hitherto　made　to
establish　metaphysical　science　dogmatically　as　non…existent。　For
what　of　analysis；　that　is；　mere　dissection　of　conceptions；　is
contained　in　one　or　other；　is　not　the　aim　of；　but　only　a　preparation
for　metaphysics　proper；　which　has　for　its　object　the　extension；　by
means　of　synthesis；　of　our　a　priori　knowledge。　And　for　this　purpose；
mere　analysis　is　of　course　useless；　because　it　only　shows　what　is
contained　in　these　conceptions；　but　not　how　we　arrive；　a　priori；　at
them；　and　this　it　is　her　duty　to　show；　in　order　to　be　able
afterwards　to　determine　their　valid　use　in　regard　to　all　objects　of
experience；　to　all　knowledge　in　general。　But　little　self…denial；
indeed；　is　needed　to　give　up　these　pretensions；　seeing　the　undeniable；
and　in　the　dogmatic　mode　of　procedure；　inevitable　contradictions　of
Reason　with　herself；　have　long　since　ruined　the　reputation　of　every
system　of　metaphysics　that　has　appeared　up　to　this　time。　It　will
require　more　firmness　to　remain　undeterred　by　difficulty　from
within；　and　opposition　from　without；　from　endeavouring；　by　a　method
quite　opposed　to　all　those　hitherto　followed；　to　further　the　growth
and　fruitfulness　of　a　science　indispensable　to　human　reason…　a　science
from　which　every　branch　it　has　borne　may　be　cut　away；　but　whose
roots　remain　indestructible。

　　VII。　Idea　and　Division　of　a　Particular　Science；　under　the
　　　　　　　Name　of　a　Critique　of　Pure　Reason。

　　From　all　that　has　been　said；　there　results　the　idea　of　a
particular　science；　which　may　be　called　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason。
For　reason　is　the　faculty　which　furnishes　us　with　the　principles　of
knowledge　a　priori。　Hence；　pure　reason　is　the　faculty　which　contains
the　principles　of　cognizing　anything　absolutely　a　priori。　An　organon
of　pure　reason　would　be　a　pendium　of　those　principles　according
to　which　alone　all　pure　cognitions　a　priori　can　be　obtained。　The
pletely　extended　application　of　such　an　organon　would　afford　us　a
system　of　pure　reason。　As　this；　however；　is　demanding　a　great　deal；
and　it　is　yet　doubtful　whether　any　extension　of　our　knowledge　be
here　possible；　or；　if　so；　in　what　cases；　we　can　regard　a　science　of
the　mere　criticism　of　pure　reason；　its　sources　and　limits；　as　the
propaedeutic　to　a　system　of　pure　reason。　Such　a　science　must　not　be
called　a　doctrine；　but　only　a　critique　of　pure　reason；　and　its　use；　in
regard　to　speculation；　would　be　only　negative；　not　to　enlarge　the
bounds　of；　but　to　purify；　our　reason；　and　to　shield　it　against
error…　which　alone　is　no　little　gain。　I　apply　the　term
transcendental　to　all　knowledge　which　is　not　so　much　occupied　with
objects　as　with　the　mode　of　our　cognition　of　these　objects；　so　far
as　this　mode　of　cognition　is　possible　a　priori。　A　system　of　such
conceptions　would　be　called　transcendental　philosophy。　But　this；
again；　is　still　beyond　the　bounds　of　our　present　essay。　For　as　such
a　science　must　contain　a　plete　exposition　not　only　of　our
synthetical　a　priori；　but　of　our　analytical　a　priori　knowledge；　it
is　of　too　wide　a　range　for　our　present　purpose；　because　we　do　not
require　to　carry　our　analysis　any　farther　than　is　necessary　to
understand；　in　their　full　extent；　the　principles　of　synthesis　a
priori；　with　which　alone　we　have　to　do。　This　investigation；　which　we
cannot　properly　call　a　doctrine；　but　only　a　transcendental　critique；
because　it　aims　not　at　the　enlargement；　but　at　the　correction　and
guidance；　of　our　knowledge；　and　is　to　serve　as　a　touchstone　of　the
worth　or　worthlessness　of　all　knowledge　a　priori；　is　the　sole　object
of　our　present　essay。　Such　a　critique　is　consequently；　as　far　as
possible；　a　preparation　for　an　organon；　and　if　this　new　organon　should
be　found　to　fail；　at　least　for　a　canon　of　pure　reason；　according　to
which　the　plete　system　of　the　philosophy　of　pure　reason；　whether　it
extend　or　limit　the　bounds　of　that　reason；　might　one　day　be　set
forth　both　analytically　and　synthetically。　For　that　this　is
possible；　nay；　that　such　a　system　is　not　of　so　great　extent　as　to
preclude　the　hope　of　its　ever　being　pleted；　is　evident。　For　we　have
not　here　to　do　with　the　nature　of　outward　objects；　which　is
infinite；　but　solely　with　the　mind；　which　judges　of　the　nature　of
objects；　and；　again；　with　the　mind　only　in　respect　of　its　cognition
a　priori。　And　the　object　of　our　investigations；　as　it　is　not　to　be
sought　without；　but；　altogether　within；　ourselves；　cannot　remain
concealed；　and　in　all　probability　is　limited　enough　to　be　pletely
surveyed　and　fairly　estimated；　according　to　its　worth　or
worthlessness。　Still　less　let　the　reader　here　expect　a　critique　of
books　and　systems　of　pure　reason；　our　present　object　is　exclusively
a　critique　of　the　faculty　of　pure　reason　itself。　Only　when　we　make
this　critique　our　foundation；　do　we　possess　a　pure　touchstone　for
estimating　the　philosophical　value　of　ancient　and　modern　writings　on
this　subject；　and　without　this　criterion；　the　inpetent　historian　or
judge　decides　upon　and　corrects　the　groundless　assertions　of　others
with　his　own；　which　have　themselves　just　as　little　foundation。
　　Transcendental　philosophy　is　the　idea　of　a　science；　for　which　the
Critique　of　Pure　Reason　must　sketch　the　whole　plan
architectonically；　that　is；　from　principles；　with　a　full　guarantee　for
the　validity　and　stability　of　all　the　parts　which　enter　into　the
building。　It　is　the　system　of　all　the　principles　of　pure　reason。　If
this　Critique　itself　does　not　assume　the　title　of　transcendental
philosophy；　it　is　only　because；　to　be　a　plete　system；　it　ought　to
contain　a　full　analysis　of　all　human　knowledge　a　priori。　Our
critique　must；　indeed；　lay　before　us　a　plete　enumeration　of　all　the
radical　conceptions　which　constitute　the　said　pure　knowledge。　But　from
the　plete　analysis　of　these　conceptions　themselves；　as　also　from
a　plete　investigation　of　those　derived　from　them；　it　abstains
with　reason；　partly　because　it　would　be　deviating　from　the　end　in　view
to　occupy　itself　with　this　analysis；　since　this　process　is　not
attended　with　the　difficulty　and　insecurity　to　be　found　in　the
synthesis；　to　which　our　critique　is　entirely　devoted；　and　partly
because　it　would　be　inconsistent　with　the　unity　of　our　plan　to
burden　this　essay　with　the　vindication　of　the　pleteness　of　such
an　analysis　and　deduction；　with　which；　after　all；　we　have　at　present
nothing　to　do。　This　pleteness　of　the　analysis　of　these　radical
conceptions；　as　well　as　of　the　deduction　from　the　conceptions　a　priori
which　may　be　given　by　the　analysis；　we　can；　however；　easily　attain；
provided　only　that　we　are　in　possession　of　all　these　radical
conceptions；　which　are　to　serve　as　principles　of　the　synthesis；　and
that　in　respect　of　this　main　purpose　nothing　is　wanting。
　　To　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason；　therefore；　belongs　all　that
constitutes　transcendental　philosophy；　and　it　is　the　plete　idea
of　transcendental　philosophy；　but　still　not　the　science　itself；
because　it　only　proceeds　so　far　with　the　analysis　as　is　necessary　to
the　power　of　judging　pletely　of　our　synthetical　knowledge　a　priori。
　　The　principal　thing　we　must　attend　to；　in　the　division　of　the
parts　of　a　science　like　this；　is　that　no　conceptions　must　enter　it
which　contain　aught　empirical；　in　other　words；　that　the　kn