the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第104章

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we　possess　only　a　general　conception　of　this　character）；　the　subject
must　be　regarded　as　free　from　all　sensuous　influences；　and　from　all
phenomenal　determination。　Moreover；　as　nothing　happens　in　this
subject…　for　it　is　a　noumenon；　and　there　does　not　consequently　exist
in　it　any　change；　demanding　the　dynamical　determination　of　time；　and
for　the　same　reason　no　connection　with　phenomena　as　causes…　this
active　existence　must　in　its　actions　be　free　from　and　independent　of
natural　necessity；　for　or　necessity　exists　only　in　the　world　of
phenomena。　It　would　be　quite　correct　to　say　that　it　originates　or
begins　its　effects　in　the　world　of　sense　from　itself；　although　the
action　productive　of　these　effects　does　not　begin　in　itself。　We　should
not　be　in　this　case　affirming　that　these　sensuous　effects　began　to
exist　of　themselves；　because　they　are　always　determined　by　prior
empirical　conditions…　by　virtue　of　the　empirical　character；　which　is
the　phenomenon　of　the　intelligible　character…　and　are　possible　only　as
constituting　a　continuation　of　the　series　of　natural　causes。　And
thus　nature　and　freedom；　each　in　the　plete　and　absolute
signification　of　these　terms；　can　exist；　without　contradiction　or
disagreement；　in　the　same　action　to

　　　　Exposition　of　the　Cosmological　Idea　of　Freedom　in　Harmony
　　　　　　　　with　the　Universal　Law　of　Natural　Necessity。

　　I　have　thought　it　advisable　to　lay　before　the　reader　at　first　merely
a　sketch　of　the　solution　of　this　transcendental　problem；　in　order　to
enable　him　to　form　with　greater　ease　a　clear　conception　of　the
course　which　reason　must　adopt　in　the　solution。　I　shall　now　proceed　to
exhibit　the　several　momenta　of　this　solution；　and　to　consider　them
in　their　order。
　　The　natural　law　that　everything　which　happens　must　have　a　cause；
that　the　causality　of　this　cause；　that　is；　the　action　of　the　cause
（which　cannot　always　have　existed；　but　must　be　itself　an　event；　for　it
precedes　in　time　some　effect　which　it　has　originated）；　must　have
itself　a　phenomenal　cause；　by　which　it　is　determined　and；　and；
consequently；　all　events　are　empirically　determined　in　an　order　of
nature…　this　law；　I　say；　which　lies　at　the　foundation　of　the
possibility　of　experience；　and　of　a　connected　system　of　phenomena　or
nature　is　a　law　of　the　understanding；　from　which　no　departure；　and
to　which　no　exception；　can　be　admitted。　For　to　except　even　a　single
phenomenon　from　its　operation　is　to　exclude　it　from　the　sphere　of
possible　experience　and　thus　to　admit　it　to　be　a　mere　fiction　of
thought　or　phantom　of　the　brain。
　　Thus　we　are　obliged　to　acknowledge　the　existence　of　a　chain　of
causes；　in　which；　however；　absolute　totality　cannot　be　found。　But　we
need　not　detain　ourselves　with　this　question；　for　it　has　already
been　sufficiently　answered　in　our　discussion　of　the　antinomies　into
which　reason　falls；　when　it　attempts　to　reach　the　unconditioned　in　the
series　of　phenomena。　If　we　permit　ourselves　to　be　deceived　by　the
illusion　of　transcendental　idealism；　we　shall　find　that　neither　nature
nor　freedom　exists。　Now　the　question　is：　〃Whether；　admitting　the
existence　of　natural　necessity　in　the　world　of　phenomena；　it　is
possible　to　consider　an　effect　as　at　the　same　time　an　effect　of　nature
and　an　effect　of　freedom…　or；　whether　these　two　modes　of　causality　are
contradictory　and　inpatible？〃
　　No　phenomenal　cause　can　absolutely　and　of　itself　begin　a　series。
Every　action；　in　so　far　as　it　is　productive　of　an　event；　is　itself
an　event　or　occurrence；　and　presupposes　another　preceding　state；　in
which　its　cause　existed。　Thus　everything　that　happens　is　but　a
continuation　of　a　series；　and　an　absolute　beginning　is　impossible　in
the　sensuous　world。　The　actions　of　natural　causes　are；　accordingly；
themselves　effects；　and　presuppose　causes　preceding　them　in　time。　A
primal　action　which　forms　an　absolute　beginning；　is　beyond　the
causal　power　of　phenomena。
　　Now；　is　it　absolutely　necessary　that；　granting　that　all　effects
are　phenomena；　the　causality　of　the　cause　of　these　effects　must　also
be　a　phenomenon　and　belong　to　the　empirical　world？　Is　it　not　rather
possible　that；　although　every　effect　in　the　phenomenal　world　must　be
connected　with　an　empirical　cause；　according　to　the　universal　law　of
nature；　this　empirical　causality　may　be　itself　the　effect　of　a
non…empirical　and　intelligible　causality…　its　connection　with
natural　causes　remaining　nevertheless　intact？　Such　a　causality　would
be　considered；　in　reference　to　phenomena；　as　the　primal　action　of　a
cause；　which　is　in　so　far；　therefore；　not　phenomenal；　but；　by　reason
of　this　faculty　or　power；　intelligible；　although　it　must；　at　the
same　time；　as　a　link　in　the　chain　of　nature；　be　regarded　as
belonging　to　the　sensuous　world。
　　A　belief　in　the　reciprocal　causality　of　phenomena　is　necessary；　if
we　are　required　to　look　for　and　to　present　the　natural　conditions　of
natural　events；　that　is　to　say；　their　causes。　This　being　admitted　as
unexceptionably　valid；　the　requirements　of　the　understanding；　which
recognizes　nothing　but　nature　in　the　region　of　phenomena；　are
satisfied；　and　our　physical　explanations　of　physical　phenomena　may
proceed　in　their　regular　course；　without　hindrance　and　without
opposition。　But　it　is　no　stumbling…block　in　the　way；　even　assuming　the
idea　to　be　a　pure　fiction；　to　admit　that　there　are　some　natural　causes
in　the　possession　of　a　faculty　which　is　not　empirical；　but
intelligible；　inasmuch　as　it　is　not　determined　to　action　by
empirical　conditions；　but　purely　and　solely　upon　grounds　brought
forward　by　the　understanding…　this　action　being　still；　when　the
cause　is　phenomenized；　in　perfect　accordance　with　the　laws　of
empirical　causality。　Thus　the　acting　subject；　as　a　causal
phenomenon；　would　continue　to　preserve　a　plete　connection　with
nature　and　natural　conditions；　and　the　phenomenon　only　of　the
subject　（with　all　its　phenomenal　causality）　would　contain　certain
conditions；　which；　if　we　ascend　from　the　empirical　to　the
transcendental　object；　must　necessarily　be　regarded　as　intelligible。
For；　if　we　attend；　in　our　inquiries　with　regard　to　causes　in　the　world
of　phenomena；　to　the　directions　of　nature　alone；　we　need　not　trouble
ourselves　about　the　relation　in　which　the　transcendental　subject；
which　is　pletely　unknown　to　us；　stands　to　these　phenomena　and　their
connection　in　nature。　The　intelligible　ground　of　phenomena　in　this
subject　does　not　concern　empirical　questions。　It　has　to　do　only　with
pure　thought；　and；　although　the　effects　of　this　thought　and　action
of　the　pure　understanding　are　discoverable　in　phenomena；　these
phenomena　must　nevertheless　be　capable　of　a　full　and　plete
explanation；　upon　purely　physical　grounds　and　in　accordance　with
natural　laws。　And　in　this　case　we　attend　solely　to　their　empirical　and
omit　all　consideration　of　their　intelligible　character　（which　is　the
transcendental　cause　of　the　former）　as　pletely　unknown；　except　in
so　far　as　it　is　exhibited　by　the　latter　as　its　empirical　symbol。　Now
let　us　apply　this　to　experience。　Man　is　a　phenomenon　of　the　sensuous
world　and；　at　the　same　time；　therefore；　a　natural　cause；　the　causality
of　which　must　be　regulated　by　empirical　laws。　As　such；　he　must　possess
an　empirical　character；　like　all　other　natural　phenomena。　We　remark
this　empirical　character　in　his　actions；　which　reveal　the　presence
of　certain　powers　and　faculties。　If　we　consider　inanimate　or　merely
animal　nature；　we　can　discover　no　reason　for　ascribing　to　ourselves
any　other　than　a　faculty　which　is　determined　in　a　purely　sensuous
manner。　But　man；　to　whom　nature　reveals　herself　only　through　sense；
cognizes　himself　not　only　by　his　senses；　but　also　through　pure
apperception；　and　this　in　actions　and　internal　determinations；　which
he　cannot　regard　as　sensuous　impressions。　He　is　thus　to　himself；　on
the　one　hand；　a　phenomenon；　but　on　the　other　hand；　in　respect　of
certain　faculties；　a　purely　intelligible　object…　intelligible；　because
its　action　cannot　be　ascribed　to　sensuous　receptivity。　These　faculties
are　understanding　and　reason。　The　latter；　especially；　is　in　a　peculiar
manner　distinct　from　all　empirically…conditioned　faculties；　for　it
employs　ideas　alone　in　the　consideration　of　its　objects；　and　by
m