the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第106章

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no　condition…　determining　man　and　his　volition　in　conformity　with　this
character…　which　does　not　itself　form　part　of　the　series　of　effects　in
nature；　and　is　subject　to　their　law…　the　law　according　to　which　an
empirically　undetermined　cause　of　an　event　in　time　cannot　exist。　For
this　reason　no　given　action　can　have　an　absolute　and　spontaneous
origination；　all　actions　being　phenomena；　and　belonging　to　the　world
of　experience。　But　it　cannot　be　said　of　reason；　that　the　state　in
which　it　determines　the　will　is　always　preceded　by　some　other　state
determining　it。　For　reason　is　not　a　phenomenon；　and　therefore　not
subject　to　sensuous　conditions；　and；　consequently；　even　in　relation　to
its　causality；　the　sequence　or　conditions　of　time　do　not　influence
reason；　nor　can　the　dynamical　law　of　nature；　which　determines　the
sequence　of　time　according　to　certain　rules；　be　applied　to　it。
　　Reason　is　consequently　the　permanent　condition　of　all　actions　of　the
human　will。　Each　of　these　is　determined　in　the　empirical　character
of　the　man；　even　before　it　has　taken　place。　The　intelligible
character；　of　which　the　former　is　but　the　sensuous　schema；　knows　no
before　or　after；　and　every　action；　irrespective　of　the　time…relation
in　which　it　stands　with　other　phenomena；　is　the　immediate　effect　of
the　intelligible　character　of　pure　reason；　which；　consequently；　enjoys
freedom　of　action；　and　is　not　dynamically　determined　either　by
internal　or　external　preceding　conditions。　This　freedom　must　not　be
described；　in　a　merely　negative　manner；　as　independence　of　empirical
conditions；　for　in　this　case　the　faculty　of　reason　would　cease　to　be　a
cause　of　phenomena；　but　it　must　be　regarded；　positively；　as　a
faculty　which　can　spontaneously　originate　a　series　of　events。　At　the
same　time；　it　must　not　be　supposed　that　any　beginning　can　take　place
in　reason；　on　the　contrary；　reason；　as　the　unconditioned　condition
of　all　action　of　the　will；　admits　of　no　time…conditions；　although
its　effect　does　really　begin　in　a　series　of　phenomena…　a　beginning
which　is　not；　however；　absolutely　primal。
　　I　shall　illustrate　this　regulative　principle　of　reason　by　an
example；　from　its　employment　in　the　world　of　experience；　proved　it
cannot　be　by　any　amount　of　experience；　or　by　any　number　of　facts；
for　such　arguments　cannot　establish　the　truth　of　transcendental
propositions。　Let　us　take　a　voluntary　action…　for　example；　a
falsehood…　by　means　of　which　a　man　has　introduced　a　certain　degree
of　confusion　into　the　social　life　of　humanity；　which　is　judged
according　to　the　motives　from　which　it　originated；　and　the　blame　of
which　and　of　the　evil　consequences　arising　from　it；　is　imputed　to
the　offender。　We　at　first　proceed　to　examine　the　empirical　character
of　the　offence；　and　for　this　purpose　we　endeavour　to　penetrate　to
the　sources　of　that　character；　such　as　a　defective　education；　bad
pany；　a　shameless　and　wicked　disposition；　frivolity；　and　want　of
reflection…　not　forgetting　also　the　occasioning　causes　which　prevailed
at　the　moment　of　the　transgression。　In　this　the　procedure　is　exactly
the　same　as　that　pursued　in　the　investigation　of　the　series　of
causes　which　determine　a　given　physical　effect。　Now；　although　we
believe　the　action　to　have　been　determined　by　all　these　circumstances；
we　do　not　the　less　blame　the　offender。　We　do　not　blame　him　for　his
unhappy　disposition；　nor　for　the　circumstances　which　influenced　him；
nay；　not　even　for　his　former　course　of　life；　for　we　presuppose　that
all　these　considerations　may　be　set　aside；　that　the　series　of
preceding　conditions　may　be　regarded　as　having　never　existed；　and　that
the　action　may　be　considered　as　pletely　unconditioned　in　relation
to　any　state　preceding；　just　as　if　the　agent　menced　with　it　an
entirely　new　series　of　effects。　Our　blame　of　the　offender　is
grounded　upon　a　law　of　reason；　which　requires　us　to　regard　this
faculty　as　a　cause；　which　could　have　and　ought　to　have　otherwise
determined　the　behaviour　of　the　culprit；　independently　of　all
empirical　conditions。　This　causality　of　reason　we　do　not　regard　as　a
co…operating　agency；　but　as　plete　in　itself。　It　matters　not　whether
the　sensuous　impulses　favoured　or　opposed　the　action　of　this
causality；　the　offence　is　estimated　according　to　its　intelligible
character…　the　offender　is　decidedly　worthy　of　blame；　the　moment　he
utters　a　falsehood。　It　follows　that　we　regard　reason；　in　spite　of
the　empirical　conditions　of　the　act；　as　pletely　free；　and
therefore；　therefore；　as　in　the　present　case；　culpable。
　　The　above　judgement　is　plete　evidence　that　we　are　accustomed　to
think　that　reason　is　not　affected　by　sensuous　conditions；　that　in　it
no　change　takes　place…　although　its　phenomena；　in　other　words；　the
mode　in　which　it　appears　in　its　effects；　are　subject　to　change…　that
in　it　no　preceding　state　determines　the　following；　and；
consequently；　that　it　does　not　form　a　member　of　the　series　of　sensuous
conditions　which　necessitate　phenomena　according　to　natural　laws。
Reason　is　present　and　the　same　in　all　human　actions　and　at　all
times；　but　it　does　not　itself　exist　in　time；　and　therefore　does　not
enter　upon　any　state　in　which　it　did　not　formerly　exist。　It　is；
relatively　to　new　states　or　conditions；　determining；　but　not
determinable。　Hence　we　cannot　ask：　〃Why　did　not　reason　determine
itself　in　a　different　manner？〃　The　question　ought　to　be　thus　stated：
〃Why　did　not　reason　employ　its　power　of　causality　to　determine　certain
phenomena　in　a　different　manner？〃　〃But　this　is　a　question　which　admits
of　no　answer。　For　a　different　intelligible　character　would　have
exhibited　a　different　empirical　character；　and；　when　we　say　that；　in
spite　of　the　course　which　his　whole　former　life　has　taken；　the
offender　could　have　refrained　from　uttering　the　falsehood；　this
means　merely　that　the　act　was　subject　to　the　power　and　authority…
permissive　or　prohibitive…　of　reason。　Now；　reason　is　not　subject　in
its　causality　to　any　conditions　of　phenomena　or　of　time；　and　a
difference　in　time　may　produce　a　difference　in　the　relation　of
phenomena　to　each　other…　for　these　are　not　things　and　therefore　not
causes　in　themselves…　but　it　cannot　produce　any　difference　in　the
relation　in　which　the　action　stands　to　the　faculty　of　reason。
　　Thus；　then；　in　our　investigation　into　free　actions　and　the　causal
power　which　produced　them；　we　arrive　at　an　intelligible　cause；
beyond　which；　however；　we　cannot　go；　although　we　can　recognize　that　it
is　free；　that　is；　independent　of　all　sensuous　conditions；　and　that；　in
this　way；　it　may　be　the　sensuously　unconditioned　condition　of
phenomena。　But　for　what　reason　the　intelligible　character　generates
such　and　such　phenomena　and　exhibits　such　and　such　an　empirical
character　under　certain　circumstances；　it　is　beyond　the　power　of　our
reason　to　decide。　The　question　is　as　much　above　the　power　and　the
sphere　of　reason　as　the　following　would　be：　〃Why　does　the
transcendental　object　of　our　external　sensuous　intuition　allow　of　no
other　form　than　that　of　intuition　in　space？〃　But　the　problem；　which　we
were　called　upon　to　solve；　does　not　require　us　to　entertain　any　such
questions。　The　problem　was　merely　this…　whether　freedom　and　natural
necessity　can　exist　without　opposition　in　the　same　action。　To　this
question　we　have　given　a　sufficient　answer；　for　we　have　shown　that；　as
the　former　stands　in　a　relation　to　a　different　kind　of　condition
from　those　of　the　latter；　the　law　of　the　one　does　not　affect　the　law
of　the　other　and　that；　consequently；　both　can　exist　together　in
independence　of　and　without　interference　with　each　other。

　　The　reader　must　be　careful　to　remark　that　my　intention　in　the
above　remarks　has　not　been　to　prove　the　actual　existence　of　freedom；
as　a　faculty　in　which　resides　the　cause　of　certain　sensuous　phenomena。
For；　not　to　mention　that　such　an　argument　would　not　have　a
transcendental　character；　nor　have　been　limited　to　the　discussion　of
pure　conceptions…　all　attempts　at　inferring　from　experience　what
cannot　be　cogitated　in　accordance　with　its　laws；　must　ever　be
unsuccessful。　Nay；　more；　I　have　not　even　aimed　at　demonstrating　the
possibility　of　freedom；　for　this　too　would　have　been　a　vain　endeavour；
inasmuch　as　it　is　beyond　the　power　of　t