the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第114章

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that　which　was　cogitated；　but　something　different；　exists。　Now；　if　I
cogitate　a　being　as　the　highest　reality；　without　defect　or
imperfection；　the　question　still　remains…　whether　this　being　exists　or
not？　For；　although　no　element　is　wanting　in　the　possible　real
content　of　my　conception；　there　is　a　defect　in　its　relation　to　my
mental　state；　that　is；　I　am　ignorant　whether　the　cognition　of　the
object　indicated　by　the　conception　is　possible　a　posteriori。　And
here　the　cause　of　the　present　difficulty　bees　apparent。　If　the
question　regarded　an　object　of　sense　merely；　it　would　be　impossible
for　me　to　confound　the　conception　with　the　existence　of　a　thing。　For
the　conception　merely　enables　me　to　cogitate　an　object　as　according
with　the　general　conditions　of　experience；　while　the　existence　of
the　object　permits　me　to　cogitate　it　as　contained　in　the　sphere　of
actual　experience。　At　the　same　time；　this　connection　with　the　world　of
experience　does　not　in　the　least　augment　the　conception；　although　a
possible　perception　has　been　added　to　the　experience　of　the　mind。
But　if　we　cogitate　existence　by　the　pure　category　alone；　it　is　not
to　be　wondered　at；　that　we　should　find　ourselves　unable　to　present　any
criterion　sufficient　to　distinguish　it　from　mere　possibility。
　　Whatever　be　the　content　of　our　conception　of　an　object；　it　is
necessary　to　go　beyond　it；　if　we　wish　to　predicate　existence　of　the
object。　In　the　case　of　sensuous　objects；　this　is　attained　by　their
connection　according　to　empirical　laws　with　some　one　of　my
perceptions；　but　there　is　no　means　of　cognizing　the　existence　of
objects　of　pure　thought；　because　it　must　be　cognized　pletely　a
priori。　But　all　our　knowledge　of　existence　（be　it　immediately　by
perception；　or　by　inferences　connecting　some　object　with　a　perception）
belongs　entirely　to　the　sphere　of　experience…　which　is　in　perfect
unity　with　itself；　and　although　an　existence　out　of　this　sphere　cannot
be　absolutely　declared　to　be　impossible；　it　is　a　hypothesis　the
truth　of　which　we　have　no　means　of　ascertaining。
　　The　notion　of　a　Supreme　Being　is　in　many　respects　a　highly　useful
idea；　but　for　the　very　reason　that　it　is　an　idea；　it　is　incapable　of
enlarging　our　cognition　with　regard　to　the　existence　of　things。　It
is　not　even　sufficient　to　instruct　us　as　to　the　possibility　of　a　being
which　we　do　not　know　to　exist。　The　analytical　criterion　of
possibility；　which　consists　in　the　absence　of　contradiction　in
propositions；　cannot　be　denied　it。　But　the　connection　of　real
properties　in　a　thing　is　a　synthesis　of　the　possibility　of　which　an
a　priori　judgement　cannot　be　formed；　because　these　realities　are　not
presented　to　us　specifically；　and　even　if　this　were　to　happen；　a
judgement　would　still　be　impossible；　because　the　criterion　of　the
possibility　of　synthetical　cognitions　must　be　sought　for　in　the
world　of　experience；　to　which　the　object　of　an　idea　cannot　belong。　And
thus　the　celebrated　Leibnitz　has　utterly　failed　in　his　attempt　to
establish　upon　a　priori　grounds　the　possibility　of　this　sublime
ideal　being。
　　The　celebrated　ontological　or　Cartesian　argument　for　the　existence
of　a　Supreme　Being　is　therefore　insufficient；　and　we　may　as　well
hope　to　increase　our　stock　of　knowledge　by　the　aid　of　mere　ideas；　as
the　merchant　to　augment　his　wealth　by　the　addition　of　noughts　to　his
cash　account。

　　　　　SECTION　V。　Of　the　Impossibility　of　a　Cosmological　Proof
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　the　Existence　of　God。

　　It　was　by　no　means　a　natural　course　of　proceeding；　but；　on　the
contrary；　an　invention　entirely　due　to　the　subtlety　of　the　schools；　to
attempt　to　draw　from　a　mere　idea　a　proof　of　the　existence　of　an　object
corresponding　to　it。　Such　a　course　would　never　have　been　pursued；　were
it　not　for　that　need　of　reason　which　requires　it　to　suppose　the
existence　of　a　necessary　being　as　a　basis　for　the　empirical　regress；
and　that；　as　this　necessity　must　be　unconditioned　and　a　priori；　reason
is　bound　to　discover　a　conception　which　shall　satisfy；　if　possible；
this　requirement；　and　enable　us　to　attain　to　the　a　priori　cognition　of
such　a　being。　This　conception　was　thought　to　be　found　in　the　idea　of
an　ens　realissimum；　and　thus　this　idea　was　employed　for　the　attainment
of　a　better　defined　knowledge　of　a　necessary　being；　of　the　existence
of　which　we　were　convinced；　or　persuaded；　on　other　grounds。　Thus
reason　was　seduced　from　her　natural　courage；　and；　instead　of
concluding　with　the　conception　of　an　ens　realissimum；　an　attempt　was
made　to　begin　with　it；　for　the　purpose　of　inferring　from　it　that
idea　of　a　necessary　existence　which　it　was　in　fact　called　in　to
plete。　Thus　arose　that　unfortunate　ontological　argument；　which
neither　satisfies　the　healthy　mon　sense　of　humanity；　nor　sustains
the　scientific　examination　of　the　philosopher。
　　The　cosmological　proof；　which　we　are　about　to　examine；　retains　the
connection　between　absolute　necessity　and　the　highest　reality；　but；
instead　of　reasoning　from　this　highest　reality　to　a　necessary
existence；　like　the　preceding　argument；　it　concludes　from　the　given。
unconditioned　necessity　of　some　being　its　unlimited　reality。　The　track
it　pursues；　whether　rational　or　sophistical；　is　at　least　natural；
and　not　only　goes　far　to　persuade　the　mon　understanding；　but
shows　itself　deserving　of　respect　from　the　speculative　intellect；
while　it　contains；　at　the　same　time；　the　outlines　of　all　the　arguments
employed　in　natural　theology…　arguments　which　always　have　been；　and
still　will　be；　in　use　and　authority。　These；　however　adorned；　and　hid
under　whatever　embellishments　of　rhetoric　and　sentiment；　are　at　bottom
identical　with　the　arguments　we　are　at　present　to　discuss。　This　proof；
termed　by　Leibnitz　the　argumentum　a　contingentia　mundi；　I　shall　now
lay　before　the　reader；　and　subject　to　a　strict　examination。
　　It　is　framed　in　the　following　manner：　If　something　exists；　an
absolutely　necessary　being　must　likewise　exist。　Now　I；　at　least；
exist。　Consequently；　there　exists　an　absolutely　necessary　being。　The
minor　contains　an　experience；　the　major　reasons　from　a　general
experience　to　the　existence　of　a　necessary　being。*　Thus　this
argument　really　begins　at　experience；　and　is　not　pletely　a
priori；　or　ontological。　The　object　of　all　possible　experience　being
the　world；　it　is　called　the　cosmological　proof。　It　contains　no
reference　to　any　peculiar　property　of　sensuous　objects；　by　which
this　world　of　sense　might　be　distinguished　from　other　possible　worlds；
and　in　this　respect　it　differs　from　the　physico…theological　proof；
which　is　based　upon　the　consideration　of　the　peculiar　constitution
of　our　sensuous　world。

　　*This　inference　is　too　well　known　to　require　more　detailed
discussion。　It　is　based　upon　the　spurious　transcendental　law　of
causality；　that　everything　which　is　contingent　has　a　cause；　which；
if　itself　contingent；　must　also　have　a　cause；　and　so　on；　till　the
series　of　subordinated　causes　must　end　with　an　absolutely　necessary
cause；　without　which　it　would　not　possess　pleteness。

　　The　proof　proceeds　thus：　A　necessary　being　can　be　determined　only　in
one　way；　that　is；　it　can　be　determined　by　only　one　of　all　possible
opposed　predicates；　consequently；　it　must　be　pletely　determined
in　and　by　its　conception。　But　there　is　only　a　single　conception　of　a
thing　possible；　which　pletely　determines　the　thing　a　priori：　that
is；　the　conception　of　the　ens　realissimum。　It　follows　that　the
conception　of　the　ens　realissimum　is　the　only　conception　by　and　in
which　we　can　cogitate　a　necessary　being。　Consequently；　a　Supreme　Being
necessarily　exists。
　　In　this　cosmological　argument　are　assembled　so　many　sophistical
propositions　that　speculative　reason　seems　to　have　exerted　in　it　all
her　dialectical　skill　to　produce　a　transcendental　illusion　of　the　most
extreme　character。　We　shall　postpone　an　investigation　of　this　argument
for　the　present；　and　confine　ourselves　to　exposing　the　stratagem　by
which　it　imposes　upon　us　an　old　argument　in　a　new　dress；　and　appeals
to　the　agreement　of　two　witnesses；　the　one　with　the　credentials　of
pure　reason；　and　the　other　with　those　of　empiricism；　while；　in　fact；
it　is　only　the　former　who　has　changed　his　dress　and　voice；　for　the
purpose　of　passing　himself　o