the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第103章

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independently　of　and　even　in　opposition　to　the　power　of　natural
causes；　and　capable；　consequently；　of　spontaneously　originating　a
series　of　events。
　　Here；　too；　we　find　it　to　be　the　case；　as　we　generally　found　in　the
self…contradictions　and　perplexities　of　a　reason　which　strives　to　pass
the　bounds　of　possible　experience；　that　the　problem　is　properly　not
physiological；　but　transcendental。　The　question　of　the　possibility
of　freedom　does　indeed　concern　psychology；　but；　as　it　rests　upon
dialectical　arguments　of　pure　reason；　its　solution　must　engage　the
attention　of　transcendental　philosophy。　Before　attempting　this
solution；　a　task　which　transcendental　philosophy　cannot　decline；　it
will　be　advisable　to　make　a　remark　with　regard　to　its　procedure　in　the
settlement　of　the　question。
　　If　phenomena　were　things　in　themselves；　and　time　and　space　forms
of　the　existence　of　things；　condition　and　conditioned　would　always
be　members　of　the　same　series；　and　thus　would　arise　in　the　present
case　the　antinomy　mon　to　all　transcendental　ideas…　that　their
series　is　either　too　great　or　too　small　for　the　understanding。　The
dynamical　ideas；　which　we　are　about　to　discuss　in　this　and　the
following　section；　possess　the　peculiarity　of　relating　to　an　object；
not　considered　as　a　quantity；　but　as　an　existence；　and　thus；　in　the
discussion　of　the　present　question；　we　may　make　abstraction　of　the
quantity　of　the　series　of　conditions；　and　consider　merely　the
dynamical　relation　of　the　condition　to　the　conditioned。　The
question；　then；　suggests　itself；　whether　freedom　is　possible；　and；
if　it　is；　whether　it　can　consist　with　the　universality　of　the
natural　law　of　causality；　and；　consequently；　whether　we　enounce　a
proper　disjunctive　proposition　when　we　say：　〃Every　effect　must　have
its　origin　either　in　nature　or　in　freedom；〃　or　whether　both　cannot
exist　together　in　the　same　event　in　different　relations。　The　principle
of　an　unbroken　connection　between　all　events　in　the　phenomenal
world；　in　accordance　with　the　unchangeable　laws　of　nature；　is　a
well…established　principle　of　transcendental　analytic　which　admits
of　no　exception。　The　question；　therefore；　is：　〃Whether　an　effect；
determined　according　to　the　laws　of　nature；　can　at　the　same　time　be
produced　by　a　free　agent；　or　whether　freedom　and　nature　mutually
exclude　each　other？〃　And　here；　the　mon　but　fallacious　hypothesis　of
the　absolute　reality　of　phenomena　manifests　its　injurious　influence　in
embarrassing　the　procedure　of　reason。　For　if　phenomena　are　things　in
themselves；　freedom　is　impossible。　In　this　case；　nature　is　the
plete　and　all…sufficient　cause　of　every　event；　and　condition　and
conditioned；　cause　and　effect　are　contained　in　the　same　series；　and
necessitated　by　the　same　law。　If；　on　the　contrary；　phenomena　are
held　to　be；　as　they　are　in　fact；　nothing　more　than　mere
representations；　connected　with　each　other　in　accordance　with
empirical　laws；　they　must　have　a　ground　which　is　not　phenomenal。　But
the　causality　of　such　an　intelligible　cause　is　not　determined　or
determinable　by　phenomena；　although　its　effects；　as　phenomena；　must　be
determined　by　other　phenomenal　existences。　This　cause　and　its
causality　exist　therefore　out　of　and　apart　from　the　series　of
phenomena；　while　its　effects　do　exist　and　are　discoverable　in　the
series　of　empirical　conditions。　Such　an　effect　may　therefore　be
considered　to　be　free　in　relation　to　its　intelligible　cause；　and
necessary　in　relation　to　the　phenomena　from　which　it　is　a　necessary
consequence…　a　distinction　which；　stated　in　this　perfectly　general　and
abstract　manner；　must　appear　in　the　highest　degree　subtle　and　obscure。
The　sequel　will　explain。　It　is　sufficient；　at　present；　to　remark　that；
as　the　plete　and　unbroken　connection　of　phenomena　is　an　unalterable
law　of　nature；　freedom　is　impossible…　on　the　supposition　that
phenomena　are　absolutely　real。　Hence　those　philosophers　who　adhere
to　the　mon　opinion　on　this　subject　can　never　succeed　in　reconciling
the　ideas　of　nature　and　freedom。

　　　　　Possibility　of　Freedom　in　Harmony　with　the　Universal　Law
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　Natural　Necessity。

　　That　element　in　a　sensuous　object　which　is　not　itself　sensuous；　I
may　be　allowed　to　term　intelligible。　If；　accordingly；　an　object
which　must　be　regarded　as　a　sensuous　phenomenon　possesses　a　faculty
which　is　not　an　object　of　sensuous　intuition；　but　by　means　of　which　it
is　capable　of　being　the　cause　of　phenomena；　the　causality　of　an　object
or　existence　of　this　kind　may　be　regarded　from　two　different　points　of
view。　It　may　be　considered　to　be　intelligible；　as　regards　its
action…　the　action　of　a　thing　which　is　a　thing　in　itself；　and
sensuous；　as　regards　its　effects…　the　effects　of　a　phenomenon
belonging　to　the　sensuous　world。　We　should　accordingly；　have　to　form
both　an　empirical　and　an　intellectual　conception　of　the　causality　of
such　a　faculty　or　power…　both；　however；　having　reference　to　the　same
effect。　This　twofold　manner　of　cogitating　a　power　residing　in　a
sensuous　object　does　not　run　counter　to　any　of　the　conceptions　which
we　ought　to　form　of　the　world　of　phenomena　or　of　a　possible
experience。　Phenomena…　not　being　things　in　themselves…　must　have　a
transcendental　object　as　a　foundation；　which　determines　them　as　mere
representations；　and　there　seems　to　be　no　reason　why　we　should　not
ascribe　to　this　transcendental　object；　in　addition　to　the　property
of　self…phenomenization；　a　causality　whose　effects　are　to　be　met
with　in　the　world　of　phenomena；　although　it　is　not　itself　a
phenomenon。　But　every　effective　cause　must　possess　a　character；　that
is　to　say；　a　law　of　its　causality；　without　which　it　would　cease　to
be　a　cause。　In　the　above　case；　then；　every　sensuous　object　would
possess　an　empirical　character；　which　guaranteed　that　its　actions；
as　phenomena；　stand　in　plete　and　harmonious　connection；　conformably
to　unvarying　natural　laws；　with　all　other　phenomena；　and　can　be
deduced　from　these；　as　conditions；　and　that　they　do　thus；　in
connection　with　these；　constitute　a　series　in　the　order　of　nature。
This　sensuous　object　must；　in　the　second　place；　possess　an
intelligible　character；　which　guarantees　it　to　be　the　cause　of　those
actions；　as　phenomena；　although　it　is　not　itself　a　phenomenon　nor
subordinate　to　the　conditions　of　the　world　of　sense。　The　former　may　be
termed　the　character　of　the　thing　as　a　phenomenon；　the　latter　the
character　of　the　thing　as　a　thing　in　itself。
　　Now　this　active　subject　would；　in　its　character　of　intelligible
subject；　be　subordinate　to　no　conditions　of　time；　for　time　is　only　a
condition　of　phenomena；　and　not　of　things　in　themselves。　No　action
would　begin　or　cease　to　be　in　this　subject；　it　would　consequently　be
free　from　the　law　of　all　determination　of　time…　the　law　of　change；
namely；　that　everything　which　happens　must　have　a　cause　in　the
phenomena　of　a　preceding　state。　In　one　word；　the　causality　of　the
subject；　in　so　far　as　it　is　intelligible；　would　not　form　part　of　the
series　of　empirical　conditions　which　determine　and　necessitate　an
event　in　the　world　of　sense。　Again；　this　intelligible　character　of　a
thing　cannot　be　immediately　cognized；　because　we　can　perceive
nothing　but　phenomena；　but　it　must　be　capable　of　being　cogitated　in
harmony　with　the　empirical　character；　for　we　always　find　ourselves
pelled　to　place；　in　thought；　a　transcendental　object　at　the　basis
of　phenomena　although　we　can　never　know　what　this　object　is　in　itself。
　　In　virtue　of　its　empirical　character；　this　subject　would　at　the　same
time　be　subordinate　to　all　the　empirical　laws　of　causality；　and；　as
a　phenomenon　and　member　of　the　sensuous　world；　its　effects　would
have　to　be　accounted　for　by　a　reference　to　preceding　phenomena。
Eternal　phenomena　must　be　capable　of　influencing　it；　and　its
actions；　in　accordance　with　natural　laws；　must　explain　to　us　how　its
empirical　character；　that　is；　the　law　of　its　causality；　is　to　be
cognized　in　and　by　means　of　experience。　In　a　word；　all　requisites
for　a　plete　and　necessary　determination　of　these　actions　must　be
presented　to　us　by　experience。
　　In　virtue　of　its　intelligible　character；　on　the　other　hand　（although
we　possess　only　a　general　conception　of　this　character）；　the　subject
m