the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第122章

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term　this　the　demonstrative　or　apodeictic　employment　of　reason。　If；
however；　the　general　is　admitted　as　problematical　only；　and　is　a
mere　idea；　the　particular　case　is　certain；　but　the　universality　of　the
rule　which　applies　to　this　particular　case　remains　a　problem。
Several　particular　cases；　the　certainty　of　which　is　beyond　doubt；
are　then　taken　and　examined；　for　the　purpose　of　discovering　whether
the　rule　is　applicable　to　them；　and　if　it　appears　that　all　the
particular　cases　which　can　be　collected　follow　from　the　rule；　its
universality　is　inferred；　and　at　the　same　time；　all　the　causes　which
have　not；　or　cannot　be　presented　to　our　observation；　are　concluded
to　be　of　the　same　character　with　those　which　we　have　observed。　This
I　shall　term　the　hypothetical　employment　of　the　reason。
　　The　hypothetical　exercise　of　reason　by　the　aid　of　ideas　employed
as　problematical　conceptions　is　properly　not　constitutive。　That　is
to　say；　if　we　consider　the　subject　strictly；　the　truth　of　the　rule；
which　has　been　employed　as　an　hypothesis；　does　not　follow　from　the　use
that　is　made　of　it　by　reason。　For　how　can　we　know　all　the　possible
cases　that　may　arise？　some　of　which　may；　however；　prove　exceptions
to　the　universality　of　the　rule。　This　employment　of　reason　is　merely
regulative；　and　its　sole　aim　is　the　introduction　of　unity　into　the
aggregate　of　our　particular　cognitions；　and　thereby　the
approximating　of　the　rule　to　universality。
　　The　object　of　the　hypothetical　employment　of　reason　is　therefore　the
systematic　unity　of　cognitions；　and　this　unity　is　the　criterion　of　the
truth　of　a　rule。　On　the　other　hand；　this　systematic　unity…　as　a　mere
idea…　is　in　fact　merely　a　unity　projected；　not　to　be　regarded　as
given；　but　only　in　the　light　of　a　problem…　a　problem　which　serves；
however；　as　a　principle　for　the　various　and　particular　exercise　of　the
understanding　in　experience；　directs　it　with　regard　to　those　cases
which　are　not　presented　to　our　observation；　and　introduces　harmony　and
consistency　into　all　its　operations。
　　All　that　we　can　be　certain　of　from　the　above　considerations　is
that　this　systematic　unity　is　a　logical　principle；　whose　aim　is　to
assist　the　understanding；　where　it　cannot　of　itself　attain　to　rules；
by　means　of　ideas；　to　bring　all　these　various　rules　under　one
principle；　and　thus　to　ensure　the　most　plete　consistency　and
connection　that　can　be　attained。　But　the　assertion　that　objects　and
the　understanding　by　which　they　are　cognized　are　so　constituted　as
to　be　determined　to　systematic　unity；　that　this　may　be　postulated　a
priori；　without　any　reference　to　the　interest　of　reason；　and　that　we
are　justified　in　declaring　all　possible　cognitions…　empirical　and
others…　to　possess　systematic　unity；　and　to　be　subject　to　general
principles　from　which；　notwithstanding　their　various　character；　they
are　all　derivable　such　an　assertion　can　be　founded　only　upon　a
transcendental　principle　of　reason；　which　would　render　this　systematic
unity　not　subjectively　and　logically…　in　its　character　of　a　method；
but　objectively　necessary。
　　We　shall　illustrate　this　by　an　example。　The　conceptions　of　the
understanding　make　us　acquainted；　among　many　other　kinds　of　unity；
with　that　of　the　causality　of　a　substance；　which　is　termed　power。
The　different　phenomenal　manifestations　of　the　same　substance　appear
at　first　view　to　be　so　very　dissimilar　that　we　are　inclined　to
assume　the　existence　of　just　as　many　different　powers　as　there　are
different　effects…　as；　in　the　case　of　the　human　mind；　we　have　feeling；
consciousness；　imagination；　memory；　wit；　analysis；　pleasure；　desire
and　so　on。　Now　we　are　required　by　a　logical　maxim　to　reduce　these
differences　to　as　small　a　number　as　possible；　by　paring　them　and
discovering　the　hidden　identity　which　exists。　We　must　inquire；　for
example；　whether　or　not　imagination　（connected　with　consciousness）；
memory；　wit；　and　analysis　are　not　merely　different　forms　of
understanding　and　reason。　The　idea　of　a　fundamental　power；　the
existence　of　which　no　effort　of　logic　can　assure　us　of；　is　the　problem
to　be　solved；　for　the　systematic　representation　of　the　existing
variety　of　powers。　The　logical　principle　of　reason　requires　us　to
produce　as　great　a　unity　as　is　possible　in　the　system　of　our
cognitions；　and　the　more　the　phenomena　of　this　and　the　other　power　are
found　to　be　identical；　the　more　probable　does　it　bee；　that　they　are
nothing　but　different　manifestations　of　one　and　the　same　power；
which　may　be　called；　relatively　speaking；　a　fundamental　power。　And
so　with　other　cases。
　　These　relatively　fundamental　powers　must　again　be　pared　with　each
other；　to　discover；　if　possible；　the　one　radical　and　absolutely
fundamental　power　of　which　they　are　but　the　manifestations。　But　this
unity　is　purely　hypothetical。　It　is　not　maintained；　that　this　unity
does　really　exist；　but　that　we　must；　in　the　interest　of　reason；　that
is；　for　the　establishment　of　principles　for　the　various　rules
presented　by　experience；　try　to　discover　and　introduce　it；　so　far　as
is　practicable；　into　the　sphere　of　our　cognitions。
　　But　the　transcendental　employment　of　the　understanding　would　lead　us
to　believe　that　this　idea　of　a　fundamental　power　is　not　problematical；
but　that　it　possesses　objective　reality；　and　thus　the　systematic　unity
of　the　various　powers　or　forces　in　a　substance　is　demanded　by　the
understanding　and　erected　into　an　apodeictic　or　necessary　principle。
For；　without　having　attempted　to　discover　the　unity　of　the　various
powers　existing　in　nature；　nay；　even　after　all　our　attempts　have
failed；　we　notwithstanding　presuppose　that　it　does　exist；　and　may
be；　sooner　or　later；　discovered。　And　this　reason　does；　not　only；　as　in
the　case　above　adduced；　with　regard　to　the　unity　of　substance；　but
where　many　substances；　although　all　to　a　certain　extent　homogeneous；
are　discoverable；　as　in　the　case　of　matter　in　general。　Here　also
does　reason　presuppose　the　existence　of　the　systematic　unity　of
various　powers…　inasmuch　as　particular　laws　of　nature　are
subordinate　to　general　laws；　and　parsimony　in　principles　is　not　merely
an　economical　principle　of　reason；　but　an　essential　law　of　nature。
　　We　cannot　understand；　in　fact；　how　a　logical　principle　of　unity
can　of　right　exist；　unless　we　presuppose　a　transcendental　principle；
by　which　such　a　systematic　unit…　as　a　property　of　objects
themselves…　is　regarded　as　necessary　a　priori。　For　with　what　right　can
reason；　in　its　logical　exercise；　require　us　to　regard　the　variety　of
forces　which　nature　displays；　as　in　effect　a　disguised　unity；　and　to
deduce　them　from　one　fundamental　force　or　power；　when　she　is　free　to
admit　that　it　is　just　as　possible　that　all　forces　should　be
different　in　kind；　and　that　a　systematic　unity　is　not　conformable　to
the　design　of　nature？　In　this　view　of　the　case；　reason　would　be
proceeding　in　direct　opposition　to　her　own　destination；　by　setting
as　an　aim　an　idea　which　entirely　conflicts　with　the　procedure　and
arrangement　of　nature。　Neither　can　we　assert　that　reason　has
previously　inferred　this　unity　from　the　contingent　nature　of
phenomena。　For　the　law　of　reason　which　requires　us　to　seek　for　this
unity　is　a　necessary　law；　inasmuch　as　without　it　we　should　not　possess
a　faculty　of　reason；　nor　without　reason　a　consistent　and
self…accordant　mode　of　employing　the　understanding；　nor；　in　the
absence　of　this；　any　proper　and　sufficient　criterion　of　empirical
truth。　In　relation　to　this　criterion；　therefore；　we　must　suppose　the
idea　of　the　systematic　unity　of　nature　to　possess　objective　validity
and　necessity。
　　We　find　this　transcendental　presupposition　lurking　in　different
forms　in　the　principles　of　philosophers；　although　they　have　neither
recognized　it　nor　confessed　to　themselves　its　presence。　That　the
diversities　of　individual　things　do　not　exclude　identity　of　species；
that　the　various　species　must　be　considered　as　merely　different
determinations　of　a　few　genera；　and　these　again　as　divisions　of
still　higher　races；　and　so　on…　that；　accordingly；　a　certain　systematic
unity　of　all　possible　empirical　conceptions；　in　so　far　as　they　can
be　deduced　from　higher　and　more　general　conceptions；　must　be　sought
for；　is　a　scholastic　maxim　or　logical　princip